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Abstract
Stable Marriage is a fundamental problem to both computer science and economics.
Four well-known NP-hard optimization versions of this problem are the Sex-Equal Stable
Marriage (SESM), Balanced Stable Marriage (BSM), max-Stable Marriage
with Ties (max-SMT) and min-Stable Marriage with Ties (min-SMT) problems.
In this paper, we analyze these problems from the viewpoint of Parameterized Complexity.
We conduct the first study of these problems with respect to the parameter treewidth. First,
we study the treewidth tw of the primal graph. We establish that all four problems are W[1]-
hard. In particular, while it is easy to show that all four problems admit algorithms that
run in time nO(tw), we prove that all of these algorithms are likely to be essentially optimal.
Next, we study the treewidth tw of the rotation digraph. In this context, the max-SMT and
min-SMT are not defined. For both SESM and BSM, we design (non-trivial) algorithms
that run in time 2twnO(1). Then, for both SESM and BSM, we also prove that unless SETH
is false, algorithms that run in time (2− )twnO(1) do not exist for any fixed  > 0. We thus
present a comprehensive, complete picture of the behavior of central optimization versions
of Stable Marriage with respect to treewidth.
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1 Introduction
Matching under preferences is a rich topic central to both economics and computer science,
which has been consistently and intensively studied for over several decades. One of the main
reasons for interest in this topic stems from the observation that it is extremely relevant to
a wide variety of practical applications modeling situations where the objective is to match
agents to other agents (or to resources). In the most general setting, a matching is defined
as an allocation (or assignment) of agents to resources that satisfies some predefined criterion
of compatibility/acceptability. Here, the (arguably) best known model is the two-sided model,
where the agents on one side are referred to as men, and the agents on the other side are referred
to as women. A few illustrative examples of real life situations where this model is employed in
practice include matching hospitals to residents, students to colleges, kidney patients to donors
and users to servers in a distributed Internet service. At the heart of all of these applications
lies the fundamental Stable Marriage (SM) problem. In particular, the Nobel Prize in
Economics was awarded to Shapley and Roth in 2012 “for the theory of stable allocations and
the practice of market design.” Moreover, several books have been dedicated to the study of
SM as well as optimization versions of this classical problem [17, 31, 33].
In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive study of four well-known NP-hard optimization
versions of SM, namely the Sex-Equal SM (SESM), Balanced SM (BSM), max-SM with
Ties (max-SMT) and min-SM with Ties (min-SMT) problems, from the viewpoint of Pa-
rameterized Complexity. Readers unfamiliar with the definitions of these problems are referred
to Section 2. The sizes of the solutions to all of these problems can often be as large as the
instances themselves. Furthermore, as these problems are NP-hard when preference lists are
restricted to have a fixed constant length, the maximum length of a preference list is not a
sensible parameter (see Appendix A). Thus, we parameterize these problems by the treewidth
of the primal graph as well as the treewidth of the rotation digraph. Arguably, the parame-
ter treewidth is the most natural one. Moreover, parameterization by treewidth is a standard
practice in Parameterized Complexity. Indeed, from a practical point of view, networks often
tend to resembles trees, and from a theoretical point of view, treewidth is often a parameter
with respect to which it is possible to derive “fast” parameterized algorithms. Accordingly,
books on Parameterized Complexity devote several complete chapters solely to the study of
treewidth (see [5, 8, 40, 11]). Nevertheless, our work is the first to study the parameterized
complexity of optimization versions of SM with respect to treewidth, although SM is a basic
problem to both economics and computer science. In this sense, our work fills a fundamental
knowledge gap. We obtain tight upper and (conditional) lower bounds for the running times of
algorithms for all of the problems that we study. Moreover, each set of results (W[1]-hardness,
XP-algorithms, FPT-algorithms and tight conditional lower bounds under SETH) is derived in
a novel systematic way that may apply not only to other optimization versions of SM, but also
to other parameterization of the problems studied in the paper.
1.1 Related Work
For a broad discussion of optimization variants of SM, the reader is referred to the books
[17, 31, 33] or surveys such as [27]. Here, we only briefly overview some relevant literature.
Sex-Equality. The egalitarian measure, which minimizes the sum of the amount of dissatisfaction
of men and that amount of dissatisfaction of women, is arguably the simplest notion of the
quality of a stable matching. A stable matching minimizing this measure is known as an
egalitarian stable matching, which is notably computable in polynomial time [25]. Gusfield and
Irving [17] noted that in the context of egalitarian stable matchings, it may be the case that
members of one sex are considerably better off than the members of the opposite sex. Knuth
discussed an example [31, pg 56] that had 10 stable matchings, each having an egalitarian
function value of 20. However, the sex-equality function value (see Section 2.2) ranged from -12
1
to +12, with the optimal being 0. This motivated the definition of a sex-equal stable matching
as a stable matching that minimizes the sex-equality function value. Gusfield and Irving [17]
then asked whether there is a polynomial-time algorithm for SESM. Kato [29] was the first to
show that SESM is NP-hard by showing a reduction from Partially Ordered Knapsack,
one of the classical problems listed by Garey and Johnson [14]. McDermid and Irving [37]
proved that given an instance of SM, where the length of each preference list is at most 3,
deciding whether or not there exists a stable matching whose sex-equal function value is 0, is
NP-complete. Contrastingly, if the length of each preference list is at most 2 on one side while
the length of each preference lists on the other side may be unbounded, then SESM is solvable
in time O(n3), where n denotes the number of men/women in the instance.
McDermid and Irving [37] also studied exact exponential-time algorithms for NP-hard special
cases of SESM. Specifically, if the preference lists on one side have length at most ` and there
is no upper bound on the length of the preference lists on the other side, then they showed that
given any  > 0, SESM can be solved in time (2αn + 2β) ·nO(1), where α = (5− 2√4)(`− 2 + )
and β = (`− 1)/2. For small enough values of , the time complexity is close to O(1.0726n) for
` = 3, O(1.1504n) for ` = 4 and O(1.2339n) for ` = 5. Curiously, Romero-Medina [42] gave an
exact algorithm for SESM where there are no restrictions on the preference lists and claimed
without proof that the algorithm runs in polynomial time. While Romero-Medina did not cite
Kato’s work [29], the claim is an obvious contradiction to Kato’s proof of NP-hardness (unless
NP=P). Also, the time complexity of Romero-Medina’s algorithm is likely to be worse than
McDermid and Irving’s when the length of the preference lists are bounded.
In the context of the approximability of SESM, for a given instance of SM, let µM and µW
denote the man-optimal and woman-optimal stable matchings (see Section 2.1), respectively.
We define Λ = max{|δ(µM )|, |δ(µW )|}, where δ(µ) denotes the sex-equal function value of the
matching µ. Iwama et al. [28] gave a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a near-optimal
solution to SESM. Formally, they showed that given some fixed  > 0, there is an O(n3+1/)
time algorithm that returns a stable matching µ such that −Λ ≤ δ(µ) ≤ Λ, or returns that no
such µ exists. Furthermore, they exhibited an instance with two near-optimal stable matchings
that have different egalitarian-cost measure. This prompted the authors to define the Minimum
Egalitarian Sex-Equal Stable Marriage problem. For this problem, shown to be NP-
hard, they gave a polynomial time algorithm whose approximation ratio is smaller than 2.
We note that SESM was also studied for genetic and ant colony-based algorithms [39, 43].
Quite recently, an empirical study on SESM was undertaken by Giannakopoulos et al. [16].
Balance. The BSM problem was introduced in the influential work of Feder [9] on stable
matchings. Intuitively, it is defined to be a stable matching in the instance that is desirable to
both the sexes (see Section 2.2), i.e. it simultaneously minimizes the dissatisfaction of both sexes.
It has been noted that it is not trivial to construct an instance of SM in which no balanced stable
matching is a sex-equal matching, and vice versa [33]. However, one such example (of infinitely
many instances), attributable to Eric McDermid, has been discussed by Manlove in [33, pg 109].
Feder [9] proved that this problem is NP-hard and that it admits a 2-approximation algorithm.
Later, it was shown that this problem also admits a (2 − 1/`)-approximation algorithm where
` is the maximum size of a set of acceptable partners [33]. O’Malley [41] phrased the BSM
problem in terms of constraint programming. McDermid, as reported in [33], proved that the
measure of balance of BSM is incomparable to the measure of fairness of SESM. Finally, in the
thesis of McDermid [36] and the conclusion of McDermid and Irving [37], the authors expressed
interest in future studies of the BSM problem with respect to treewidth.
Maximum/Minimum Cardinality. When the preference lists have ties, there are three different
notions of stability: super stability, strong stability and weak stability (see [23, 32]). Our work
is centered around weak stability. In the presence of ties, the existence of a (weakly) stable
matching is guaranteed; simply break the ties arbitrarily and run the Gale-Shapley algorithm [12]
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on the resulting instance. A stable matching in the new instance is (weakly) stable in the original
instance. However, the breaking of ties affects the size of the stable matching produced. Thus,
the size of the stable matchings are no longer exactly the same as in the case where preference
lists are strict (see Section 2.1). This engenders the study of the computation of a maximum
(minimum) cardinality stable matching, known as the max-SMT (min-SMT) problem, which
capture scenarios where we would like to maximize (minimize) available resources.
Irving et al. [22] showed that both max-SMT and min-SMT are NP-hard even if the inputs
are restricted to have ties for only one sex, preference lists are of bounded length, and there
is symmetry in the preference lists. Irving et al. [26] showed that max-SMT is solvable in
polynomial time if the length of the preference lists of one sex is at most 2, and the length of
the preferences of the other sex is unbounded. Furthermore, it is shown that max-SMT is not
α-approximable unless P = NP, for some α > 1, even if each man’s preference list is of length
at most 3, and each woman’s preference list is of length at most 4. Given the large “gap” in
the computational complexity of these results, perhaps it is not surprising that this has led to
the study of max-SMT from the perspectives of approximation and parameterized complexity.
In the context of approximation algorithms, note that it is easy to obtain a factor 2-
approximation—break the ties arbitrarily, and return some stable matching in the resulting
instance. A breakthrough was achieved by Iwama et al. [28], who obtained a factor 1.875-
approximation algorithm for max-SMT using a local search technique. Kira´ly [30] improved
upon this result, and introduced a simple effective technique of promotion to break ties in a mod-
ified Gale-Shapley algorithm. In particular, he improved the approximation ratio to 5/3 = 1.66
for max-SMT, and to 1.5 for the one-sided ties version of max-SMT, that is, the preference lists
have to be strict on one side, while ties are permitted in the preference lists of the other side. For
the one-sided version of max-SMT, Huang and Kavitha [19] gave an approximation algorithm
with factor 1.4667, and Dean and Jalasutram [6] gave an approximation algorithm with factor
1.4615. The best known approximation algorithm for max-SMT is a factor 1.5-approximation
algorithm in [35]. References to additional works addressing approximation algorithms and
inapproximabilty results for max-SMT can be found in [6].
Marx and Schlotter [34] studied max-SMT with several parameters: (i) the maximum
number of ties in an instance (κ1); (ii) the maximum length of ties in an instance (κ2); (iii)
the total length of the ties in an instance (κ3). The authors showed that max-SMT is W[1]-
hard parameterized by κ1, and FPTparameterized by κ3. Furthermore, since it was shown that
max-SMT is NP-hard even when the length of each tie is at most 2, we do not hope to have
an algorithm with running time f(κ2)n
g(κ2), for any functions f and g that depend only on k.
Relatively less work has been done for min-SMT. Beyond what has been mentioned earlier,
we would like to mention that lower bounds on the approximability of min-SMT has been
discussed in Yanagisawa’s Masters thesis [44] and in the paper [18]. Finally, we remark that
experimental approaches have also been undertaken to study max-SMT. Munera et al. [38] gave
an algorithm based on local search. Moreover, Gent and Prosser [15] formulated the problem
as a constrained optimization problem and gave an algorithm via constrained programming for
both decision and optimization version.
1.2 Our Contribution
Our contribution can be summarized in three main theorems, namely Theorems 1, 3 and 4. The
proof of Theorem 2 is straightforward (unlike the other theorems), yet we present it for the sake
of completeness. The approaches employed to establish each of these theorems are discussed in
detail in Section 3. The principles underlying each of these approaches are quite general, and
therefore they can be applicable to other parameterizations of these problems as well as to other
problems related to SM. Here, we only present the statements of our findings. Our first set of
results analyzes the parameterized complexity of the SESM, BSM, max-SMT and min-SMT
3
problems with respect to the treewidth of the primal graph.
Theorem 1. The SESM, BSM, max-SMT and min-SMT problems are all W[1]-hard with
respect to tw, the treewidth of the primal graph. Moreover, unless ETH fails, none of these
problems can be solved in time f(tw) · no(tw) for any function f that depends only on tw.
Next, we observe that it is straightforward to derive XP-algorithms whose running times, in
light of Theorem 1, are essentially tight.
Theorem 2. The SESM, BSM, max-SMT and min-SMT problems are all solvable in time
nO(tw), where tw is the treewidth of the primal graph.
Due to the barrier posed by Theorem 1, we next turn to analyze the treewidth of the rotation
digraph. Here, we only study SESM and BSM, as the rotation digraph is not defined in the
context of max-SMT and min-SMT. On the positive side, we establish the following theorem.
Theorem 3. The SESM and BSM problems are both solvable in time 2tw · n6, where tw is the
treewidth of the rotation digraph.
Finally, we prove that unless SETH fails, Theorem 3 pinpoints precisely the running times
of FPT-algorithms for both SESM and BSM.
Theorem 4. Unless SETH fails, neither SESM nor BSM is solvable in time (2 − )tw · nO(1)
for any fixed  > 0, where tw is the treewidth of the rotation digraph.
Thus, we present a comprehensive, complete picture of the behavior of central optimization
versions of the SM problem with respect to the parameter treewidth of both the primal graph
and the rotation digraph. (We remark that along the way, we thus also resolve open problems
posed by McDermid [36] and McDermid and Irving [37].)
2 Preliminaries
Standard graph-theoretic terms not explicitly defined here can be found in [7], and for standard
notions in Parameterized Complexity, refer to Appendices A and B. Given a non-negative integer
n, we use [n]0 and [n] to denote the sets {0, 1, . . . , n} and {1, 2, . . . , n}, respectively. Given a
function f : A→ B, dom(f) and ima(f) denote the domain and the image of f , respectively.
2.1 Stable Marriage
In the classic Stable Marriage (SM) problem, the input consists of a set of men, M , and a
set of women, W . The set of agents (men and women) is denoted by A = M ∪W . The total
number of agents, |A|, is denoted by n. Each man (woman) has a preference list, which is a list
ranking a subset of W (M). More precisely, each man m ∈M is assigned a subset W ′ ⊆W and
an injective function pm : W
′ → [|W ′|]. Symmetrically, each woman w ∈W is assigned a subset
M ′ ⊆ M and an injective function pw : M ′ → [|M ′|].1 For all m ∈ M and w ∈ W , it holds
that w ∈ dom(pm) if and only if m ∈ dom(pw). The case where for every agent a ∈ M ∪W ,
the function pa may not be injective, is known as the SM with Ties (SMT) problem. In this
generalization of SM, for every agent a ∈M ∪W , the image of pa is restricted to be of the form
[t] for t ∈ N. The formulation of the objectives of SM and SMT relies on the notion of stability.
Definition 2.1. Given M ′ ⊆ M and an injective function µ : M ′ → W , we say that a pair
(m,w) of a man m ∈ M and a woman w ∈ W such that w ∈ dom(pm) is a blocking pair of
µ if (i) m /∈ dom(µ) and w /∈ ima(µ), or (ii) m /∈ dom(µ) and pw(m) < pw(µ−1(w)), or (iii)
pm(w) < pm(µ(m)) and w /∈ ima(µ), or (iv) pm(w) < pm(µ(m)) and pw(m) < pw(µ−1(w)).
1Throughout our paper, we do not assume that each person must rank all people of the opposite sex. That
is, we deal with the general case where preference lists may be incomplete. For emphasis, some papers add the
letter “I” to the abbreviation SM, but for the sake of brevity, we avoid this addition.
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Definition 2.2. Given M ′ ⊆ M and an injective function µ : M ′ → W , we say that µ is a
stable matching if for every m′ ∈M ′, µ(m′) ∈ dom(pm′), and µ has no blocking pair.
Roughly speaking, a stable matching is a matching between a subset of men and a subset
of women such that there does not exist a pair of a man and a woman who prefer each other to
their matched partners (if at all such partners exist). To simplify our presentation, we use the
notation (m,w) ∈ µ to indicate that m ∈ dom(µ) and it holds that µ(m) = w. Moreover, we let
S denote the set of all stable matchings. In the seminal paper [12], Gale and Shapley showed
that there always exists at least one stable matching.
Proposition 2.1 ([12]). The set S is non-empty.
Thus, the objective of SM and SMT is to find a stable matching. However, there can be an
exponential number of stable matchings [17]. Notably, Gale and Sotomayor [13] showed that in
the absence of ties, stable matchings do not differ in which men and women they match.
Proposition 2.2 ([13]). In SM, for all µ, µ′ ∈ S, dom(µ) = dom(µ′) and ima(µ) = ima(µ′).
In the absence of ties, we denote M? = {m ∈ M : m ∈ ⋂µ∈S dom(µ)} and W ? = {w ∈
W : w ∈ ⋂µ∈S ima(µ)}. Note that by Proposition 2.2, we have that M? = {m ∈ M : m ∈⋃
µ∈S dom(µ)} and W ? = {w ∈W : w ∈
⋃
µ∈S ima(µ)}. Finally, we denote A? = M? ∪W ?.
We also recall the notions of man- and woman-optimal stable matchings.
Proposition 2.3 ([12]). In SM, there is exactly one stable matching µ, denoted by µM = µ∅,
that minimizes
∑
(m,w)∈µ pm(w). Symmetrically, there is exactly one stable matching µ, denoted
by µW , that maximizes
∑
(m,w)∈µ pm(w). Both µM and µW can be found in time O(n2).
We remark that µM is also the unique stable matching that maximizes
∑
(m,w)∈µ pw(m),
and µW is also the unique stable matching that minimizes
∑
(m,w)∈µ pw(m) [12]. From now
onwards, by Proposition 2.3, we assume that we have µM and µW at hand.
Finally, the primal graph H of an instance of SM or SMI is the bipartite graph whose vertex
set is {va : a ∈ A} and whose edge set is {{vm, vw} : m ∈ dom(pw)}.
2.2 SM and SMT: Optimization
Sex-Equality and Balance. We first discuss the scenario where ties are forbidden, that is,
we first present two optimization versions of SM. Here, the set of stable matchings, S, can
be viewed as a spectrum where the two extremes are the man-optimal stable matching and
the woman-optimal stable matching. Naturally, it is desirable to analyze matchings that lie
somewhere in the middle, being fair towards both sides or desirable by both sides. Deciding
which notion best describes an appropriate outcome depends on the specific situation at hand.
Here, the quantity pa(µ(a)) is viewed as the “satisfaction” of a in µ, where a smaller value
signifies a greater amount of satisfaction. For a stable matching µ ∈ S, the total satisfaction
of men from µ is satM (µ) =
∑
(m,w)∈µ pm(w), and the total satisfaction of women from µ is
satW (µ) =
∑
(m,w)∈µ pw(m).
In the Sex-Equal Stable Marriage (SESM) problem, we seek a stable matching that
is fair towards both sides by minimizing the difference between their individual amounts of
satisfaction. The formulation of this problem relies on the notion of the sex-equality measure:
Definition 2.3. The sex-equality measure is the function δ : S → Z such that for all µ ∈ S,
δ(µ) = satM (µ)− satW (µ).
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The best value that this measure attains is ∆ = min
µ∈S
|δ(µ)|. The objective of the SESM
problem is to find a stable matching µ such that δ(µ) = ∆.2
In Balanced Stable Marriage, the objective is to find a stable matching that is desirable
by both sides. Here, we rely on the notion of the balance measure, which is defined as follows.
Definition 2.4. The balance measure is the function bal : S → Z such that for all µ ∈ S,
bal(µ) = max{satM (µ), satW (µ)}.
The best value that this measure attains is Bal = min
µ∈S
|bal(µ)|. The task of BSM is to find a
stable matching µ such that bal(µ) = Bal. At first sight, this measure might seem conceptually
similar to the previous one, but in fact, the two measures are quite different. Indeed, BSM
examines the amount of dissatisfaction of each party individually, and attempts to minimize
the worse one among the two. This problem fits the scenario where each party is selfish in the
sense that it wishes to minimize its own dissatisfaction irrespective of the dissatisfaction of the
other party. Here, our goal is to find a matching desirable by both parties by ensuring that each
individual amount of dissatisfaction does not exceed some threshold. In some situations, the
minimization of bal(µ) may indirectly also minimize δ(µ), and vice versa, yet in general, this is
not true. Indeed, it is known how to construct a family of instances where there does not exist
any matching that is both a sex-equal stable matching and a balanced stable matching [33].
Maximum/Minimum Size. We now present two optimization versions of SMT. Here, the two
(arguably) most natural objectives are to maximize or minimize the size of the outputted stable
matching as it might be desirable to maintain stability while either maximizing or minimizing
the use of available “resources”. These objectives define the well-known max-SMT and min-
SMT problems. Formally, given an instance of SMT, the task of max-SMT is to find a stable
matching of maximum size, and the task of min-SMT is to find a stable matching of minimum
size. Here, the size of a matching is simply its number of matched pairs. We remark that due
to Proposition 2.2, the study of both of these problems only makes sense in the presence of ties.
2.3 Rotation Digraph
First, we stress that the rotation digraph is a notion defined only in the context of SM, that is,
in the absence of ties. Let us start by defining a rotation, which is an operation that transforms
one stable matching to another. For this purpose, given µ ∈ S and m ∈ M?, we let sµ(m)
denote the first woman w succeeding µ(m) in m’s preference list, such that w /∈ ima(µ) or w
prefers m over µ−1(w) (if such a woman exists). Now, a rotation is defined as follows.
Definition 2.5. Let µ ∈ S. A µ-rotation is an ordered sequence of pairs ρ = ((m0, w0), (m1, w1),
. . . , (mr−1, wr−1) for some r ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n}, such that for all i ∈ [r − 1]0, (mi, wi) ∈ µ and
w(i+1)mod r = sµ(mi). For all i ∈ [r − 1]0, we say that ρ involves mi and wi.
When µ is immaterial or clear from context, the term rotation replaces the term µ-rotation.
Given a µ-rotation ρ, the elimination of ρ is the operation that modifies µ by matching each mi
with w(i+1)mod r rather than wi. This operation results in a stable matching [24]. Let R denote
the set of all sequences of pairs ρ for which there exists µ ∈ S such that ρ is a µ-rotation. It is
known that |R| ≤ n2. Moreover, for all ρ ∈ R, the agents involved in ρ belong to A? [17].
Proposition 2.4 ([24]). Let µ ∈ S. There is a unique subset of R, denoted by R(µ), such that
starting with µ∅, there is an order in which the rotations in R(µ) can be eliminated to obtain µ.
2We only compute ∆. By backtracking our computations, it is possible to construct a stable matching µ such
that δ(µ) = ∆. This remark is also relevant to our algorithms for BSM, max-SMT and min-SMT.
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Irving and Leather [24] studied the rotation poset Π = (R,≺). Here, ≺ is a partial order on
R such that ρ ≺ ρ′ if and only if for every µ ∈ S such that ρ′ ∈ R(µ), ρ ∈ R(µ) as well. We
say that R′ ⊆ R is a closed set if there does not exist ρ ∈ R \ R′ and ρ′ ∈ R′ such that ρ ≺ ρ′.
Moreover, given R′ ⊆ R, we let cl(R′) denote the smallest closed set that contains R′. We also
say that an order in which the rotations in R′ are eliminated is ≺-compatible if for all ρ, ρ′ ∈ R
such that ρ ≺ ρ′, ρ is eliminated before ρ′. Roughly speaking, the rotation poset describes how
every stable matching can be derived from the man-optimal stable matching. More precisely,
Proposition 2.5 ([24]). Let R′ ⊆ R be a closed set. Starting with µ∅, eliminating the rotations
in R′ in any ≺-compatible order is valid—at each step, where our current stable matching is
some µ, the rotation that we eliminate next is a µ-rotation. Moreover, all ≺-compatible orders
in which one eliminates the rotations in R′ result in the same stable matching.
Given R′ ⊆ R, let µR′ denote the stable matching µ such that R(µ) = cl(R′). By Proposition
2.5, this notation is well defined. Moreover, given a ∈ A, let R(a) denote the set of all rotations
that involve a. Our FPT algorithms will crucially rely on the following proposition.
Proposition 2.6 ([17]). For any m ∈M , ≺ is a total order on R(m).
Irving, Leather and Gusfield [25] studied digraphs that are a compact representation of Π.
Specifically, we say that a digraph is the rotation digraph of Π, denoted by DΠ, if it is the
directed acyclic graph (DAG) of minimum size whose transitive closure is isomorphic to Π.
Proposition 2.7 ([25]). The rotation digraph DΠ can be computed in time O(n2).
We let GΠ denote the underlying undirected graph of DΠ. In light of Proposition 2.7, when
we design our algorithms, we may assume that we have DΠ and GΠ at hand.
3 Overview
In this section, we explain the main ingredients underlying our results.
W[1]-Hardness Results. Our first set of results, given in Section 4, establishes Theorem 1.
The source problem of the reductions developed in this section is the Multicolored Clique
problem. Our four constructions share common features, which we believe to be relevant to
other reductions meant to prove that optimization versions of SM and SMT are W[1]-hard
with respect to various structural parameters. First, all of our reductions introduce the same
sets of “basic agents”. Roughly speaking, we introduce two basic men to represent each color
class, two basic women to represent each vertex, and one basic woman to represent each edge.
Second, the preference lists of the basic men representing color classes are set in a special form,
to which we refer as the form of a leader. Informally, the preference lists of the two men
representing a color class are distorted mirror images of one another. More precisely, each man
among these two men ranks his own set of women representing vertices of the appropriate color
class, where if we view the two women representing the same vertex as the same woman, then it
is seen that the order in which one ranks these women is opposite to the order in which the other
one ranks them. Both of these men “embed” in their preference lists women representing edges
between women representing vertices, and both of them prefer a woman representing vertex v
over all women representing edges incident to v. The third common feature is that all of our four
reductions then proceed to introduce similar sets of agents that are meant to construct vertex
and edge selection gadgets. In particular, in all of our reductions, the only interaction between
vertex selector gadgets and edge selector gadgets is via the special men whose preference lists
are of the form of a leader. Moreover, all of our reductions introduce quite similar definitions of
“enriched” sets of agents who locally interact with basic agents. Hence, in all of our reductions,
we ensure in a somewhat similar manner that basic agents, excluding those special men whose
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preference lists are of the form of a leader, can replace partners in a manner that does not
enforce too many other “close-by” men to change partners as well in order to maintain stability.
The principles described above are quite general as we prove that they are useful for two
natural “types” of optimization problems that may a priori seem different. The first type is the
one where the challenge lies in the output that is enforced to comply with a satisfaction target
value, and the second type is the one where the challenge lies in the input that is generalized
to include ties while the output only needs to be either large enough or small enough. When
we examine each type of problems separately, it is revealed that our reductions to SESM and
BSM share many other similar ideas, and the same holds true when we compare our reductions
to max-SMT and min-SMT. In fact, our reduction to BSM is a modification of our reduction
to SESM where we carefully plug-in different numbers of “dummy agents” into the preference
lists of some “central” agents to manipulate the different men to choose partners in a coordinate
manner without relying on stability, but merely on subtle analysis of the satisfaction value.
For a concrete illustrative example, let us give a high-level overview of other elements incor-
porated in one of our reductions, namely, the reduction to SESM. Here, we begin by introducing
the so called Original Vertex Selector gadget, which is a structure where one man representing
a color class selects one woman representing a vertex of that color class as his partner. The
selection of the partners of the women representing all other vertices of that color class is done
locally by introducing an enriched set of men. Then, we introduce the Mirror Vertex Selector
gadget, which handles the other man representing the same color class in an almost symmetric
manner. By embedding dummy agents into the preference lists of the basic agents involved in
Original and Mirror Vertex Selector gadgets, we can ensure that in all of these gadgets together,
a predetermined number of men would be matched to their most preferred women. We remark
that the ability to set such a predetermined value is crucially dependent on the fact that each
color class is represented by two gadgets. Next, to ensure that the two gadgets representing a
color class are consistent (in the sense that the two men representing the same color class are
matched to women representing the same vertex), we introduce a new special gadget per vertex
v, called the Consistency gadget. This gadget consists of only four agents, where one of the men
in this gadget ranks both women (outside the gadget) that represent the vertex v. Here, we need
to ensure that among all of the gadgets representing the same color class, the “configuration”
of exactly one gadget will be such that its men will not attain their best partner. Here, the
gadgets cannot interact directly by introducing, for example, new common agents that agents
of different Consistency gadgets would rank, as we need to ensure that the treewidth of the
primal graph of the output instance is small. Hence, to coordinate between these gadgets, we
rely on carefully chosen numbers of dummy agents that are added to the preference lists of their
agents. The numbers involved in this gadget are of a different magnitude than those involved
in the Original and Mirror Vertex Selector gadgets. However, we cannot also assign each color
class a number of a different magnitude, as then we would end up assigning numbers of mag-
nitudes such as nk, which means that we would need to insert nk dummy agents and hence
the construction would not be done in “FPT time”. Nevertheless, we are able to overcome this
difficulty by using a simple equation that has a unique solution of the form that we want, and
using the appropriate coefficients as a guide for the number of dummy agents to be inserted.3
Afterwards, we introduce the Edge Selector gadget. Here, we define one gadget per edge,
which involves the woman representing that edge. Such a gadget indicates that an edge has been
selected by being in the configuration where the woman representing the edge has not attained
her best partner. Notice that unlike the previously discussed gadgets, which are analyzed from
the perspective of the men, these gadgets are analyzed from the perspective of the women. In
3By using a different equation, we are able to reuse our construction in the context of BSM, and hence it
seems like the applicability of our construction is quite broad (where one only needs to be able tune the equation
according to the target measure at hand).
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particular, while in the Consistency gadgets the total satisfaction of women is forced to be low,
here the total satisfaction of the women would be forced to be high. However, we stress that
this difference is not employed to attain a certain target value, but it is used to control which
matchings are stable and to avoid introducing any form of direct interaction between Edge
Selector gadgets and Consistency gadgets (which is necessary to ensure that the treewidth of
the output is small). In particular, having set up all of the previously mentioned gadgets, we
still encounter a significant imbalance between the satisfaction of men and women in the stable
matchings of the form that we would like to represent solutions. However, this issue is easily
handled by introducing “garbage collector” agents which counterweight this imbalance properly.
XP-Algorithms. Our second set of results, given in Section 5, establishes Theorem 2. The proof
of this theorem is based on a standard application of the method of dynamic programming over
nice tree decompositions, and it is sketched in this paper only for the sake of completeness.
FPT-Algorithms. Our third set of results, given in Section 6, leads to the establishment of
Theorem 3. For this purpose, we present an approach that deviates from standard applications
of DP over tree decompositions. First, the proof of its correctness integrates new insights into
the structure of rotation digraphs that might be of independent interest. To formulate these
insights, we introduce new notions that may be adapted to tackle other optimization versions
of SM. Second, while in standard DP elements that have not yet been examined determine
only how to extend/modify partial solutions, in our DP such elements (rotations) are part of
the partial solutions themselves. Thus, we need to design a delicate mechanism that maintains
consistency between the manner in which we handled rotations in the bags below the current
one, and the manner in which we anticipate handling rotations in other bags. Third, we face
difficulties stemming from the fact that to update partial solutions, we need to change the
assignments of women to men that correspond to these partial solutions, yet the information
we have at hand does not directly reveal the assignments. By associating a directed path with
each man, and tracing the manner in which the path “enters and leaves” every bag of the tree
decomposition, we are able to deduce sufficient information on the assignments. We remark that
this solution introduces yet another difficulty, namely, the need to store and maintain “illegal
scores” that are associated with assignments of several men to the same woman.
We proceed with a more detailed description of some ingredients of our approach. First, to
unify the principles underlying our approach, we introduce a problem more generic than SESM
and BSM,4 where the objective is to determine, for all tM , tW ∈ N, whether there exists µ ∈ S
such that both satM (µ) = tM and satW (µ) = tW . To describe our approach compactly, we note
that a state is a pair (v,R′) where v ∈ V (T ) and R′ ⊆ β(v). Moreover, µ ∈ S is said to be
compatible with a state (v,R′) if R(µ)∩β(v) = R′. Now, to design our algorithm, we first observe
that each man can be associated with a directed path of DΠ whose vertex-set is a superset of
R(m). With respect to a given state, we then proceed to introduce special “entry” and “exit”
points for each man, based on the directed path associated with him. These special points allow
us to further identify a subpath of the path of each man that captures the current most updated
information that we have about his partner, where the internal vertices (which are rotations)
of the paths encompass all changes that might occur when we analyze future states. We are
then able to define exactly which men have been already settled with a partner. Next, again
with respect to a given state, but also with respect to a stable matching µ, we assign a woman
to each man. This woman may be either the same one that µ assigns to m (if m is settled) or
some specific woman whose choice is based on the most updated information we could extract.
We remark that such an assignment, due to inherent uncertainties at intermediate steps of the
computation, may assign several men to the same woman. Having assigned tentative partners
to men, we are able to introduce definitions related to tentative amounts of satisfaction.
4By analyzing SESM and BSM separately, we also show how to speed-up the generic algorithm.
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The description above sets the background for the study of our algorithm. The algorithm
itself is very short and easily implementable. The computation simply fills a table that consists
of Boolean entries of the form N[v,R′, tM , tW ], where v ∈ V (T ), R′ ⊆ β(v) and tM , tW ∈ [n2].
Here, N[v,R′, tM , tW ] = 1 if and only if there exists µ ∈ S that is compatible with the state
(v,R′) and where the “tentative” amounts of satisfaction of men and women are tM and tW ,
respectively. We stress that these amounts of satisfaction are not satM (µ) and satW (µ) (such
amounts simply cannot be computed when we handle the entry N[v,R′, tM , tW ] since we do not
have enough information at hand at that point to extract them). In the computation of an
introduce node, in particular, we need to correct our tentative amounts of satisfaction. Having
defined the algorithm, the technical part of the analysis begins. Here, we need to carefully
analyze each type of node of the nice tree decomposition, and prove that the definitions we have
set up as background indeed allow us to trace the paths of the men correctly, and to obtain
precise amounts of satisfaction at the end. In this context, we present a sequence of lemmata
(for each type of node) that verify consistencies between types of men, partners and tentative
amounts of satisfaction deduced for the current node and for the child(ren) of the current node.
Lower Bounds Based on SETH. Our last set of results, given in Section 7, establishes of Theo-
rem 4. Here, by plugging in coefficients associated with two different equations to (essentially)
the same construction, we are able to handle both SESM and BSM. Let us now give a high-level
overview of the reduction to SESM. We remark that some ideas relevant to our W[1]-hardness
results also underlie the proofs of our SETH-based results, yet here we also introduce several
new ideas on top of them. The source problem of our reduction is the s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT
problem (for some appropriate choice of s and p), which is the special case of CNF-SAT where
the size of each clause is at most p and there are at most sn clauses in total.
We begin by partitioning the set of all clauses into a “large” number of (pairwise-disjoint)
small sets of clauses, where the size of each small set of clauses is fixed according to s and
p. The necessity of having this partition stems from our need to ensure that the number of
dummy agents that we need to insert into preference lists of other agents would not be too large
(yet we would still need an exponential number of dummy agents). For the sake of clarity of
explanation, let us think of each small set of clauses as a color class. For each color class t, we
enumerate all truth assignments that satisfy all of the clauses of that color t. Each such truth
assignment is represented by two sets of variables, the true set and the false set, where the first
contains all those variables that the assignment sets to true and which appear in clauses of color
t, and the second contains all those other variables appearing in clauses of color t. Each variable
xt is represented by two basic agents called mt and wt, each true set associated with color class
i, indexed by j in that color class, is represented by two basic agents called mij and w
i
j , and each
false assignment associated with color class i, indexed by j in that color class (where the two
sets indexed j in the same color class correspond to the same truth assignment), is represented
by two basic agents called mij and w
i
j . In addition to these agents, we also employ two “garbage
collector” agents who are meant to counterweight imbalance in satisfaction of men and women
that is present in “desirable configurations” of the gadgets described below.
For each variable xt, the Variable Selector gadget consists of four agents, the basic agents
mt and wt as well as two “enriched” agents, m̂t and ŵt. The enriched agents do not rank any
agent outside the gadget, and their sole purpose is to allow the gadget to encode two internal
configurations, one where mt is matched to wt (while m̂t is matched to ŵt), and the other where
mt is matched to ŵt while wt is matched to m̂t. Having two such local agents also enables
us to allow a basic agent a to rank some other basic agent b and yet a and b would never be
matched to one another in any stable matching. The first configuration indicates that xt should
be assigned false, while the second one indicates that xt should be assigned true. The man mt
is defined to prefer all women representing false sets that contain xt to the woman ŵt, while the
woman wt is defined to prefer all men representing true sets that contain xt to the man mt.
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Next, for every true set, we introduce the Truth Selector gadget, which in addition to mij
and wij , consists of the two enriched agents m̂
i
j and ŵ
i
j . Here, the configuration where m
i
j is
matched to wij indicates that the truth assignment is selected, and the configuration where m
i
j
is not matched to wij indicates that the truth assignment is not selected. To ensure that for each
color class, exactly one truth assignment would be selected, we insert dummy agents into the
preference lists of the basic agents of Truth Selector gadgets whose numbers correspond to the
coefficients of a certain equation. While the number color classes is large, it is still significantly
smaller than n, and thus the magnitute of the numbers involved is small enough for our purpose.
The man mij is defined to prefer wt to ŵ
i
j for all women wt that rank m
i
j , thus ensuring that if
the truth assignment in which he is involved is selected, all of the appropriate Variable Selector
gadgets would have to be selected as well to maintain stability. Moreover, mij is also defined to
prefer all women wik for k 6= j over ŵij (the purpose of this setting would be clarified below).
Finally, for every false set, we introduce the False Selector gadget, which in addition to mij
and wij , consists of the two enriched agents m̂
i
j and ŵ
i
j . Here, unlike the previous gadgets, the
configuration where mij is matched to w
i
j indicates that the truth assignment is not selected, and
the configuration where mij is not matched to w
i
j indicates that the truth assignment is selected.
The woman wij is defined to prefer mt to m̂
i
j for all men mt that rank w
i
j , thus ensuring that if
the truth assignment in which she is involved is selected, all of the appropriate Variable Selector
gadgets would have to not be selected to maintain stability. Moreover, wij is also defined to
prefer all men mik where k 6= j to m̂
i
j . This ensure that if the current false set is selected, the
only true set of the same color class that can be selected is the one that is complementary to
this false set. We remark that to further conveniently control the selection of false sets, we also
insert dummy agents into the preference lists of their basic agents.
Having defined the reduction, we proceed to precisely characterize every stable matching
of the output. Then, we are also able to precisely identify which set of rotations gives rise to
which stable matching. Overall, we can then explicitly construct the rotation digraph of the
output. In our proof, for the sake of simplicity, we actually construct a supergraph of the
rotation digraph. We are thus able to show that the rotation digraph of our instance is simply
a DAG with three layers such that the middle layer contains exactly n vertices, and that if
we remove the middle layer from that graph, the subgraph that remains is just a collection of
“small” connected components—roughly speaking, each such connected component would be
a representation of one color class. Hence, we are able to conclude that the treewidth (of the
underlying undirected graph) of the rotation digraph is not much larger than n.
4 Primal Graph: W[1]-Hardness
In this section, we prove Theorem 1, based on the approach described in Section 3. Throughout
this section, the notation tw refers to the treewidth of the primal graph. The source of our
reduction is Multicolored Clique, which is defined as follows. The input of Mulicolored
Clique consists of a graph G, a positive integer k, and a partition (V 1, V 2, . . . , V k) of V (G),
where for all i, j ∈ [k], |V i| = |V j |. Here, the parameter is k. For every index i ∈ [k], the
set V i is called color class i. The task is to decide whether G contains a clique that consists
of exactly one vertex from each color class. We denote n = |V (G)| and p = n/k. Moreover,
for every color class i ∈ [k], we denote V i = {vi1, vi2, . . . , vip}, and for every two color classes
i, j ∈ [k] where i < j, we denote Ei,j = {{u, v} ∈ E(G) : u ∈ V i, v ∈ V j} and qi,j = |Ei,j |.
Accordingly, we denote Ei,j = {ei,j1 , ei,j2 , . . . , ei,jqi,j}. For every vertex v ∈ V (G), we denote the
set of edges incident to v in G by E(v). We assume w.l.o.g. that |E(G)| ≥ n. Furthermore, we
implicitly assume that |E(G)| is significantly larger than k (else the problem is solvable by a
parameterized algorithm). For our purpose, it is sufficient to assume that |E(G)| > 10k.
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Proposition 4.1 ([10, 5]). The Multicolored Clique problem is W[1]-hard with respect to
k. Moreover, unless ETH fails, Multicolored Clique cannot be solved in time f(k) · no(k)
for any function f that depends only on k.
Each section below is devoted to one reduction.
4.1 Sex Equal Stable Marriage
First, we prove that SESM is W[1]-hard, and that unless ETH fails, SESM cannot be solved in
time f(tw) · no(tw) for any function f that depends only on tw.
4.1.1 Reduction
Let I = (G, (V 1, V 2, . . . , V k)) be an instance of Multicolored Clique. We now describe how
to construct an instance redSESM (I) = (M,W, {pm}|m∈M , {pw}|w∈W ) of SESM.
Basic Agents. We introduce the following sets of basic agents, which would be part of all of
our reductions.
• Mbas = {m1,m2, . . . ,mk}. Each man mi would be the basic vertex that represents color
class i.
• M̂bas = {m̂1, m̂2, . . . , m̂k}. Each man m̂i would be the basic vertex that is the mirror of
the vertex mi.
• For every color class i ∈ [k], W ibas = {wi1, wi2, . . . , wip}. Each woman wij would be the basic
vertex that represents the selection of vij .
• For every color class i ∈ [k], Ŵ ibas = {ŵi1, ŵi2, . . . , ŵip}. Each woman ŵij would be the basic
vertex that is the mirror of the vertex wij .
• For every two color class i, j ∈ [k] where i < j, W i,j
bas
= {wi,j1 , wi,j2 , . . . , wi,jqi,j}. Each woman
wi,jt would be the basic vertex that represents the selection of e
i,j
t .
Moreover, in all of our reductions, the preference lists of the men in Mbas ∪ M̂bas would
be of the following form, which we call the form of a leader since, roughly speaking, women
representing edges incident to some vertex v would follow the woman representing v with respect
to their positions in preference lists. Formally, for every color class i ∈ [k], the preference lists
of mi and m̂i satisfy the four following conditions.
1. dom(pmi) ∩
(⋃k
j=1(W
j
bas
∪ Ŵ j
bas
∪ (⋃k`=1W `,jbas))) = W ibas ∪W i,jbas;
dom(pm̂i) ∩
(⋃k
j=1(W
j
bas
∪ Ŵ j
bas
∪ (⋃k`=1W `,jbas))) = Ŵ ibas ∪W i,jbas.
2. pmi(w
i
1) < pmi(w
i
2) < · · · < pmi(wit); pm̂i(wit) < pm̂i(wit−1) < · · · < pm̂i(wi1).
3. For every index t ∈ [j] where i < t and edge ei,t` ∈ E(vij), pmi(wij) < pmi(wi,t` ), and if
j ≤ t − 1, then pmi(wi,t` ) < pmi(wij+1). The internal ordering of all women representing
edges in E(vij) is arbitrary.
4. For every index t ∈ [j] where i < t and edge ei,t` ∈ E(vij), pm̂i(wij) < pm̂i(wi,t` ), and if
j ≥ 2, then pm̂i(wi,t` ) < pm̂i(wij−1). The internal ordering of all women representing edges
in E(vij) is arbitrary.
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Figure 1: The Original and Mirror Vertex Selector gadgets. Colorful numbers indicate the
relative order in which agents rank only those other agents shown in the figure.
We are now ready to present the gadgets employed by our reduction.
Original Vertex Selector. For every color class i ∈ [k], our first set of gadgets introduces the
following set of new men: M ienr = {mi2,mi3, . . . ,mip}. Here, the abbreviation “enr” stands for
the word “enriched”. Each man mij would be the basic vertex most preferred by the woman w
i
j .
The preference lists of the new men are defined as follows. For every index j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , p},
set dom(mij) = {wij , wij−1}, pmij (w
i
j) = 1 and pmij
(wij−1) = 1. Moreover, for every index j ∈
{2, 3, . . . , p}, set pwij (m
i) < pwij
(mij). Finally, for every index j ∈ [p − 1], set pwij (m
i
j+1) <
pwij
(mi).
Notice that so far, we have finished defining exactly which agents in Mbas ∪ (
⋃k
i=1W
i
bas ∪
M ienr) rank which other agents in this set as well as what is the order in which they rank them
(although we have not yet finished defining the preference lists of some of the agents in this
set). For an illustration of the Original Vertex Selector gadget, the reader is referred to Fig. 1.
Mirror Vertex Selector. For every color class i ∈ [k], our second set of gadgets introduces the
following set of new men: M̂ ienr = {m̂i1, m̂i2, . . . , m̂ip−1}. Each man m̂ij would be the basic vertex
most preferred by the woman ŵij . The preference lists of the new men are defined as follows. For
every index j ∈ [p− 1], set dom(m̂ij) = {ŵij , ŵij+1}, pm̂ij (ŵ
i
j) = 1 and pm̂ij
(ŵij+1) = 1. Moreover,
for every index j ∈ [p− 1], set pŵij (m̂
i) < pŵij
(m̂ij). Finally, for every index j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , p}, set
pŵij
(m̂ij−1) < pŵij (m̂
i).
Thus, we have so far finished defining exactly which agents in Mbas∪ (
⋃k
i=1W
i
bas∪M ienr)∪
M̂bas ∪ (
⋃k
i=1 Ŵ
i
bas ∪ M̂ ienr) rank which other agents in this set as well as what is the order in
which they rank them. For an illustration of the Mirror Vertex Selector gadget, the reader is
referred to Fig. 1.
Consistency. We would next like to ensure that for all i, j ∈ [k], mi would matched to wij if
and only if m̂i would be matched to ŵij . For this purpose, we insert the Consistency gadgets.
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Here, for every color class i ∈ [k], we introduce two sets of new men, M˜ i = {m˜i1, m˜i2, . . . , m˜ip}
and M
i
= {mi1,mi2, . . . ,mip}, and two sets of new women, W˜ i = {w˜i1, w˜i2, . . . , w˜ip} and W i =
{wi1, wi2, . . . , wip}. For all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [p], we set the preference lists of mij , mij , w˜ij and wij
as follows. First, let us set the preference list of m˜ij .
• The intersection of dom(pm˜i1) with the set of all agents, excluding the happy agents defined
later, is exactly {w˜i1, ŵi1, wi1}, and pm˜i1(w˜i1) < pm˜i1(ŵi1) < pm˜i1(wi1).
• If 2 ≤ j ≤ p − 2, then excluding happy agents, the intersection of dom(pm˜ij ) with the set
of all agents, excluding the happy agents defined later, is exactly {w˜ij , wij , ŵij , wij}, and
pm˜ij
(w˜ij) < pm˜ij
(wij) < pm˜ij
(ŵij) < pm˜ij
(wij).
• The intersection of dom(pm˜ip) with the set of all agents, excluding the happy agents defined
later, is exactly {w˜ip, wip, wip}, and pm˜ip(w˜ip) < pm˜it(wip) < pm˜ip(wip).
Second, let us set the preference lists of mij , w˜
i
j and w
i
j .
• dom(pmij ) = {w
i
j , w˜
i
j}, pmij (w
i
j) = 1 and pmij
(w˜ij) = 2.
• The intersection of dom(pw˜ij ) with the set of all agents, excluding the happy agents defined
later, is exactly {mij , m˜ij}, and pwij (m
i
j) < pwij
(m˜ij).
• dom(pwij ) = {m˜
i
j ,m
i
j}, pwij (m˜
i
j) = 1 and pwij
(mij) = 2.
For all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [p], we are now ready to explicitly define the preference lists of wij
and ŵij as follows. First, let us define the preference list of w
i
j .
• dom(pwi1) = {mi2,mi}, pwi1(mi2) = 1 and pwi1(mi) = 2.
• If 2 ≤ j ≤ p−1, then excluding happy agents, the intersection of dom(pwij ) with the set of
all agents is exactly {mij+1,mi, m˜ij ,mij}, and pwij (m
i
j+1) < pwij
(mi) < pwij
(m˜ij) < pwij
(mij).
• The intersection of dom(pwip) with the set of all agents, excluding the happy agents defined
later, {mi, m˜ip,mip}, and pwip(mi) < pwip(m˜ip) < pwip(mip).
Second, let us define the preference list of ŵij .
• dom(pŵip) = {m̂ip−1, m̂i}, pŵip(m̂ip−1) = 1 and pŵip(m̂i) = 2.
• Else if 2 ≤ j ≤ p− 1, then excluding happy agents, the intersection of dom(pŵij ) with the
set of all agents is exactly {m̂ij−1, m̂i, m˜ij , m̂ij}, and pŵij (m̂
i
j−1) < pŵij (m̂
i) < pŵij
(m˜ij) <
pŵij
(m̂ij).
• The intersection of dom(pŵi1) with the set of all agents, excluding the happy agents defined
later, is exactly {m̂i, m˜i1, m̂i1}, and pŵi1(m̂i) < pŵi1(m˜i1) < pŵi1(m̂i1).
For an illustration of a Consistency gadget, the reader is referred to Fig. 2.
Edge Selector. For every two color classes i, j ∈ [k] where i < j, our last set of gadgets
introduces the following three sets of new agents: M i,jenr = {mi,j1 ,mi,j2 , . . . ,mi,jqi,j}, M
i,j
=
{mi,j1 ,mi,j2 , . . . ,mi,jqi,j} and W
i,j
= {wi,j1 , wi,j2 , . . . , wi,jqi,j}. For every t ∈ [qi,j ], the preference
lists of the new agents, mi,jt , m
i,j
t and w
i,j
t , are defined as follows.
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Figure 2: The Consistency gadget. Colorful numbers indicate the relative order in which agents
rank only those other agents shown in the figure.
• The intersection of dom(p
mi,jt
) with the set of all agents, excluding the happy agents
defined later, is exactly {wi,jt , wi,jt }, and pmi,jt (w
i,j
t ) < pmi,jt
(wi,jt ).
• dom(p
mi,jt
) = {wi,jt , wi,jt }, pmi,jt (w
i,j
t ) = 1 and pmi,jt
(wi,jt ) = 2.
• dom(p
wi,jt
) = {mi,jt ,mi,jt }, pwi,jt (m
i,j
t ) = 1 and pwi,jt
(mi,jt ) = 2.
For all i, j ∈ [k] where i < j and t ∈ [qi,j ], we are now ready to define also the prefer-
ence list of wi,jt up to the insertion of happy agents that are defined later. The intersection
of dom(p
wi,jt
) with the set of all agents, excluding the happy agents defined later, is exactly
{mi,jt ,mi, m̂i,mj , m̂j ,mi,jt }, and pwi,jt (m
i,j
t ) < pwi,jt
(mi) < p
wi,jt
(m̂i) < p
wi,jt
(mj) < p
wi,jt
(m̂j) <
p
wi,jt
(mi,jt ).
For an illustration of an Edge Selector gadget, the reader is referred to Fig. 3.
Happy Pairs. To be able to control the measure of sex-equality, we introduce agents whose sole
purpose is to serve as “fillers” of preference lists of other agents. For this purpose, we rely on
the following notion of a happy pair.
Definition 4.1. A happy pair is a pair (m,w) of a man m ∈ M and a woman w ∈ W such
that pm(w) = pw(m) = 1. A happy agent is an agent that belongs to a happy pair.
We introduce α′ = α4k|E(G)|10 new happy pairs, denoted by (m1hap, w1hap), (m2hap, w2hap), . . . ,
(mαhap, w
α′
hap), where
α = −9k + 3pk + 4k2 − (pk − k + 2)|E(G)|
−(|E(G)| − 2(k2))|E(G)|10 − (2k − 1)|E(G)|30 + (p− 1)(2k − 1)|E(G)|40.
Initially, the preference list of every such happy agent a contains only one agent, the one that
belongs to the same happy pair as a. In what follows, we insert happy agents into the preference
lists of previously defined agents. We implicitly assume that when we insert a happy agents a
into the preference of an agent b, the agent b is appended to the end of the preference list of s.
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Figure 3: The Edge Selector gadget. Colorful numbers indicate the relative order in which
agents rank only those other agents shown in the figure.
Note that in this manner, the agent a together with the agents at the top of the preference list
of a remain a happy pair.
Now, we insert happy women into the preference lists of men of the forms mi, m̂i, m˜ij and
mi,jt . Whenever we state below that we insert some set of arbitrarily chosen happy agents to
the preference list of some agent, we suppose that these happy agents are chosen from the set
of happy agents such that neither them nor their most preferred partners have already been
inserted to the preference list of any other agent. It would be clear that the number α′ is
sufficiently large to allow such selection.
First, for every i ∈ [k], we explicitly define the preference list of mi as follows. We set
dom(pmi) to consist of the union of W
i
bas ∪W
i,j
bas
and a set of arbitrarily chosen |E(G)|20(p −
1) +
p∑
j=1
(|E(G)| − |Ei,j |) happy women. Now, we set the preference list to satisfy the following
conditions.
1. For all j ∈ [p], pmi(wij) = 1 + (1 + |E(G)|+ |E(G)|20)(j − 1).
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2. For all j ∈ [p], we insert all of the women wi,jt such that ei,jt ∈ E(vij) into positions
2 + (1 + |E(G)| + |E(G)|20)(j − 1), 3 + (1 + |E(G)| + |E(G)|10)(j − 1), . . . , 1 + |E(vij)| +
(1+ |E(G)|+ |E(G)|20)(j−1) (the choice of which of these women occupies which of these
positions is arbitrary).
3. All of the positions that have not been occupied by the conditions above are occupied by
the happy women (the choice of which happy woman occupies which vacant position is
arbitrary).
Second, for every i ∈ [k], we explicitly define the preference list of m̂i as follows. We set
dom(pm̂i) to consist of the union of Ŵ
i
bas ∪ Ŵ
i,j
bas
and a set of arbitrarily chosen |E(G)|20(p −
1) +
p∑
j=1
(|E(G)| − |Ei,j |) happy women. Now, we set the preference list to satisfy the following
conditions.
1. For all j ∈ [p], pm̂i(wij) = 1 + (1 + |E(G)|+ |E(G)|20)(p− j).
2. For all j ∈ [p], we insert all of the women wi,jt such that ei,jt ∈ E(vij) into positions
2 + (1 + |E(G)| + |E(G)|20)(p − j), 3 + (1 + |E(G)| + |E(G)|20)(p − j), . . . , 1 + |E(vij)| +
(1+ |E(G)|+ |E(G)|20)(j−1) (the choice of which of these women occupies which of these
positions is arbitrary).
3. All of the positions that have not been occupied by the conditions above are occupied by
the happy women (the choice of which happy woman occupies which vacant position is
arbitrary).
Third, for every i ∈ [k], we explicitly define the preference list of m˜i1 as follows. We set
dom(pm˜i1) to consist of the union of {w˜i1, ŵi1, wi1} and a set of arbitrarily chosen |E(G)|30 + 1
happy women. Define pm˜i1(w˜
i
1) = 1, pm˜i1(ŵ
i
1) = 2 and pm˜i1(w
i
1) = 4 + |E(G)|30. All of the
positions that have not been occupied above are occupied by the happy women (the choice of
which happy woman occupies which vacant position is arbitrary). For every i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [p]
where 2 ≤ j ≤ p− 1, we explicitly define the preference list of m˜i1 as follows. We set dom(pm˜ij )
to consist of the union of {w˜ij , wij , ŵij , wij} and a set of arbitrarily chosen 2i−1|E(G)|30 happy
women. Define pm˜ij
(w˜ij) = 1, pm˜ij
(wij) = 2, pm˜ij
(ŵij) = 3 and pm˜ij
(wij) = 4 + 2
i−1|E(G)|30. All
of the positions that have not been occupied above are occupied by the happy women (the
choice of which happy woman occupies which vacant position is arbitrary). For every i ∈ [k],
we explicitly define the preference list of m˜ip as follows. We set dom(pm˜ip) to consist of the
union of {w˜ip, wip, wip} and a set of arbitrarily chosen 2k−1|E(G)|30 + 1 happy women. Define
pm˜ip(w˜
i
p) = 1, pm˜ip(w
i
p) = 2 and pm˜ip(w
i
p) = 4 + 2
k−1|E(G)|30. All of the positions that have
not been occupied above are occupied by the happy women (the choice of which happy woman
occupies which vacant position is arbitrary).
Fourth, for every i, j ∈ [k] where i < j and t ∈ [qi,j ], we explicitly define the preference list of
mi,jt as follows. We set dom(pmi,jt
) to consist of the union of {wi,jt , wi,jt } and a set of arbitrarily
chosen |E(G)|10 happy women. Define p
mi,jt
(wi,jt ) = 1 and pmi,jt
(wi,jt ) = 2 + |E(G)|10. All of the
positions that have not been occupied above are occupied by the happy women (the choice of
which happy woman occupies which vacant position is arbitrary).
We next insert happy men into the preference lists of women of the forms wij where j 6= 1, ŵij
where j 6= p, w˜ij and wi,jt . First, for every i ∈ [k] and j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , p−1}, we explicitly define the
preference list of wij as follows. We set dom(pwij
) to consist of the union of {mij+1,mi, m˜ij ,mij}
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and a set of arbitrarily chosen |E(G)|20 happy men. Define pwij (m
i
j+1) = 1, pwij
(mi) = 2,
pwij
(m˜ij) = 3 and pwij
(mij) = 4 + |E(G)|20. All of the positions that have not been occupied
above are occupied by the happy men (the choice of which happy man occupies which vacant
position is arbitrary). Moreover, for every i ∈ [k], we explicitly define the preference list of wip
as follows. We set dom(pwip) to consist of the union of {mi, m˜ip,mip} and a set of arbitrarily
chosen |E(G)|20 + 1 happy men. Define pwip(mi) = 2, pwip(m˜ip) = 3 and pwip(mip) = 4 + |E(G)|20.
All of the positions that have not been occupied above are occupied by the happy men (the
choice of which happy man occupies which vacant position is arbitrary).
Second, for every i ∈ [k] and j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , p − 1}, we explicitly define the preference list
of ŵij as follows. We set dom(pŵij
) to consist of the union of {m̂ij−1, m̂i, m˜ij , m̂ij} and a set of
arbitrarily chosen |E(G)|20 happy men. Define pŵij (m̂
i
j−1) = 1, pŵij (m̂
i) = 2, pŵij
(m˜ij) = 3 and
pŵij
(m̂ij) = 4 + |E(G)|20. All of the positions that have not been occupied above are occupied
by the happy men (the choice of which happy man occupies which vacant position is arbitrary).
Moreover, for every i ∈ [k], we explicitly define the preference list of ŵi1 as follows. We set
dom(pŵip) to consist of the union of {m̂i, m˜i1, m̂i1} and a set of arbitrarily chosen |E(G)|20 + 1
happy men. Define pŵi1(m
i) = 2, pŵi1(m˜
i
1) = 3 and pŵi1(m
i
1) = 4 + |E(G)|20. All of the positions
that have not been occupied above are occupied by the happy men (the choice of which happy
man occupies which vacant position is arbitrary).
Third, for every i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [p], we explicitly define the preference list of w˜ij as follows.
We set dom(pw˜ij
) to consist of the union of {mij , m˜ij} and a set of arbitrarily chosen 2k−i|E(G)|40
happy men. Define pw˜ij
(mij) = 1 and pw˜ij
(m˜ij) = 2 + 2
k−i|E(G)|40. All of the positions that
have not been occupied above are occupied by the happy men (the choice of which happy man
occupies which vacant position is arbitrary).
Fourth, for every i, j ∈ [k] where i < j and t ∈ [qi,j ], we explicitly define the preference list of
wi,jt as follows. We set dom(pwi,jt
) to consist of the union of {mi,jt ,mi, m̂i,mj , m̂j ,mi,jt } and a set
of arbitrarily chosen |E(G)|10 happy men. Define p
wi,jt
(mi,jt ) = 1, pwi,jt
(mi) = 2, p
wi,jt
(m̂i) = 3,
p
wi,jt
(mj) = 4, p
wi,jt
(m̂j) = 5 and p
wi,jt
(mi,jt ) = 6 + |E(G)|10. All of the positions that have not
been occupied above are occupied by the happy men (the choice of which happy man occupies
which vacant position is arbitrary).
Garbage Collector. Finally, we introduce one new man, m?, and one new woman, w?. The
preference list of µ? first contains all happy women, w1hap, w
2
hap, . . . , w
α
hap, in some arbitrary
order, and afterwards it contains the woman w?. The preference list of w? is simply defined to
contain only the man m?.
4.1.2 Treewidth
We begin the analysis of the reduction by bounding the treewidth of the resulting primal graph.
Lemma 4.1. Let I be an instance of Multicolored Clique. Then, the treewidth of redSESM (I)
is bounded by 2k +O(1).
Proof. Let P be the primal graph of redSESM (I), and let P̂ denote the graph obtained from
P by the removal of all of (the vertices that represent) men in Mbas ∪ M̂bas. Note that since
|Mbas ∪ M̂bas| = 2k, to prove that the treewidth of P is bounded by 2k +O(1), it is sufficient
to prove that the treewidth of every connected component of P̂ is bounded by O(1). Indeed,
given a tree decomposition of every connected component of P̂ of with O(1), we can construct
a tree decomposition of P of width 2k+O(1) by simply inserting all of the men in Mbas∪M̂bas
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into every bag of each of the tree decompositions and then arbitrarily connecting the tree
decompositions to obtain a single tree rather than a forest. Let P ′ denote the graph obtained
from P ′ be removing all of the happy agents. Note that all of the happy agents are either leaves
themselves in P ′ or vertices of degree 2 that are incident to happy agents that are leaves in P ′.
Given a tree decomposition (T, β) of P ′, we can construct a tree decomposition of P̂ of either
the same width or width O(1) as follows. We assign to each vertex v of P ′, which is adjacent
to some x happy agents, an arbitrarily chosen node u whose bag contains v, insert x new leaves
to T which are each adjacent to u, and defining the bag of each of these leaves to contain v, a
distinct happy agent adjacent to v and the agent most preferred by this happy agent. For each
pair of happy agents not yet inserted, we create a new node whose bag contains only these two
agents, and attach this node as a leaf to some arbitrarily chosen node of T .
By the arguments above, it is sufficient to show that the treewidth of P ′ is upper bounded
by O(1). First, for all i, j ∈ [k] where i < j and t ∈ [qi,j ], we have that {mi,jt , wi,jt , m˜i,jt } is the
entire vertex set of a connected component of P ′. Since this connected component is simply a
cycle, its treewidth is 2.
We next note that for all i ∈ [k], we have that Xi = M ienr ∪ M̂ ienr ∪ W ibas ∪ Ŵ ibas ∪
M˜ i ∪M i ∪ W˜ i ∪W i is the entire vertex set of a connected component of P ′. For this connected
component, which we denote by Ci. we explicitly define a tree decomposition (T i, βi) as follows.
The tree T i is simply a path on p vertices, denoted by T = u1 − u2 − · · · − up. We define
βi(u1) = {wi1,mi2, ŵi1, m̂i1, m˜i1,mi1, w˜i1, wi1} and βi(up) = {wip,mip, ŵip, m̂ip−1, m˜ip,mip, w˜ip, wip}. For
all j ∈ {2, . . . , p − 1}, we define βi(uj) = {wij ,mij ,mij+1, ŵij , m̂ij , m̂ij−1, m˜ij ,mij , w˜ij , wij}. Note
that the size of each bag of is upper bounded by 10 = O(1). Moreover, each agent in Xi belongs
to the bags of at most two nodes of T i, and these two nodes are adjacent. Lastly, for all j ∈ [p],
all endpoints of edges incident to either wij or ŵ
i
j belong to the bag β
i(uj), and every edge of C
i
has an endpoint in W ibas ∪ Ŵbas. Thus, (T i, βi) is indeed a tree decomposition of Ci of widthO(1).
Finally, the treewidth of the connected component consisting only of {m?, w?} is clearly 1.
Observe that we have indeed considered every connected component of P ′, and thus we conclude
the proof of the lemma.
4.1.3 Correctness
Forward Direction. We first show how given a solution of an instance I of Multicolored
Clique, we can construct a stable matching µ of redSESM (I) whose sex-equality measure is
exactly 0. For this purpose, we introduce the following definition. Here, when we denote a
vertex-set by U = {v1`1 , v2`2 , . . . , vt`k}, we implicitly assume that for every i ∈ [k], vi`i ∈ V i.
Moreover, when we denote an edge-set by W = {ei,j`i,j : i, j ∈ [k], i < j}, we implicitly assume
that for every i, j ∈ [k] where i < j, ei,j`i,j is an edge whose endpoints are a vertex in V i and a
vertex in V j .
Definition 4.2. Let I = (G, (V 1, V 2, . . . , V k)) be a Yes-instance of Multicolored Clique,
and let U = {v1`1 , v2`2 , . . . , vt`k} and W = {e
i,j
`i,j
: i, j ∈ [k], i < j} denote the vertex and edge
sets, respectively, of a multicolored clique C of G. Then, the matching µCSESM of redSESM (I)
is defined as follows.
• For all i ∈ [k]: µCSESM (mi) = wi`i and µCSESM (m̂i) = ŵi`i.
• For all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , `i}: µCSESM (mij) = wij−1.
• For all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ {`i + 1, `i + 2, . . . , p}: µCSESM (mij) = wij.
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• For all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ {`i, `i + 1, . . . , p− 1}: µCSESM (m̂ij) = ŵij+1.
• For all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [`i − 1]: µCSESM (m̂ij) = ŵij.
• For all i ∈ [k]: µCSESM (m˜i`i) = wi`i and µCSESM (mi`i) = w˜i`i.
• For all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [p] such that j 6= `i: µCSESM (m˜ij) = w˜ij and µCSESM (mij) = wij.
• For all i, j ∈ [k] where i < j: µCSESM (mi,j`i,j ) = w
i,j
`i,j
and µCSESM (m
i,j
`i,j
) = wi,j`i,j .
• For all i, j ∈ [k] where i < j and t ∈ [qi,j ] such that t 6= `i,j: µCSESM (mi,jt ) = wi,jt and
µCSESM (m
i,j
t ) = w
i,j
t .
• For all i ∈ [α′]: µCSESM (mihap) = wihap.
• µCSESM (m?) = w?.
Observe that µ matches all agents of redSESM (I). Let us first argue that µ
C
SESM is a stable
matching.
Lemma 4.2. Let I = (G, (V 1, V 2, . . . , V k)) be a Yes-instance of Multicolored Clique. Let
C be a multicolored clique of G. Then, µCSESM is a stable matching of redSESM (I).
Proof. First, notice that for every i ∈ [α′], mihap is matched to the woman he prefers the most,
and therefore this man cannot belong to any blocking pair. Thus, since the preference list of
µ? only contains happy women in addition to w?, we also have that µ? cannot belong to any
blocking pair. For all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , p} such that j > `i, mij is matched to the woman
he prefers the most, and for all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [p − 1] such that j < `i, m̂ij is matched to the
woman he prefers the most, thus these men cannot belong to any blocking pair. Moreover, for
all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [p] such that j 6= `i: m˜ij and mij are matched to the women they prefer the
most, and thus these men cannot belong to any blocking pair as well. We also note that for all
i, j ∈ [k] where i < j, mi,j`i,j and m
i,j
`i,j
are matched to the women they prefer the most, and thus
these men cannot belong to any blocking pair as well.
Next, we analyze each of the remaining men in M separately.
• For all i ∈ [k], recall that µCSESM (mi) = wi`i . The only women who mi prefers over wi`i ,
who are not happy women, are those that belong to the sets X = {wij : j ∈ [`i − 1]} and
Y = {wi,jt : j ∈ [k], j > i, there exists s ∈ [`i − 1] such that ei,jt is incident to vis in G}.
However, for all wij ∈ X, pwij (µ
C
SESM (w
i
j)) = pwij
(mij+1) < pwij
(mi), and for all wi,jt ∈ Y ,
p
wi,jt
(µCSESM (w
i,j
t )) = pwi,jt
(mi,jt ) < pwi,jt
(mi). Thus, mi cannot belong to any blocking
pair. Symmetrically, we derive that for all i ∈ [k], m̂i also cannot belong to any blocking
pair. Note that to ensure that both mi and m̂i do not belong to any blocking pair, we
crucially rely on the definition of their preference lists to be of the form of a leader.
• For all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , p} such that j ≤ `i, recall that µCSESM (mij) = wij−1. The
only woman who mij prefers over w
i
j−1 is w
i
j . However, w
i
j is matched to either m
i or mij+1,
who she prefers over mij . Thus, m
i
j also cannot belong to a blocking pair. Symmetrically,
we derive that for all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [p− 1] such that j ≥ `i, m̂ij also cannot belong to a
blocking pair.
• For all i ∈ [k], recall that µCSESM (m˜i`i) = wi`i . The only women who m˜i`i prefers over wi`i ,
who are not happy women, are wi`i (if `i 6= 1),ŵi`i (if `i 6= p) and w˜i`i . However, wi`i and
ŵi`i are matched to m
i and m̂i, respectively, who they prefer over m˜i`i . Moreover, w˜
i
`i
is
matched to mi`i , who she prefers over m˜
i
`i
. Thus, m˜i`i cannot belong to any blocking pair.
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• For all i ∈ [k], recall that µCSESM (mi`i) = w˜i`i . The only woman who mi`i prefers over w˜i`i is
wi`i . However, w
i
`i
is matched to m˜i`i , who she prefers over m
i
`i
. Thus, mi`i cannot belong
to a blocking pair.
• For all i, j ∈ [k] where i < j and t ∈ [qi,j ] such that t 6= `i,j , recall that µCSESM (mi,jt ) = wi,jt .
The only woman who mi,jt prefers over w
i,j
t , who is not a happy woman, is w
i,j
t . However,
wi,jt is matched to m
i,j
t , who she prefers over m
i,j
t . Thus, m
i,j
t cannot belong to a blocking
pair.
• For all i, j ∈ [k] where i < j and t ∈ [qi,j ] such that t 6= `i,j , recall that µCSESM (mi,jt ) = wi,jt .
The only woman who mi,jt prefers over w
i,j
t is w
i,j
t . However, w
i,j
t is matched to m
i,j
t , who
she prefers over mi,jt . Thus, m
i,j
t cannot belong to a blocking pair.
This concludes the proof of the lemma.
In light of Lemma 4.2, the measure δ(µCSESM ) is well defined. We proceed to analyze this
measure with the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3. Let I = (G, (V 1, V 2, . . . , V k)) be a Yes-instance of Multicolored Clique. Let
C be a multicolored clique of G. Then, δ(µCSESM ) = 0.
Proof. Let U = {v1`1 , v2`2 , . . . , vt`k} and W = {e
i,j
`i,j
: i, j ∈ [k], i < j} denote the vertex and edge
sets, respectively, of the multicolored clique C. We first analyze the positions of women in the
preference lists of their matched partners.
• For all i ∈ [k], pmi(wi`i) = 1 + (1 + |E(G)| + |E(G)|20)(`i − 1) and pm̂i(ŵi`i) = 1 + (1 +
|E(G)|+ |E(G)|20)(p− `i).
• For all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , p} such that j ≤ `i: pmij (w
i
j−1) = 2.
• For all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , p} such that j > `i: pmij (w
i
j) = 1.
• For all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [p− 1] such that j ≥ `i: pm̂ij (ŵ
i
j+1) = 2.
• For all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [p− 1] such that j < `i: pm̂ij (ŵ
i
j) = 1.
• For all i ∈ [k]: pm˜i`i (w
i
`i
) = 4 + 2i−1|E(G)|30 and pmij (w˜
i
j) = 2.
• For all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [p] such that j 6= `i: pm˜ij (w˜
i
j) = 1 and pmij
(wij) = 1.
• For all i ∈ [k], j ∈ [p]: p
mi,j`i,j
(wi,j`i,j ) = 1 and pmi,j`i,j
(wi,j`i,j ) = 1.
• For all i ∈ [k], j ∈ [p] and t ∈ [qi,j ] such that t 6= `i,j : pmi,jt (w
i,j
t ) = 2 + |E(G)|10 and
p
mi,jt
(wi,jt ) = 2.
• For all i ∈ [α′]: pmi
hap
(wihap) = 1.
• pm?(w?) = α+ 1.
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Thus, we have that the following equality holds.
satM (µ
C
SESM ) =
k∑
i=1
(
2 + (1 + |E(G)|+ |E(G)|20)(`i − 1) + (1 + |E(G)|+ |E(G)|20)(p− `i)
)
+
k∑
i=1
`i∑
j=2
2 +
k∑
i=1
p∑
j=`i+1
1 +
k∑
i=1
p−1∑
j=`i
2 +
k∑
i=1
`i−1∑
j=1
1
+
k∑
i=1
(
4 + 2i−1|E(G)|30 + 2)+ k∑
i=1
∑
j∈[p],j 6=`i
(1 + 1)
+
k−1∑
i=1
k∑
j=i+1
(1 + 1) +
k−1∑
i=1
k∑
j=i+1
∑
t∈[qi,j ],t6=`i,j
(
2 + |E(G)|10 + 2)
+α′ + (α+ 1)
= 2k + (1 + |E(G)|+ |E(G)|20)(p− 1)k + 3kp− 3k + 6k + (2k − 1)|E(G)|30
+2(p− 1)k + k(k − 1) + (4 + |E(G)|10)(|E(G)| − (k2)) + α′ + α+ 1
= 1 + 3k + 6pk − k2 + (pk − k + 4)|E(G)|
+(p− 1)k|E(G)|20 + (|E(G)| − (k2))|E(G)|10 + (2k − 1)|E(G)|30 + α′ + α.
Second, we analyze the positions of men in the preference lists of their matched partners.
• For all i ∈ [k]: pwi`i (m
i) = 2 and pŵi`i
(m̂i) = 2.
• For all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [`i − 1]: pwij (m
i
j+1) = 1.
• For all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [p] such that j > `i: pwij (m
i
j+1) = 4 + |E(G)|20.
• For all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [p] such that j > `i: pŵij (m̂
i
j−1) = 1.
• For all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [`i − 1]: pwij (m
i
j+1) = 4 + |E(G)|20.
• For all i ∈ [k]: pw˜i`i (m
i
`i
) = 1 and pwi`i
(m˜i`i) = 1.
• For all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [p] such that j 6= `i: pw˜ij (m˜
i
j) = 2 + 2
k−i|E(G)|40 and pwij (m
i
j) = 2.
• For all i ∈ [k], j ∈ [p]: p
wi,j`i,j
(mi,j`i,j ) = 6 + |E(G)|10 and pwi,j`i,j (m
i,j
`i,j
) = 2.
• For all i ∈ [k], j ∈ [p] and t ∈ [qi,j ] such that t 6= `i,j : pwi,jt (m
i,j
t ) = 1 and pwi,jt
(mi,jt ) = 1.
• For all i ∈ [α′]: pwi
hap
(mihap) = 1.
• pw?(m?) = 1.
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Thus, we have that the following equality holds.
satW (µ
C
SESM ) =
k∑
i=1
(2 + 2) +
k∑
i=1
`i−1∑
j=1
1 +
k∑
i=1
p∑
j=`i+1
(4 + |E(G)|20) +
k∑
i=1
p∑
j=`i+1
1
+
k∑
i=1
`i−1∑
j=1
(4 + |E(G)|20) +
k∑
i=1
(1 + 1) +
k∑
i=1
∑
j∈[p],j 6=`i
(
2 + 2k−i|E(G)|40 + 2
)
+
k−1∑
i=1
k∑
j=i+1
(
6 + |E(G)|10 + 2)+ k−1∑
i=1
k∑
j=i+1
∑
t∈[qi,j ],t 6=`i,j
(1 + 1) + α′ + 1
= 4k + (p− 1)k + (p− 1)k(4 + |E(G)|20) + 2k + 4(p− 1)k
+(p− 1)(2k − 1)|E(G)|40 + (k2)(8 + |E(G)|10) + 2(|E(G)| − (k2)) + α′ + 1
= 1− 6k + 9pk + 3k2 + 2|E(G)|
+(p− 1)k|E(G)|20 + (k2)|E(G)|10 + (p− 1)(2k − 1)|E(G)|40 + α′.
Thus, to derive that satM (µ
C
SESM ) = satW (µ
C
SESM ), which would imply that δ(µ
C
SESM ) = 0,
we need to show that the following equality holds.
3k + 6pk − k2 + (pk − k + 4)|E(G)|+ (|E(G)| − (k2))|E(G)|10 + (2k − 1)|E(G)|30 + α
= −6k + 9pk + 3k2 + 2|E(G)|+ (k2)|E(G)|10 + (p− 1)(2k − 1)|E(G)|40
However, recall that
α = −9k + 3pk + 4k2 − (pk − k + 2)|E(G)|
−(|E(G)| − 2(k2))|E(G)|10 − (2k − 1)|E(G)|30 + (p− 1)(2k − 1)|E(G)|40.
This concludes the proof of the lemma.
Combining Lemmata 4.2 and 4.3, we derive the following corollary.
Corollary 4.1. Let I be a Yes-instance of Multicolored Clique. Then, for the instance
redSESM (I) of SESM, ∆ = 0.
This concludes the proof of the forward direction.
Reverse Direction. Second, we prove that given an instance I of Multicolored Clique, if
for the instance redSESM (I) of SESM, ∆ = 0, then we can construct a solution for I. To this
end, we first need to analyze the structure of stable matchings of redSESM (I) whose sex-equality
measure is 0. Let us begin by proving the following two lemmata.
Lemma 4.4. Let I be an of Multicolored Clique. Every stable matching of redSESM (I)
matches all agents.
Proof. Observe that the matching µ that matches every man to the woman he prefers the most,
except for m? who is matched to w?, is a stable matching. Indeed, in this matching, it is clear
that no man but m? can belong to a blocking pair simply because there is no woman who such
a man prefers over his current partner, and the man m? cannot belong to a blocking pair since
all of the women who he prefers over w? are matched to their most preferred men. Thus, by
Proposition 2.2, we deduce that every stable matching of redSESM (I) matches all men. Since the
number of men is equal to the number of women, we conclude the correctness of the lemma.
Lemma 4.5. Let I be an of Multicolored Clique. Every stable matching µ of redSESM (I)
satisfies the following conditions.
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1. For all i ∈ [k], µ(mi) ∈W ibas and µ(m̂i) ∈ Ŵ ibas.
2. For all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [p], µ(m˜ij) ∈ {w˜ij , wij}.
3. For all i ∈ [α′], µ(mihap) = wihap.
4. µ(m?) = w?.
Proof. Let µ be a stable matching of redSESM (I). Since for all i ∈ [α′], mihap and wihap prefer
each other over all other agents, they must be matched to one another (by µ), else they would
have formed a blocking pair. Then, since apart from happy women, the preference lists of m?
and w? only contain each other, they also must be matched to one another, else they would
have formed a blocking pair. We have thus proved the satisfaction of Conditions 3 and 4.
Next, to prove the satisfaction of Condition 2, consider some man m˜ij ∈ M˜ ij . Since Condition
3 is satisfied, m˜ij is either unmatched or matched to a woman in {w˜ij , wij , ŵij , wij}. Suppose, by
way of contradiction, that m˜ij is either unmatched or matched to a woman in {wij , ŵij}. Then,
since m˜ij prefers being matched to w˜
i
j over his current status, yet µ does not have any blocking
pair, we have that w˜ij must be matched to (since she is the only unhappy man that she prefers
over m˜ij). Then, however w
i
j is necessarily left unmatched, and thus she forms a blocking pair
together with mij , reaching a contradiction.
Finally, to prove the satisfaction of Condition 1, consider some index i ∈ [k]. Since Condition
3 is satisfied, mi is either unmatched or matched to a woman in W ibas∪(
⋃k
j=i+1W
i,j
bas
). Suppose,
by way of contradiction, that mi is either unmatched or matched to a woman in (
⋃k
j=i+1W
i,j
bas
).
By Lemma 4.4, the first possibility is not feasible, and therefore there exists j ∈ [k] such that
mi is matched to some woman wi,jt ∈W i,jt . Since wi,jt prefers mi,jt over mi, yet µ does not have
any blocking pair, we have that mi,jt must be matched to w
i,j
t (since she is the only unhappy
man that she prefers over wi,jt ). Then, however m
i,j
t is necessarily left unmatched, and thus he
forms a blocking pair together with wi,jt , reaching a contradiction. Symmetrically, we derive
that µ(m̂i) ∈ Ŵ ibas. This concludes the proof of the lemma.
To proceed with our proof of correctness of our reduction, we need to analyze the sex-
equality measure. For this purpose, we use the notation defined below, which is well-defined
due to Lemmata 4.4 and 4.5.
Definition 4.3. Let I be an instance of Multicolored Clique, and let µ be a stable matching
of redSESM (I). For all i ∈ [k], let a(µ, i) and â(µ, i) denote the indices j ∈ [p] and ĵ ∈ [p],
respectively, such that µ(mi) = wij and µ(m̂
i) = ŵij. Moreover, for all i ∈ [k], denote b(µ, i) =
|{j ∈ [p] : µ(m˜ij) = wij}|. Finally, denote c(µ) = |{(i, j, t) ∈ [k] × [k] × [qi,j ] : i < j, µ(mi,jt ) =
wij}|.
Next, we analyze the sex-equality measure.
Lemma 4.6. Let I be an instance of Multicolored Clique, and let µ be a stable matching
of redSESM (I). Then, for some −100|E(G)|2 ≤ x ≤ 100|E(G)|2, it holds that
satM (µ)− α′ =
k∑
i=1
(p+ a(µ, i)− â(µ, i)− 1)|E(G)|20 + (c(µ)− |E(G)|+ 2
(
k
2
)
)|E(G)|10
+
(
(
k∑
i=1
b(µ, i)2i−1)− 2k + 1
)
|E(G)|30 + (p− 1)(2k − 1)|E(G)|40 + x.
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Moreover, for some −10|E(G)|2 ≤ y ≤ 10|E(G)|2, it holds that
satW (µ)− α′ =
k∑
i=1
(p+ â(µ, i)− a(µ, i)− 1)|E(G)|20 + (|E(G)| − c(µ))|E(G)|10 +
k∑
i=1
(p− b(µ, i))2k−i|E(G)|40 + y.
Proof. On the one hand, by Lemmata 4.4 and 4.5 and the definition of preference lists of the
men of redSESM (I), we have that
satM (µ) =
k∑
i=1
pmi(µ(m
i)) +
k∑
i=1
pm̂i(µ(m̂
i)) +
k∑
i=1
p∑
j=1
pmij
(µ(mij)) +
k∑
i=1
p∑
j=1
pm̂ij
(µ(m̂ij))
+
k∑
i=1
p∑
j=1
pm˜ij
(µ(m˜ij)) +
k∑
i=1
p∑
j=1
pmij
(µ(mij))
+
k−1∑
i=1
k∑
j=i+1
qi,j∑
t=1
p
mi,jt
(µ(mi,jt )) +
k−1∑
i=1
k∑
j=i+1
qi,j∑
t=1
p
mi,jt
(µ(mi,jt )) + α
′ + α+ 1
=
k∑
i=1
(
1 + (1 + |E(G)|+ |E(G)|20)(a(µ, i)− 1))
+
k∑
i=1
(
1 + (1 + |E(G)|+ |E(G)|20)(p− â(µ, i)))
+
k∑
i=1
a(µ,i)∑
j=2
2 +
k∑
i=1
p∑
j=a(µ,i)+1
1 +
k∑
i=1
â(µ,i)−1∑
j=1
1 +
k∑
i=1
p−1∑
j=â(µ,i)
2
+
k∑
i=1
(
b(µ, i)(6 + 2i−1|E(G)|30) + 2(p− b(µ, i)))
+c(µ)(4 + |E(G)|10) + 2(|E(G)| − c(µ)) + α′ + α+ 1.
Thus, we have that
α+
k∑
i=1
(p+ a(µ, i)− â(µ, i)− 1)|E(G)|20 + c(µ)|E(G)|10 +
k∑
i=1
b(µ, i)2i−1|E(G)|30 − 10|E(G)|2
≤ satM (µ)− α′
≤ α+
k∑
i=1
(p+ a(µ, i)− â(µ, i)− 1)|E(G)|20 + c(µ)|E(G)|10 +
k∑
i=1
b(µ, i)2i−1|E(G)|30 + 10|E(G)|2.
Substituting α, we have that
k∑
i=1
(p+ a(µ, i)− â(µ, i)− 1)|E(G)|20 + (c(µ)− |E(G)|+ 2
(
k
2
)
)|E(G)|10
+
(
(
k∑
i=1
b(µ, i)2i−1)− 2k + 1
)
|E(G)|30 + (p− 1)(2k − 1)|E(G)|40 − 100|E(G)|2
≤ satM (µ)− α′
≤
k∑
i=1
(p+ a(µ, i)− â(µ, i)− 1)|E(G)|20 + (c(µ)− |E(G)|+ 2
(
k
2
)
)|E(G)|10
+
(
(
k∑
i=1
b(µ, i)2i−1)− 2k + 1
)
|E(G)|30 + (p− 1)(2k − 1)|E(G)|40 + 100|E(G)|2.
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On the other hand, by Lemmata 4.4 and 4.5 and the definition of preference lists of the
women of redSESM (I), we have that
satW (µ) =
k∑
i=1
pµ(mi)(m
i) +
k∑
i=1
pµ(m̂i)(m̂
i) +
k∑
i=1
p∑
j=1
pµ(mij)
(mij) +
k∑
i=1
p∑
j=1
pµ(m̂ij)
(m̂ij)
+
k∑
i=1
p∑
j=1
pµ(m˜ij)
(m˜ij) +
k∑
i=1
p∑
j=1
pµ(mij)
(mij)
+
k−1∑
i=1
k∑
j=i+1
qi,j∑
t=1
p
µ(mi,jt )
(mi,jt ) +
k−1∑
i=1
k∑
j=i+1
qi,j∑
t=1
p
µ(mi,jt )
(mi,jt ) + α
′ + 1
= 4k +
k∑
i=1
(a(µ, i)− 1) +
k∑
i=1
(p− a(µ, i))(4 + |E(G)|20))
+
k∑
i=1
(p− â(µ, i)) +
k∑
i=1
(â(µ, i)− 1)(4 + |E(G)|20))
+
k∑
i=1
(
2b(µ, i) + (p− b(µ, i))(4 + 2k−i|E(G)|40)
)
+2c(µ) + (|E(G)| − c(µ))(8 + |E(G)|10) + α′ + 1.
Thus, we have that
(p+ â(µ, i)− a(µ, i)− 1)|E(G)|20 + (|E(G)| − c(µ))|E(G)|10 +
k∑
i=1
(p− b(µ, i))2k−i|E(G)|40
−10|E(G)|2
≤ satW (µ)− α′
≤ (p+ â(µ, i)− a(µ, i)− 1)|E(G)|20 + (|E(G)| − c(µ))|E(G)|10 +
k∑
i=1
(p− b(µ, i))2k−i|E(G)|40
+10|E(G)|2.
This concludes the proof of the lemma.
The following two lemmata prove further useful properties of the matching partners of agents
in the context of a stable matching µ that satisfies δ(µ) = 0.
Lemma 4.7. Let I be an instance of Multicolored Clique. Let µ be a stable matching of
redSESM (I) such that δ(µ) = 0. Then, for all i ∈ [k], there exists j ∈ [p] such that µ(m˜ij) = wij
and for all t 6= j, µ(m˜ij) = w˜ij.
Proof. The statement of the lemma is equivalent to the statement that for all i ∈ [k], b(µ, i) = 1.
Since δ(µ) = 0, it holds that satM (µ) − α′ = satW (µ) − α′. Hence, by Lemma 4.6, the two
following equalities are satisfied.
•
(
(
k∑
i=1
b(µ, i)2i−1)− 2k + 1
)
|E(G)|30 = 0.
• (p− 1)(2k − 1)|E(G)|40 =
k∑
i=1
(p− b(µ, i))2k−i|E(G)|40.
Simplifying the equalities above, we derive that the two following equalities are satisfied.
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•
k∑
i=1
b(µ, i)2i−1 = 2k − 1.
•
k∑
i=1
b(µ, i)2k−i = 2k − 1.
Note that for all i ∈ [k], b(µ, i) ∈ [p]. Let ϕ be an assignment to the variables b(µ, i) that
satisfies this condition as well as the two equalities above. We claim that ϕ necessarily assigns
1 to all of these variables. This claim can be easily proven by induction on k. In the base case,
where k = 1, the first equality directly implies that b(µ, 1) = 1. Now, suppose that k ≥ 2 and
that the claim holds for k−1. Then, first note that to satisfy the first equality, it must hold that
b(µ, k) ≤ 1, while to satisfy the second one, it must holds that b(µ, k) ≥ 1. Thus, b(µ, k) = 1,
which implies that the two following equalities are then satisfied.
•
k−1∑
i=1
b(µ, i)2i−1 + 2k−1 = 2k − 1. That is,
k−1∑
i=1
b(µ, i)2i−1 = 2k−1 − 1
•
k−1∑
i=1
b(µ, i)2k−i + 1 = 2k − 1. That is,
k−1∑
i=1
b(µ, i)2(k−1)−i = 2k−1 − 1.
By the inductive hypothesis, we derive that for all i ∈ [k − 1], it also holds that b(µ, i) = 1.
This concludes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 4.8. Let I be an instance of Multicolored Clique. Let µ be a stable matching of
redSESM (I) such that δ(µ) = 0. Then, for all i ∈ [k], there exists j ∈ [p] such that µ(mi) = wij
and µ(m̂i) = m̂ij.
Proof. Since δ(µ) = 0, it holds that satM (µ) − α′ = satW (µ) − α′. Hence, by Lemma 4.6, the
following equality is satisfied.
k∑
i=1
(p+ a(µ, i)− â(µ, i)− 1)|E(G)|20 =
k∑
i=1
(p+ â(µ, i)− a(µ, i)− 1)|E(G)|20.
For all i ∈ [k], denote a′(µ, i) = (p + 1) − â(µ, i). Then, by simplifying the equality above,
we derive that the following equality is satisfied.
k∑
i=1
(a(µ, i) + a′(µ, i)) = (p+ 1)k.
Fix some i′ ∈ [k]. By Lemma 4.7, there exists j′ ∈ [p] such that µ(m˜i′j′) = wi
′
j′ . Observe that
m˜i
′
j′ prefers both w
i′
j′ and ŵ
i′
j′ over w
i′
j′ , but since µ ∈ S, he forms a blocking pair with neither
of them. Thus, we deduce that wi
′
j′ is matched to either m
i′ or mi
′
j′+1, and that ŵ
i′
j′ is matched
to either m̂i
′
or m̂i
′
j′−1. Hence, by Lemmata 4.4 and 4.5, we deduce that all of the women in
{wi′j ∈ W i
′
bas : j ≥ j′} are matched to men in {mi
′
j ∈ M i
′
enr : j > j
′} ∪ {mi′}, and all of the
women in {ŵi′j ∈ Ŵ i
′
bas : j ≤ j′} are matched to men in {m̂i
′
j ∈ M̂ i
′
enr : j < j
′} ∪ {m̂i′}. In
particular, this implies that a(µ, i′) ≥ j′ and â(µ, i′) ≤ j. The latter inequality is equivalent to
a′(µ, i′) ≥ (p+ 1)− j. We thus get that a(µ, i′) + a′(µ, i′) ≥ p+ 1.
Since the choice of i′ above was arbitrary, we derive that for all i ∈ [k], a(µ, i)+a′(µ, i) ≥ p+1.
However, since
k∑
i=1
(a(µ, i) + a′(µ, i)) = (p+ 1)k, we have that for all i ∈ [k], a(µ, i) + a′(µ, i) =
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p + 1. By substituting a′(i, ·), we have that for all i ∈ [k], a(µ, i) = â(µ, i). This claim is
equivalent to the statemtn of the lemma, and thus we conclude its proof.
We are now ready to prove the correctness of the reverse direction.
Lemma 4.9. Let I = (G, (V 1, V 2, . . . , V k)) be an instance of Multicolored Clique. If for
the instance redSESM (I) of SESM, ∆ = 0, then I is a Yes-instance of Multicolored Clique.
Proof. Suppose that for the instance redSESM (I) of SESM, ∆ = 0. Then, there exists a stable
matching µ such that δ(µ) = 0. Hence, by Lemma 4.6, the following equality is satisfied.
(c(µ)− |E(G)|+ 2
(
k
2
)
)|E(G)|10 = (|E(G)| − c(µ))|E(G)|10.
Simplifying the equality above, we have that the following equality is satisfied.
c(µ) = |E(G)| −
(
k
2
)
.
Denote W ′ = {wi,jt ∈
⋃
i,j∈[k],i<jW
i,j
bas
: µ(wi,jt ) = m
i,j
t }. By the equality above and Lem-
mata 4.4 and 4.5, we have that |W ′| = (k2). By Lemma 4.8, for all i ∈ [k], it is well defined
to let `i denote the index j ∈ [p] such that µ(mi) = wi`i and µ(m̂i) = ŵi`i . Since every woman
wi,jt ∈W ′ prefers both mi and m̂i over her matched partner, we have that wi,jt is located before
wi`i in the preference list of m
i as well as before ŵi`i in the preference list of m̂
i. However, by
the definition of the preference lists of mi and m̂i, it must then hold that ei,jt is an edge incident
to vi`i in G. Hence, we have that X = {vi`i : i ∈ [k]} is a subset of V (G) size k such that every
edge in Y = {ei,jt : wi,jt } is incident to two vertices in X. Since |Y | = |W ′| =
(
k
2
)
, we deduce
that X is the vertex set of a colorful clique of G. We thus conclude that I is a Yes-instance of
Multicolored Clique.
Summary. Finally, we note that the reduction can be performed in time that is polynomial in
the size of the output. That is, we have the following observation.
Observation 4.1. Let I = (G, (V 1, V 2, . . . , V k)) be an instance of Multicolored Clique.
Then, the instance redSESM (I) of SESM can be constructed in time 2
O(k) · nO(1). Here, n =
|V (G)|.
By Proposition 4.1, Lemma 4.1, Corollary 4.1, Lemma 4.9 and Observation 4.1, we conclude
that SESM is W[1]-hard. Moreover, unless ETH fails, SESM cannot be solved in time f(tw) ·
no(tw) for any function f that depends only on tw. Here, n is the number of agents.
4.2 Balanced Stable Marriage
Second, we prove that BSM is W[1]-hard, and that unless ETH fails, BSM cannot be solved in
time f(tw) · no(tw) for any function f that depends only on tw.
4.2.1 Reduction
Let I = (G, (V 1, V 2, . . . , V k)) be an instance of Multicolored Clique. We now describe how
to construct an instance redBSM (I) = (M,W, {pm}|m∈M , {pw}|w∈W ) of BSM. The construction
of redBSM (I) is identical to redSESM (I) up until the part where we introduce happy pairs. The
preference lists the agents of the form mi, m̂i, mi,jt , w
i
j , m˜
i
j , m
i,j
t , w
i,j
t and w
? are defined exactly
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as in the case of SESM. The preference list of m? is defined as before with the exception that
now rather than α happy women, it contains the following number α̂ of happy women.
α̂ = α− (p− 1)(2k − 1)|E(G)|40 + 13(p− 1)(4k − 1)|E(G)|40
= −9k + 3pk + 4k2 − (pk − k + 2)|E(G)|
−(|E(G)| − 2(k2))|E(G)|10 − (2k − 1)|E(G)|30 + 13(p− 1)(4k − 1)|E(G)|40.
Thus, it only remains to define the preference lists of the agents of the form w˜ij . For every
i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [p], we explicitly define the preference list of w˜ij as follows. We set dom(pw˜ij ) to
consist of the union of {mij , m˜ij} and a set of arbitrarily chosen 4i−1|E(G)|40 happy men. Define
pw˜ij
(mij) = 1 and pw˜ij
(m˜ij) = 2 + 4
i−1|E(G)|40. All of the positions that have not been occupied
above are occupied by the happy men (the choice of which happy man occupies which vacant
position is arbitrary).
Finally, let us define
η = 1 + 3k + 6pk − k2 + (pk − k + 4)|E(G)|
+(p− 1)k|E(G)|20 + (|E(G)| − (k2))|E(G)|10 + (2k − 1)|E(G)|30 + α′ + α̂
Note that
η = 1− 6k + 9pk + 3k2 + 2|E(G)|
+(p− 1)k|E(G)|20 + (k2)|E(G)|10 + (p− 1)13(4k − 1)|E(G)|40 + α′.
4.2.2 Treewidth
Let I be an instance of Multicolored Clique. Notice that the primal graphH of redBSM (I) =
(M,W, {pm}|m∈M , {pw}|w∈W ) is the same as the primal graph H ′ of the instance of SESM con-
structed in Section 4.2 with the exception that a different number of pendent paths on two
vertices that are attached to each vertex of the form w˜ij . Clearly, this observation implies that
the treewidth of H is the same as the treewidth of H ′. We thus have the following version of
Lemma 4.1.
Lemma 4.10. Let I be an instance of Multicolored Clique. Then, the treewidth of
redBSM (I) is bounded by 2k +O(1).
4.2.3 Correctness
Forward Direction. Due to the manner in which we define redBSM in the context of BSM, we
can again employ Definition 4.2. More precisely, given a multicolored clique C of an instance I
of Multicolored Clique, we define µCBSM exactly as µ
C
SESM (with the modification that we
now match a different number of happy agents to one another). Consequently, we derive the
appropriate version of Lemma 4.2.
Lemma 4.11. Let I = (G, (V 1, V 2, . . . , V k)) be a Yes-instance of Multicolored Clique. Let
C be a multicolored clique of G. Then, µCBSM is a stable matching of redBSM (I).
In light of Lemma 4.11, the measure bal(µCBSM ) is well defined. We proceed to analyze this
measure with the following lemma.
Lemma 4.12. Let I = (G, (V 1, V 2, . . . , V k)) be a Yes-instance of Multicolored Clique. Let
C be a multicolored clique of G. Then, δ(µCBSM ) ≤ η.
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Proof. First, since among the men, only the preference list of m? has changed, where now it con-
tains α̂ happy women rather than α happy women, we have that satM (µ
C
BSM ) = satM (µ
C
SESM )−
α+ α̂. By the definition of η and the arguments given in the proof of Lemma 4.3, we have that
satM (µ
C
SESM ) = η − (p − 1)(2k − 1)|E(G)|40 + (p − 1)13(4k − 1)|E(G)|40 = η − α + α̂, which
implies that satM (µ
C
BSM ) = η.
Second, note that since the preference lists of women of the form w˜ij have changed, the term
k∑
i=1
p∑
j=1
pw˜ij
(µCSESM (w˜
i
j)) = k +
∑k
i=1(p− 1)
(
2 + 2i−1|E(G)|40)
= k +
k∑
i=1
(p− 1)
(
2 + 2k−i|E(G)|40
)
= k + 2(p− 1)k + (p− 1)(2k − 1)|E(G)|40.
which is part of the analysis of satW (µ
C
SESM ), is replaced by the term
k∑
i=1
p∑
j=1
pw˜ij
(µCBSM (w˜
i
j)) = k +
∑k
i=1(p− 1)
(
2 + 2i−1|E(G)|40)
= k +
∑k
i=1(p− 1)
(
2 + 4i−1|E(G)|40)
= k + 2(p− 1)k + (p− 1)13(4k − 1)|E(G)|40.
Since the preference lists of all other women remained the same, this is the only term that is
changed. Thus, we have that satW (µ
C
BSM ) = satW (µ
C
SESM ) − (p − 1)(2k − 1)|E(G)|40 + (p −
1)13(4
k−1)|E(G)|40. By Lemma 4.3, satM (µCSESM ) = satW (µCSESM ), and therefore satW (µCBSM ) =
η. We thus conclude that δ(µCBSM ) ≤ η.
Combining Corollary 4.11 and Lemma 4.12, we derive the following corollary.
Corollary 4.2. Let I be a Yes-instance of Multicolored Clique. Then, for the instance
redBSM (I) of BSM, Bal ≤ η.
This concludes the proof of the forward direction.
Reverse Direction. Second, we prove that given an instance I of Multicolored Clique, if
for the instance redBSM (I) of BSM, Bal = 0, then we can construct a solution for I. First,
exactly as in the case of SESM, the following two lemmata are true.
Lemma 4.13. Let I be an of Multicolored Clique. Every stable matching of redBSM (I)
matches all agents.
Lemma 4.14. Let I be an of Multicolored Clique. Every stable matching µ of redBSM (I)
satisfies the following conditions.
1. For all i ∈ [k], µ(mi) ∈W ibas and µ(m̂i) ∈ Ŵ ibas.
2. For all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [p], µ(m˜ij) ∈ {w˜ij , wij}.
3. For all i ∈ [α′], µ(mihap) = wihap.
4. µ(m?) = w?.
Now, we reuse Definition 4.3 in the context of BSM, and turn to prove the appropriate
adaptation of Lemma 4.6 (specifically, we need to update the coefficient of |E(G)|40 in the
equality involving satW (µ)).
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Lemma 4.15. Let I be an instance of Multicolored Clique, and let µ be a stable matching
of redBSM (I). Then, for some −100|E(G)|2 ≤ x ≤ 100|E(G)|2, it holds that
satM (µ)− α′ =
k∑
i=1
(p+ a(µ, i)− â(µ, i)− 1)|E(G)|20 + (c(µ)− |E(G)|+ 2
(
k
2
)
)|E(G)|10
+
(
(
k∑
i=1
b(µ, i)2i−1)− 2k + 1
)
|E(G)|30 + 1
3
(p− 1)(4k − 1)|E(G)|40 + x.
Moreover, for some −10|E(G)|2 ≤ y ≤ 10|E(G)|2, it holds that
satW (µ)− α′ =
k∑
i=1
(p+ â(µ, i)− a(µ, i)− 1)|E(G)|20 + (|E(G)| − c(µ))|E(G)|10 +
k∑
i=1
(p− b(µ, i))4i−1|E(G)|40 + y.
Proof. On the one hand, note that except for m?, the preference lists of the men of redBSM (I)
are the same as their preference lists in redSESM (I). Hence, the first part of the lemma (that is,
the equality concerning satM (µ)) is proven exactly as in the proof of Lemma 4.6, where due to
the man m?, the term (p− 1)(2k − 1)|E(G)|40 is replaced by the term 13(p− 1)(4k − 1)|E(G)|40.
On the other hand, by Lemmata 4.13 and 4.14 and the definition of preference lists of the
agents of redBSM (I), we have that
satW (µ) =
k∑
i=1
pµ(mi)(m
i) +
k∑
i=1
pµ(m̂i)(m̂
i) +
k∑
i=1
p∑
j=1
pµ(mij)
(mij) +
k∑
i=1
p∑
j=1
pµ(m̂ij)
(m̂ij)
+
k∑
i=1
p∑
j=1
pµ(m˜ij)
(m˜ij) +
k∑
i=1
p∑
j=1
pµ(mij)
(mij)
+
k−1∑
i=1
k∑
j=i+1
qi,j∑
t=1
p
µ(mi,jt )
(mi,jt ) +
k−1∑
i=1
k∑
j=i+1
qi,j∑
t=1
p
µ(mi,jt )
(mi,jt ) + α
′ + 1
= 4k +
k∑
i=1
(a(µ, i)− 1) +
k∑
i=1
(p− a(µ, i))(4 + |E(G)|20))
+
k∑
i=1
(p− â(µ, i)) +
k∑
i=1
(â(µ, i)− 1)(4 + |E(G)|20))
+
k∑
i=1
(
2b(µ, i) + (p− b(µ, i))(4 + 4i−1|E(G)|40))
+2c(µ) + (|E(G)| − c(µ))(8 + |E(G)|10) + α′ + 1.
Thus, we have that
(p+ â(µ, i)− a(µ, i)− 1)|E(G)|20 + (|E(G)| − c(µ))|E(G)|10 +
k∑
i=1
(p− b(µ, i))4i−1|E(G)|40
−10|E(G)|2
≤ satW (µ)− α′
≤ (p+ â(µ, i)− a(µ, i)− 1)|E(G)|20 + (|E(G)| − c(µ))|E(G)|10 +
k∑
i=1
(p− b(µ, i))4i−1|E(G)|40
+10|E(G)|2.
This concludes the proof of the lemma.
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Since the coefficient of |E(G)|40 above has changed, we need to explicitly prove the following
version of Lemma 4.7. We remark that if this coefficient were to remain the same, the lemma
would not have been correct, and therefore we had to perform the presented modification of the
preference lists of m? and women of the form w˜ij .
Lemma 4.16. Let I be an instance of Multicolored Clique. Let µ be a stable matching of
redBSM (I) such that bal(µ) ≤ η. Then, for all i ∈ [k], there exists j ∈ [p] such that µ(m˜ij) = wij
and for all t 6= j, µ(m˜ij) = w˜ij.
Proof. The statement of the lemma is equivalent to the statement that for all i ∈ [k], b(µ, i) = 1.
Since Bal(µ) = 0, it holds that satM (µ) ≤ η and satW (µ) ≤ η. Hence, by Lemma 4.15, the two
following inequalities are satisfied.
•
(
(
k∑
i=1
b(µ, i)2i−1)− 2k + 1
)
|E(G)|30 ≤ 0.
•
k∑
i=1
(p− b(µ, i))4i−1|E(G)|40 ≤ 1
3
(p− 1)(4k − 1)|E(G)|40.
Simplifying the inequalities above, we derive that the two following inequalities are satisfied.
1.
k∑
i=1
b(µ, i)2i−1 ≤ 2k − 1.
2.
1
3
(4k − 1) ≤
k∑
i=1
b(µ, i)4i−1.
Note that for all i ∈ [k], b(µ, i) ∈ [p]. Let ϕ be an assignment to the variables b(µ, i) that
satisfies this condition as well as the two inequalities above. We claim that ϕ necessarily assigns
1 to all of these variables. This claim can be proven by induction on k. In the base case,
where k = 1, the Equation 1 directly implies that b(µ, 1) ≤ 1, while Equation 2 implies that
1 = 13(4
1 − 1) ≤ b(µ, 1), and therefore b(µ, 1) = 1.
We next suppose that k ≥ 2 and that the claim holds for k − 1. Then, first note that
to satisfy Equality 1, it must hold that b(µ, k) ≤ 1. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that
b(µ, k) = 0. By Equation 1, we have that b(µ, k−1) ≤ 3. Accordingly, we consider the following
cases.
• Assume that b(µ, k−1) = 3. By Equation 1,
k−2∑
i=1
b(µ, i)2i−1 ≤ 2k − 1− 3 · 2k−2 = 1
4
2k − 1.
Hence, we have that
k∑
i=1
b(µ, i)4i−1 =
3
16
22k +
k−2∑
i=1
b(µ, i)2i−12i
≤ 3
16
22k +
(
1
4
2k − 1
)
2k−2
=
3
16
22k +
1
16
22k − 2k−2 ≤ 1
4
4k − 1.
However,
1
4
4k − 1 < 1
3
(4k − 1), which contradicts the satisfaction of Equality 2.
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• Assume that b(µ, k−1) = 2. By Equation 1,
k−2∑
i=1
b(µ, i)2i−1 ≤ 2k − 1− 2 · 2k−2 = 1
2
2k − 1.
Hence, we have that
k∑
i=1
b(µ, i)4i−1 =
1
8
22k +
k−2∑
i=1
b(µ, i)2i−12i
≤ 1
8
22k +
(
1
2
2k − 1
)
2k−2
=
1
8
22k +
1
8
22k − 2k−2 ≤ 1
4
4k − 1.
Again, this contradicts the satisfaction of Equality 2.
• Assume that b(µ, k − 1) = 1. By Equation 1,
k−2∑
i=1
b(µ, i)2i−1 ≤ 2k − 1− 2k−2 = 3
4
2k − 1.
Hence, we have that
k∑
i=1
b(µ, i)4i−1 =
1
16
22k +
k−2∑
i=1
b(µ, i)2i−12i
≤ 1
16
22k +
(
3
4
2k − 1
)
2k−2
=
1
16
22k +
3
16
22k − 2k−2 ≤ 1
4
4k − 1.
Again, this contradicts the satisfaction of Equality 2.
• Assume that b(µ, k − 1) = 0. Then, by Equality 1, we have that
k∑
i=1
b(µ, i)4i−1 =
k−2∑
i=1
b(µ, i)2i−12i ≤ (2k − 1)2k−2 ≤ 1
4
4k − 1.
Again, this contradicts the satisfaction of Equality 2.
Thus, we derive that b(µ, k) = 1, which implies that the two following inequalities are then
satisfied.
•
k−1∑
i=1
b(µ, i)2i−1 + 2k−1 ≤ 2k − 1. That is,
k−1∑
i=1
b(µ, i)2i−1 ≤ 2k−1 − 1
• 1
3
(4k − 1) ≤
k−1∑
i=1
b(µ, i)4i−1 + 4k−1. That is,
1
3
(4k−1 − 1) ≤
k−1∑
i=1
b(µ, i)4i−1.
By the inductive hypothesis, we derive that for all i ∈ [k − 1], it also holds that b(µ, i) = 1.
This concludes the proof of the lemma.
Having proved Lemma 4.16, we now turn the prove the following version of Lemma 4.8.
Lemma 4.17. Let I be an instance of Multicolored Clique. Let µ be a stable matching of
redBSM (I) such that bal(µ) ≤ η. Then, for all i ∈ [k], there exists j ∈ [p] such that µ(mi) = wij
and µ(m̂i) = m̂ij.
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Proof. Since bal(µ) = 0, it holds that satM (µ) ≤ η and satW (µ) ≤ η. By Lemma 4.16, for all
i ∈ [k], b(µ, i) = 1. Hence, by Lemma 4.6, to satisfy satM (µ) ≤ η, the following inequality is
satisfied.
k∑
i=1
(p+ a(µ, i)− â(µ, i)− 1)|E(G)|20 ≤ (p− 1)k|E(G)|20.
Moreover, by Lemma 4.6, to satisfy satW (µ) ≤ η, the following inequality is satisfied.
k∑
i=1
(p+ â(µ, i)− a(µ, i)− 1)|E(G)|20 ≤ (p− 1)k|E(G)|20.
That is, the two following inequalities are satisfied.
•
k∑
i=1
(a(µ, i)− â(µ, i)) ≤ 0.
•
k∑
i=1
(â(µ, i)− a(µ, i)) ≤ 0.
These two inequalities imply that
k∑
i=1
a(µ, i) =
k∑
i=1
â(µ, i). For all i ∈ [k], denote a′(µ, i) =
(p+ 1)− â(µ, i). Then,
k∑
i=1
(a(µ, i) + a′(µ, i)) = (p+ 1)k.
Having established the last equality above, the proof proceeds exactly as the proof of Lemma
4.8.
We are now ready to prove the correctness of the reverse direction.
Lemma 4.18. Let I = (G, (V 1, V 2, . . . , V k)) be an instance of Multicolored Clique. If for
the instance redBSM (I) of BSM, Bal = 0, then I is a Yes-instance of Multicolored Clique.
Proof. Suppose that for the instance redBSM (I) of BSM, Bal = 0. Then, there exists a stable
matching µ such that bal(µ) = 0. Hence, satM (µ) ≤ η and satW (µ) ≤ η. By Lemmata 4.15,
4.16 and 4.17, to satisfy satM (µ) ≤ η, the following inequality is satisfied.
(c(µ)− |E(G)|+ 2
(
k
2
)
) ≤
(
k
2
)
.
Moreover, by Lemmata 4.15, 4.16 and 4.17, to satisfy satW (µ) ≤ η, the following inequality is
satisfied.
(|E(G)| − c(µ)) ≤
(
k
2
)
.
The first inequality is equivalent to c(µ) ≤ |E(G)| −
(
k
2
)
, while the second inequality is equiv-
alent to c(µ) ≥ |E(G)| −
(
k
2
)
. Thus, we have that c(µ) = |E(G)| −
(
k
2
)
. Having established
this last equality, the proof proceeds exactly as the proof of Lemma 4.9.
Summary. Finally, we note that the reduction can be performed in time that is polynomial in
the size of the output. That is, we have the following observation.
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Observation 4.2. Let I = (G, (V 1, V 2, . . . , V k)) be an instance of Multicolored Clique.
Then, the instance redBSM (I) of BSM can be constructed in time 2
O(k)·nO(1). Here, n = |V (G)|.
By Proposition 4.1, Lemma 4.10, Corollary 4.2, Lemma 4.18 and Observation 4.2, we con-
clude that BSM is W[1]-hard. Moreover, unless ETH fails, BSM cannot be solved in time
f(tw) · no(tw) for any function f that depends only on tw. Here, n is the number of agents.
4.3 max-Stable Marriage with Ties
Next, we prove that max-SMT is W[1]-hard, and that unless ETH fails, max-SMT cannot be
solved in time f(tw) · no(tw) for any function f that depends only on tw.
4.3.1 Reduction
Let I = (G, (V 1, V 2, . . . , V k)) be an instance of Multicolored Clique. We now describe
how to construct an instance redmax(I) = (M,W, {pm}|m∈M , {pw}|w∈W ) of max-SMT. First,
we again use the set of basic agents defined in Section 4.1. Recall that for this set of basic
agents, the preference lists of the men in Mbas ∪ M̂bas are of the form of a leader. In the
current reduction, this form completes the precise definition of the preference lists of the men
in Mbas ∪ M̂bas, since for all i ∈ [k], we now set the intersection of dom(pmi) with M , the set
of all men, to be exactly W ibas ∪W
i,j
bas
, and we also set the intersection of dom(pm̂i) with M to
be exactly Ŵ ibas ∪W
i,j
bas
.
In our current reduction, we would have one set of gadgets called Combined Vertex Selector
gadgets, rather than the three sets of Original Vertex Selector gadgets, Mirror Vertex Selector
gadgets and Consistency gadgets that were introduced in Section 4.1. Namely, we would be able
to integrate all of the properties guaranteed by the later three sets of gadgets using only one set
of gadgets in a manner that does not compromise the readability of the reduction. Afterwards,
we would again introduce a set of Edge Selector gadgets. Here, however, the definition of happy
pairs is not required, as the source of difficulty of max-SMT lies in the existence of ties in
preference lists and not in the necessity to achieve a certain budget such as ∆ = 0.
Combined Vertex Selector. For every color class i ∈ [k], our first set of gadgets introduces
the following sets of new men: M ienr = {mi2,mi3, . . . ,mip} and M̂ = {m̂i1, m̂i2, . . . , m̂ip}. Note
that or all i ∈ [k], mi1 is not defined, but m̂i1 is defined. We also introduce one new woman,
called wi. For all j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , p}, the preference list of mij is defined as follows. We set
dom(pmij
) = {wij−1, wij}, and pmij (w
i
j−1) = pmij (w
i
j) = 1. Moreover, for all j ∈ [p], the preference
list of m̂ij is defined as follows. We set dom(pm̂ij
) = {wi, wij , ŵij}, pm̂ij (w
i) = 1, pm̂ij
(wij) = 2 and
pm̂ij
(ŵij) = 3. This completes the definition of the preference lists of all men introduced so far.
Let us now also define the preference lists of the women participating in the Combined
Vertex Selector gadget that handles color class i ∈ [k]. First, the preference list of wi1 is defined
as follows. We set dom(pwi1) = {mi2, m̂i1,mi}, pwi1(mi2) = 1, pwi1(m̂i1) = 2 and pwi1(mi) = 3.
For all j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , p − 1}, the preference list of wij is defined as follows. We set dom(pwij ) =
{mij ,mij+1, m̂ij ,mi}, pwij (m
i
j) = pwij
(mij+1) = 1, pwij
(m̂ij) = 2 and pwij
(mi) = 3. The preference
list of wip is defined as follows. We set dom(pwip) = {mip, m̂i1}, pwip(mip) = 1, pwip(m̂ip) = 2 and
pwip(m
i) = 3. Second, for all j ∈ [p], the preference list of ŵij is defined by setting dom(pŵij ) =
{m̂ij , m̂i}, pŵij (m̂
i
j) = 1 and pŵij
(m̂i) = 2. Finally, the preference list of wi is defined as follows.
We set dom(pwi) = M
i
enr, where for all j ∈ {2, 3 . . . , p}, pwi(mij) = 1.
An illustration of a Combined Vertex Selector gadget is given in Fig. 4.
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Figure 4: The Combined Vertex Selector gadget where p = 5. Numbers indicate the positions
of agents in preference lists.
Edge Selector. For every two color classes i, j ∈ [k] where i < j, we introduce the following
three sets of new men: M i,jenr = {mi,j1 ,mi,j2 , . . . ,mi,jqi,j}, M
i,j
= {mi,j1 ,mi,j2 , . . . ,mi,jqi,j} and M˜ i,j =
{m˜i,j2 , m˜i,j3 , . . . , m˜i,jqi,j}. We also introduce two sets of new women: W
i,j
= {wi,j1 , wi,j2 , . . . , wi,jqi,j}
and M˜ i,j = {w˜i,j2 , w˜i,j3 , . . . , w˜i,jqi,j}.
Let us now define the preference lists of the men participating in the Edge Selector gadget
that handles color classes i, j ∈ [k] where i < j. For all t ∈ [qi,j ], the preference list of mi,jt is
defined by setting dom(p
mi,jt
) = {wi,jt , wi,jt } and pmi,jt (w
i,j
t ) = pmi,jt
(wi,jt ) = 1. The preference
list of mi,j1 is set by defining dom(pmi,j1
) = {w˜i,j2 , wi,j1 }, pmi,j1 (w˜
i,j
2 ) = 1 and pmi,j1
(wi,j1 ) = 2. For
all t ∈ {2, 3, . . . , qi,j}, the preference list of mi,jt is set by defining dom(pmi,jt ) = {w˜
i,j
t , w˜
i,j
t+1, w
i,j
t },
p
mi,jt
(w˜i,jt ) = pmi,jt
(w˜i,jt+1) = 1 and pmi,jt
(wi,jt ) = 2. The preference list of m
i,j
p is set by defining
dom(p
mi,jp
) = {w˜i,jp , wi,jp }, pmi,jp (w˜
i,j
p ) = 1 and pmi,jp (w
i,j
p ) = 2. For all t ∈ {2, 3, . . . , qi,j},
the preference list of m˜i,jt is defined by setting dom(pm˜i,jt
) = {wi,jt−1, wi,jt } and pm˜i,jt (w
i,j
t−1) =
p
m˜i,jt
(wi,jt ) = 1.
We proceed by defining the preference lists of the women participating in the Edge Selector
gadget that handles color classes i, j ∈ [k] where i < j. For all t ∈ [p], the preference list
of wi,jt is defined as follows. We set dom(pwi,jt
) = {mi,jt ,mi, m̂i,mj , m̂j ,mi,jt }, pwi,jt (m
i,j
t ) = 1,
p
wi,jt
(mi) = 2, p
wi,jt
(m̂i) = 2, p
wi,jt
(mj) = 2, p
wi,jt
(m̂j) = 2 and p
wi,jt
(mi,jt ) = 3. The preference
list of wi,j1 is set by defining dom(pwi,j1
) = {m˜i,j2 ,mi,j1 }, pwi,j1 (m˜
i,j
2 ) = 1 and pwi,j1
(mi,j1 ) = 2. For
all t ∈ {2, 3, . . . , qi,j}, the preference list of wi,jt is set by defining dom(pwi,jt ) = {m˜
i,j
t , m˜
i,j
t+1,m
i,j
t },
p
wi,jt
(m˜i,jt ) = pwi,jt
(m˜i,jt+1) = 1 and pwi,jt
(mi,jt ) = 2. The preference list of w
i,j
p is set by defining
dom(p
wi,jp
) = {m˜i,jp ,mi,jp }, pwi,jp (m˜
i,j
p ) = 1 and pwi,jp (m
i,j
p ) = 2. For all t ∈ {2, 3, . . . , qi,j},
the preference list of w˜i,jt is defined by setting dom(pw˜i,jt
) = {mi,jt−1,mi,jt } and pw˜i,jt (m
i,j
t−1) =
p
w˜i,jt
(mi,jt ) = 1.
An illustration of an Edge Selector gadget is given in Fig. 5.
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Figure 5: The Edge Selector gadget where qi,j = 5. Numbers indicate the positions of agents in
preference lists.
4.3.2 Treewidth
We begin the analysis of the reduction by bounding the treewidth of the resulting primal graph.
Lemma 4.19. Let I be an instance of Multicolored Clique. Then, the treewidth of
redmax(I) is bounded by 2k +O(1).
Proof. Let P be the primal graph of redmax(I), and let P
′ denote the graph obtained from
P by the removal of all of (the vertices that represent) men in Mbas ∪ M̂bas. Note that
|Mbas ∪ M̂bas| = 2k. Hence, as in the proof of Lemma 4.1, to prove that the treewidth of P is
bounded by 2k+O(1), it is sufficient to prove that the treewidth of every connected component
of P ′ is bounded by O(1). First, for all i ∈ [k], we have that M ienr∪M̂ ienr∪W ibas∪Ŵ ibas∪{wi}
is the entire vertex set of a connected component of P ′. Since after we remove wi from this
connected component we obtain a tree (whose treewidth is 1), we deduce that the treewidth of
this connected component is at most 2.
Next, note that for all i, j ∈ [k] where i < j and t ∈ [qi,j ], it holds that Xi,j = M i,jenr ∪
M
i,j ∪ M˜ i,j ∪ W i,j
bas
∪ W i,j ∪ W˜ i,j is the entire vertex set of a connected component of P ′.
For this connected component, which we denote by Ci,j , we explicitly define a tree decompo-
sition (T i,j , βi,j) as follows. Denote q = qi,j . The tree T i,j is simply a path on q vertices,
denoted by T = u1 − u2 − · · · − uq. We define βi,j(u1) = {wi,j1 ,mi,j1 , wi,j1 ,mi,j1 , m˜i,j2 , w˜i,j2 } and
βi,j(uq) = {wi,jq ,mi,jq , wi,jq ,mi,jq , m˜i,jq , w˜i,jq }. For all t ∈ {2, . . . , q − 1}, we define βi,j(ut) =
{wi,jt ,mi,jt , wi,jt ,mi,jt , m˜i,jt , w˜i,jt , m˜i,jt+1, w˜i,jt+1}. Note that the size of each bag of is upper bounded
by 10 = O(1). Moreover, each agent in Xi,j belongs to the bags of at most two nodes of T i,j ,
and these two nodes are adjacent. Lastly, for all j ∈ [p], all endpoints of edges incident to either
wi,jt or m
i,j
t belong to the bag β
i,j(ut), and every edge of C
i,j has an endpoint in W
i,j ∪M i,j .
Thus, (T i, βi) is indeed a tree decomposition of Ci,j of width O(1).
We have thus considered every connected component of P ′, and hence we conclude the proof
of the lemma.
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4.3.3 Correctness
Forward Direction. We first show how given a solution of an instance I of Multicolored
Clique, we can construct a stable matching µ of redmax(I) which matches all agents. For this
purpose, we introduce the following definition.
Definition 4.4. Let I = (G, (V 1, V 2, . . . , V k)) be a Yes-instance of Multicolored Clique,
and let U = {v1`1 , v2`2 , . . . , vt`k} and W = {e
i,j
`i,j
: i, j ∈ [k], i < j} denote the vertex and edge sets,
respectively, of a multicolored clique C of G. Then, the matching µCmax of redmax(I) is defined
as follows.
• For all i ∈ [k]: µCmax(mi) = wi`i and µCmax(m̂i) = ŵi`i.
• For all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , `i}: µCmax(mij) = wij−1.
• For all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ {`i + 1, `i + 2, . . . , p} : µCmax(mij) = wij.
• For all i ∈ [k]: µCmax(m̂i`i) = wi.
• For all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [p] such that j 6= `i: µCmax(m̂ij) = ŵij.
• For all i, j ∈ [k] where i < j: µCmax(mi,j`i,j ) = w
i,j
`i,j
and µCmax(m
i,j
`i,j
) = wi,j`i,j .
• For all i, j ∈ [k] where i < j and t ∈ [qi,j ] such that t 6= `i,j: µCmax(mi,jt ) = wi,jt .
• For all i, j ∈ [k] where i < j and t ∈ {2, 3, . . . , `i,j}: µCmax(m˜i,jt ) = wi,jt−1 and µCmax(mi,jt−1) =
w˜i,jt .
• For all i, j ∈ [k] where i < j and t ∈ {`i,j + 1, `i,j + 2, . . . , qi,j}: µCmax(m˜i,jt ) = wi,jt and
µCmax(m
i,j
t ) = w˜
i,j
t .
By Definition 4.4, we directly derive the following observation.
Observation 4.3. Let I = (G, (V 1, V 2, . . . , V k)) be a Yes-instance of Multicolored Clique.
Let C be a multicolored clique of G. Then, µCmax matches all agents of redmax(I).
Lemma 4.20. Let I = (G, (V 1, V 2, . . . , V k)) be a Yes-instance of Multicolored Clique. Let
C be a multicolored clique of G. Then, µCMAX is a stable matching of redmax(I).
Proof. First, for all i ∈ [k], we claim that neither mi not m̂i can belong to a blocking pair. All
the women in W ibas \ {wi`i} are matched to men that they rank at position 1 in their preference
lists, and therefore none of them can form a blocking pair with mi. Similarly, all the women
in Ŵ ibas \ {ŵi`i} are matched to men that they rank at position 1 in their preference lists,
and therefore none of them can form a blocking pair with m̂i. All of the other women in the
preference lists of both mi and m̂i belong to
⋃
j∈[k],j 6=iW
i,j
bas
. For all j ∈ [k], j 6= i, due to the
fact that the preference lists of mi and m̂i are of the form of a leader and ei,j`i,j is incident to
vi`i in G, we have that m
i prefers wi`i over w
i,j
`i
and that m̂i prefers ŵi`i over w
i,j
`i
. Moreover, for
all j ∈ [k], j 6= i and t ∈ [qi,j ] such that t 6= `i,j , we have that wi,jt is matched to the man she
prefers the most, and therefore she can form a blocking pair with neither mi nor m̂i.
Second, notice that for all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [p], mij is matched to a woman at position 1 in
his preference list, and therefore he cannot belong to a blocking pair. Moreover, notice that for
all i ∈ [k], wi is matched to a man at position 1 in her preference list, and therefore she cannot
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belong to a blocking pair. Thus, since for all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [p], the only woman that m̂ij prefers
over his matched partner is wi, we have that m̂ij cannot belong to a blocking pair.
Third, for all i, j ∈ [k] where i < j and t ∈ [qi,j ], mi,j is matched to a woman at position
1 in his preference list, and therefore he cannot belong to a blocking pair. Moreover, for all
i, j ∈ [k] where i < j and t ∈ {2, 3, . . . , qi,j}, w˜i,jt is matched to a man at position 1 in her
preference list, and therefore she cannot belong to a blocking pair. Hence, for i, j ∈ [k] where
i < j and t ∈ [qi,j ], all of the women that mi,jt prefers over his matched partner (if there are
any such women) cannot belong to blocking pairs, and thus mi,jt cannot belong to a blocking
pair. Finally, for all i, j ∈ [k] where i < j and t ∈ {2, 3, . . . , qi,j}, m˜i,jt is matched to a woman
at position 1 in his preference list, and therefore he cannot belong to a blocking pair.
Combining Observation 4.3 and Lemma 4.20, we derive the following corollary.
Corollary 4.3. Let I be a Yes-instance of Multicolored Clique. Then, the instance
redmax(I) of max-SMT admits a stable matching that matches all agents.
This concludes the proof of the forward direction.
Reverse Direction. Second, we prove that given an instance I of Multicolored Clique, if
the instance redmax(I) of max-SMT admits a stable matching that matches all agents, then
we can construct a solution for I. To this end, we analyze the structure of stable matchings of
redmax(I) that match all agents.
Lemma 4.21. Let I be an instance of Multicolored Clique. Let µ be a stable matching of
redmax(I) that matches all agents. Then, for all i ∈ [k], there exists j ∈ [p] such that µ(mi) = wij
and µ(m̂i) = ŵij.
Proof. Let i ∈ [k] be some color class. First, notice that excluding mi and m̂i, the Combined
Vertex Selector gadget for color class i contains exactly 2p + 1 women and 2p − 1 men. Thus,
since µ matches all agents, both mi and m̂i must be matched to women that belong to this
gadget. Since among the women in this gadget, mi only ranks those women in W ibas and m̂
i
only ranks those women in Ŵ ibas, we have that there exist j, ĵ ∈ [p] such that µ(mi) = wij and
µ(m̂i) = ŵi
ĵ
. Since µ is a stable matching although wij prefers m̂
i
j over m
i, we have that µ
matches m̂ij to w
i as this is the only woman that over which m̂ij does not prefer w
i
j . However,
note that excluding m̂ij , the only man in the preference list of ŵ
i
j is m̂
i. Since ŵij is matched
by µ, we deduce that j = ĵ. As the choice i was arbitrary, we conclude that the lemma is
correct.
Lemma 4.22. Let I be an instance of Multicolored Clique. Let µ be a stable matching of
redmax(I) that matches all agents. Then, for all i, j ∈ [k] where j < i, there exists t ∈ [qi,j ] such
that µ(wi,jt ) = m
i,j
t .
Proof. Let i, j ∈ [k], i < j, be some two color classes. Note that |W˜ i,j | = p− 1 while |M i,j | = p.
Thus, there exists t ∈ [qi,j ] such that mi,jt is not matched to a woman in W˜ i,j . Since the
only other woman in the preference list of mi,jt is w
i,j
t and µ matches all agents, we have
that µ(wi,jt ) = m
i,j
t . As the choices of i and j were arbitrary, we conclude that the lemma is
correct.
Lemma 4.23. Let I = (G, (V 1, V 2, . . . , V k)) be an instance of Multicolored Clique. If the
instance redmax(I) of max-SMT admits a stable matching that matches all agents, then I is a
Yes-instance of Multicolored Clique.
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Proof. Suppose that the instance redmax(I) of max-SMT admits a stable matching µ that
matches all agents. By Lemma 4.21, for all i ∈ [k], there exists `i ∈ [p] such that µ(mi) = wi`i
and µ(m̂i) = ŵi`i . Moreover, by Lemma 4.22, for all i, j ∈ [k] where j < i, there exists `i,j ∈ [qi,j ]
such that µ(wi,j`i,j ) = m
i,j
`i,j
. Denote U = {v1`1 , v2`2 , . . . , vt`k} and W = {e
i,j
`i,j
: i, j ∈ [k], i < j}.
Note that we have proved that |U | = k and |W | ≥ (k2). Since for all i, j ∈ [k] where j < i, wi,j`i
prefers both mi and m̂i over her matched partner, we have that wi,j`i is not located after w
i
`i
in
the preference list of mi as well as that it is not located after ŵi`i in the preference list of m̂
i.
However, by the definition of the preference lists of mi and m̂i, it must then hold that ei,j`i,j is
an edge incident to vi`i in G. Hence, we derive that U is the vertex set of a colorful clique of G.
We thus conclude that I is a Yes-instance of Multicolored Clique.
Summary. Finally, we note that the reduction can be performed in time that is polynomial in
the size of the output. That is, we have the following observation.
Observation 4.4. Let I = (G, (V 1, V 2, . . . , V k)) be an instance of Multicolored Clique.
Then, the instance redmax(I) of max-SMT can be constructed in time polynomial in the size of I.
By Proposition 4.1, Lemma 4.19, Corollary 4.3, Lemma 4.23 and Observation 4.4, we con-
clude that max-SMT is W[1]-hard. Moreover, unless ETH fails, max-SMT cannot be solved in
time f(tw) ·no(tw) for any function f that depends only on tw. Here, n is the number of agents.
4.4 min-Stable Marriage with Ties
Finally, we prove that min-SMT is W[1]-hard, and that unless ETH fails, min-SMT cannot be
solved in time f(tw) · no(tw) for any function f that depends only on tw.
4.4.1 Reduction
Let I = (G, (V 1, V 2, . . . , V k)) be an instance of Multicolored Clique. We now describe
how to construct an instance redmin(I) = (M,W, {pm}|m∈M , {pw}|w∈W ) of min-SMT. First, we
again use the set of basic agents defined in Section 4.1. Recall that for this set of basic agents, the
preference lists of the men in Mbas∪M̂bas are of the form of a leader. Here, we also add two sets
of new women: W ienr = {w1, w2, . . . , wk} and Ŵ ienr = {ŵ1, ŵ2, . . . , ŵk}. For all i ∈ [k], we set
the intersection of dom(pmi) with M , the set of all men, to be exactly W
i
bas∪W
i,j
bas
∪{wi}, and
we also set the intersection of dom(pm̂i) with M to be exactly Ŵ
i
bas∪W
i,j
bas
∪{ŵi}. Moreover, we
define wi and ŵi to be the least preferred women by mi and m̂i, respectively. We thus complete
the precise definition of the preference lists of the men in Mbas ∪ M̂bas. The preference list of
wi is defined to contains only mi, and the preference list of ŵi is defined to contains only m̂i.
In what follows, as in the case of max-SMT, we introduce two types of gadgets, namely, the
Combined Vertex Selector gadget and the Edge Selector gadget.
Combined Vertex Selector. For every color class i ∈ [k], our first set of gadgets introduces
the following sets of new men: M ienr = {mi1,mi2, . . . ,mip} and M̂ = {m̂i1, m̂i2, . . . , m̂ip}. We also
introduce one set of new women: W
i
= {wi1, wi2, . . . , wip}. For all j ∈ [p], the preference list of
mij is defined by setting dom(pmij
) = {wij , wij}, pmij (w
i
j) = 1 and pmij
(wij) = 2. Moreover, for all
j ∈ [p], the preference list of m̂ij is defined by setting dom(pm̂ij ) = {ŵ
i
j , w
i
j}, pm̂ij (ŵ
i
j) = 1 and
pm̂ij
(wij) = 2.
For all j ∈ [p], the preference list of wij is defined by setting dom(pwij ) = {m
i,mij}, and
pwij
(mi) = pwij
(mij) = 1. Moreover, for all j ∈ [p], the preference list of ŵij is defined by setting
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Figure 6: The Combined Vertex Selector gadget where p = 4. Numbers indicate the positions
of agents in preference lists.
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Figure 7: The Edge Selector gadget where qi,j = 5. Numbers indicate the positions of agents in
preference lists.
dom(pŵij
) = {m̂i,mij}, and pŵij (m
i) = pŵij
(m̂ij) = 1. Finally, the preference list of w
i
j is defined
by setting dom(pwij
) = {mij , m̂ij}, and pwij (m
i
j) = pwij
(m̂ij) = 1. An illustration of a Combined
Vertex Selector gadget is given in Fig. 6.
Edge Selector. For every two color classes i, j ∈ [k] where i < j, we introduce one set of new
men: M i,jenr = {mi,j1 ,mi,j2 , . . . ,mi,jqi,j}. We also introduce one new woman, called wi,j . For all
t ∈ [qi,j ], the preference list of mi,jt is defined by setting dom(pmi,jt ) = {w
i,j , wi,jt }, pmi,jt (w
i,j) = 1
and p
mi,jt
(wi,jt ) = 2. For all t ∈ [qi,j ], the preference list of wi,jt is defined by setting dom(pwi,jt ) =
{mi,jt ,mi, m̂i,mj , m̂j}, pwi,jt (m
i,j
t ) = 1 and pwi,jt
(mi) = p
wi,jt
(m̂i) = p
wi,jt
(mj) = p
wi,jt
(m̂j) = 2.
The preference list of wi,j is defined by setting dom(pwi,j ) = M
i,j
enr where for all t ∈ [qi,j ],
pwi,j (m
i,j
t ) = 1. An illustration of a Combined Vertex Selector gadget is given in Fig. 7.
4.4.2 Treewidth
We begin the analysis of the reduction by bounding the treewidth of the resulting primal graph.
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Lemma 4.24. Let I be an instance of Multicolored Clique. Then, the treewidth of
redmin(I) is bounded by 2k +O(1).
Proof. Let P be the primal graph of redmin(I), and let P
′ denote the graph obtained from
P by the removal of all of (the vertices that represent) men in Mbas ∪ M̂bas. Note that
|Mbas ∪ M̂bas| = 2k. Hence, as in the proof of Lemma 4.1, to prove that the treewidth of P is
bounded by 2k+O(1), it is sufficient to prove that the treewidth of every connected component
of P ′ is bounded by O(1). However, P ′ is a forest, and therefore the treewidth of each of its
connected components is simply 1.
4.4.3 Correctness
Forward Direction. We first show how given a solution of an instance I of Multicolored
Clique, we can construct a stable matching µ of redmin(I) which matches all agents. For this
purpose, we introduce the following definition.
Definition 4.5. Let I = (G, (V 1, V 2, . . . , V k)) be a Yes-instance of Multicolored Clique,
and let U = {v1`1 , v2`2 , . . . , vt`k} and W = {e
i,j
`i,j
: i, j ∈ [k], i < j} denote the vertex and edge sets,
respectively, of a multicolored clique C of G. Then, the matching µCmin of redmin(I) is defined
as follows.
• For all i ∈ [k]: µCmin(mi) = wi`i and µCmin(m̂i) = ŵi`i.
• For all i ∈ [k]: µCmin(mi`i) = wi`i and m̂i`i is not matched.
• For all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [p] such that j 6= `i: µCmin(mij) = wij and µCmin(m̂ij) = ŵij.
• For all i, j ∈ [k] where i < j: µCmin(mi,j`i,j ) = wi,j.
• For all i, j ∈ [k] where i < j and t ∈ [qi,j ] such that t 6= `i,j: µCmin(mi,jt ) = wi,jt .
By Definition 4.5, we directly derive the following observation.
Observation 4.5. Let I = (G, (V 1, V 2, . . . , V k)) be a Yes-instance of Multicolored Clique.
Let C be a multicolored clique of G. Then, the size of µCmin is k + 2|V (G)|+ |E(G)|.
Lemma 4.25. Let I = (G, (V 1, V 2, . . . , V k)) be a Yes-instance of Multicolored Clique. Let
C be a multicolored clique of G. Then, µCmin is a stable matching of redmin(I).
Proof. First, for all i ∈ [k], we claim that neither mi not m̂i can belong to a blocking pair. All
the women in W ibas \ {wi`i} are matched to men that they rank at position 1 in their preference
lists, and therefore none of them can form a blocking pair with mi. Similarly, all the women
in Ŵ ibas \ {ŵi`i} are matched to men that they rank at position 1 in their preference lists,
and therefore none of them can form a blocking pair with m̂i. All of the other women in the
preference lists of both mi and m̂i belong to
⋃
j∈[k],j 6=iW
i,j
bas
. For all j ∈ [k], j 6= i, due to the
fact that the preference lists of mi and m̂i are of the form of a leader and ei,j`i,j is incident to
vi`i in G, we have that m
i prefers wi`i over w
i,j
`i
and that m̂i prefers ŵi`i over w
i,j
`i
. Moreover, for
all j ∈ [k], j 6= i and t ∈ [qi,j ] such that t 6= `i,j , we have that wi,jt is matched to the man she
prefers the most, and therefore she can form a blocking pair with neither mi nor m̂i.
Second, notice that for all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [p] such that j 6= `i, mij and m̂ij are matched to
women at position 1 in their preference lists, and therefore they cannot belong to any blocking
pair. Moreover, notice that for all i ∈ [k], wi`i , ŵi`i and wi`i are matched to men at position 1
42
in their preference lists, and therefore they cannot belong to any blocking pair. Since the only
women in the preference lists of mij and m̂
i
j are these three women, we have that there two men
cannot belong to any blocking pair as well.
Third, for all i, j ∈ [k] where i < j and t ∈ [qi,j ], note that wi,j is matched to a man at
position 1 in her preference list, and therefore she cannot belong to any blocking pair. Hence,
every man in M i,jenr is matched to a woman that he ranks ranks either first or second, and the
(unique) woman that he ranks first is wi,j . Therefore, no man in M i,jenr can belong to a blocking
pair.
Combining Observation 4.5 and Lemma 4.25, we derive the following corollary.
Corollary 4.4. Let I be a Yes-instance of Multicolored Clique. Then, the instance
redmin(I) of min-SMT admits a stable matching of size k + 2|V (G)|+ |E(G)|.
This concludes the proof of the forward direction.
Reverse Direction. Second, we prove that given an instance I of Multicolored Clique, if the
instance redmin(I) of min-SMT admits a stable matching of size at most k+ 2|V (G)|+ |E(G)|,
then we can construct a solution for I. To this end, we analyze the structure of stable matchings
of redmin(I).
Lemma 4.26. Let I be an instance of Multicolored Clique. Let µ be a stable matching of
redmin(I). Then, µ matches all of the men in
(⋃k
i=1M
i
bas ∪ M̂ ibas
)
∪
(⋃k−1
i=1
⋃k
j=i+1M
i,j
enr
)
.
Proof. For each men in
(⋃k
i=1M
i
bas ∪ M̂ ibas
)
∪
(⋃k−1
i=1
⋃k
j=i+1M
i,j
enr
)
, there exists a woman
such this man is the unique man at position 1 in her list. Indeed, for all i ∈ [k] and or all
men mi ∈ M i and m̂i, these women are wi and ŵi, respectively. Moreover, for all i, j ∈
[k] where i < j and for every man mi,jt ∈ M i,jenr, this woman is wi,jt . Thus, every man in(⋃k
i=1M
i
bas ∪ M̂ ibas
)
∪
(⋃k−1
i=1
⋃k
j=i+1M
i,j
enr
)
is matched by µ, else he would have formed a
blocking pair with the aforementioned woman.
Lemma 4.27. Let I be an instance of Multicolored Clique. Let µ be a stable matching of
redmin(I). Then, for all i ∈ [k], either µ matches all of the men in M ienr ∪ M̂ ienr or the two
following conditions hold: (i) µ matches p − 1 of the men in M i, and (ii) there exists j ∈ [p]
such that both µ(mi) = wij and µ(m̂) = ŵ
i
j.
Proof. Consider some color class i ∈ [k]. If µ matches all of the men in M ienr ∪ M̂ ienr, then
we are done. Thus, suppose that there exists a man in this set that µ does not match. Due
to symmetry between M ibas and M̂
i
bas, we can assume w.l.o.g. that there exists j ∈ [p] such
that µ does not match mij . Since µ is a stable matching and m
i
j ranks w
i
j , it must hold that
this woman is matched to the only other man that she ranks, who is mi. That is, µ(wij) = m
i.
Moreover, since mij ranks w
i
j , it must hold that this woman is matched to the only other man
that she ranks, who is m̂ij . That is, µ(w
i
j) = m̂
i
j . However, m̂
i
j prefers ŵ
i
j over w
i
j . Thus, ŵ
i
j
is matched to the only other man that she ranks, who is m̂i. That is, µ(ŵij) = m̂
i. Since the
choice of i was arbitrary, we conclude that the lemma is correct.
Lemma 4.28. Let I be an instance of Multicolored Clique. Let µ be a stable matching
of redmin(I). Then, for all i, j ∈ [k] where i < j, there exists t ∈ [qi,j ] such that wi,jt is either
unmatched or matched to one man among mi and m̂i.
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Proof. Consider some two color classes i, j ∈ [k] where i < j. Since wi,j is the unique woman
at position 1 in the preference list of all men in M i,jenr, she is matched by µ. Hence, the number
of men in M i,jenr that are not matched by µ to w
i,j is exactly qi,j − 1. However, the number of
women in W i,j
bas
is exactly qi,j . Thus, by the definition of the preference lists of the women in
W i,j
bas
, we deduce that there exists t ∈ [qi,j ] such that wi,jt is either unmatched or matched to
one man among mi and m̂i. Since the choices of i and j were arbitrary, we conclude that the
lemma is correct.
From Lemmata 4.26, 4.27 and 4.28, we derive the following result.
Lemma 4.29. Let I be an instance of Multicolored Clique. Let µ be a stable matching
of redmin(I) of size at most k + 2|V (G)| + |E(G)|. Then, for all i ∈ [k], there exists j ∈ [p]
such that both µ(mi) = wij and µ(m̂) = ŵ
i
j. Moreover, for all i, j ∈ [k] where i < j, there exists
t ∈ [qi,j ] such that wi,jt is unmatched.
Proof. First, note that the size of a matching is equal to the number of men that it matches.
Hence, µ matches at most k + 2|V (G)| + |E(G)| men. By Lemma 4.26, all of the men in(⋃k
i=1M
i
bas ∪ M̂ ibas
)
∪
(⋃k−1
i=1
⋃k
j=i+1M
i,j
enr
)
are matched by µ. Since there are 2k + |E(G)|
men in this set, and the set of all other men is
⋃k
i=1M
i ∪ M̂ i whose size is 2|V (G)|, we have
that µ not matches at least k men from
⋃k
i=1M
i ∪ M̂ i. Recall that |V (G)| = pk. Thus, by
Lemma 4.27, this scenario is only possible if for all i ∈ [k], there exists j ∈ [p] such that both
µ(mi) = wij and µ(m̂) = ŵ
i
j . Now, consider some indices i, j ∈ [k] where i < j. Note that since
wi,j is the unique woman at position 1 in the preference list of all men in M i,jenr, she is matched
by µ. Hence, the number of men in M i,jenr that are not matched by µ to w
i,j is exactly qi,j − 1.
However, the number of women in W i,j
bas
is exactly qi,j , and since we have argued that the men
in M ibas ∪ M̂ ibas are matched to women in W ibas ∪ Ŵ ibas, the only men that these women can
be matched to are those that belong to M i,jenr. We thus deduce that there exists t ∈ [qi,j ] such
that wi,jt is unmatched.
We are now ready to prove the correctness of the reverse direction.
Lemma 4.30. Let I = (G, (V 1, V 2, . . . , V k)) be an instance of Multicolored Clique. If the
instance redmin(I) of min-SMT admits a stable matching of size at most k+ 2|V (G)|+ |E(G)|,
then I is a Yes-instance of Multicolored Clique.
Proof. Suppose that the instance redmin(I) of min-SMT admits a stable matching µ of size
at most k + 2|V (G)| + |E(G)|. By Lemma 4.29, for all i ∈ [k], there exists `i ∈ [p] such that
µ(mi) = wi`i and µ(m̂
i) = ŵi`i . Moreover, by Lemma 4.29, for all i, j ∈ [k] where j < i,
there exists `i,j ∈ [qi,j ] such that µ(wi,j`i,j ) is unmatched. Denote U = {v1`1 , v2`2 , . . . , vt`k} and
W = {ei,j`i,j : i, j ∈ [k], i < j}. Note that we have proved that |U | = k and |W | ≥
(
k
2
)
. Since for
all i, j ∈ [k] where j < i, wi,j`i prefers both mi and m̂i over being unmatched, we have that w
i,j
`i
is not located after wi`i in the preference list of m
i as well as that it is not located after ŵi`i in
the preference list of m̂i. However, by the definition of the preference lists of mi and m̂i, it must
then hold that ei,j`i,j is an edge incident to v
i
`i
in G. Hence, we derive that U is the vertex set of a
colorful clique of G. We thus conclude that I is a Yes-instance of Multicolored Clique.
Summary. Finally, we note that the reduction can be performed in time that is polynomial in
the size of the output. That is, we have the following observation.
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Observation 4.6. Let I = (G, (V 1, V 2, . . . , V k)) be an instance of Multicolored Clique.
Then, the instance redmin(I) of min-SMT can be constructed in time polynomial in the size of I.
By Proposition 4.1, Lemma 4.24, Corollary 4.4, Lemma 4.30 and Observation 4.6, we con-
clude that min-SMT is W[1]-hard. Moreover, unless ETH fails, min-SMT cannot be solved in
time f(tw) ·no(tw) for any function f that depends only on tw. Here, n is the number of agents.
5 Primal Graph: XP Algorithms
In this section, we sketch the proof of Theorem 2. Each subsection below is devoted to one
problem. Throughout this section, tw is used to denote the treewidth of the primal graph, and
n = |A| denotes the number of agents.
5.1 Sex Equal Stable Marriage
We first show that SESM can be solved in time nO(tw). To this end, let I = (M,W, {pm}|m∈M ,
{pw}|w∈W ) be an instance of SESM, and let (T, β) denote a nice tree decomposition of width
tw of the primal graph. First, in light of Proposition 2.2, by employing the algorithm given
by Proposition 2.3, we compute the subset A? ⊆ A of agents who are matched by every stable
matching, which is also the set of agents who are matched by at least one stable matching.
Based on the method of DP, we introduce a table N. Each entry of the table N is of the
form N[v, f, t], where v ∈ V (T ), f : β(v) ∩ A? → A? is an injective function such that for all
a ∈ dom(f), a and f(a) are agents of opposite sex, and t ∈ {−n2,−n2 +1, . . . , n2}. To formulate
our objective, we rely on the following definition, which is also relevant to instances of SMT,
that is, in the presence of ties. We remark that this definition will be reused when we design
our other XP algorithms.
Definition 5.1. Let (M,W, {pm}|m∈M , {pw}|w∈W ) be an instance of SMT, and let (T, β) de-
note a tree decomposition of width tw of the primal graph. Given a node v ∈ V (T ), a set
U ⊆ β(v) and a function f : U → A, we say an injective function g is (v, U, f)-stable if
dom(g) ⊆ γ(v), ima(g) ⊆ A, and the following conditions are satisfied.
• For all a ∈ β(v), if a /∈ U then a /∈ dom(g), and otherwise g(a) = f(a).
• There do not exist m ∈ γ(v)∩M and w ∈ γ(v)∩W whose matching is inconsistent, that is,
at least one of the following conditions is satisfied: (i) g(m) = w and either w /∈ dom(g)
or g(w) 6= m; (ii) g(w) = m and either m /∈ dom(g) or g(m) 6= w.
• There do not exist m ∈ γ(v) ∩M and w ∈ γ(v) ∩W that strictly prefer being matched to
one another over their “status” with respect to g, that is, both of the following conditions
are satisfied: (i) either m /∈ dom(g) or m prefers w over g(m); (ii) either w /∈ dom(g) or
w prefers m over g(w).
We say that N is computed correctly if for each entry N[v, f, t], it holds that N[v, f, t] ∈ {0, 1},
and N[v, f, t] = 1 if and only if there exists a (v, β(v) ∩ A?, f)-stable function g such that∑
m∈dom(g)∩M (pm(g(m))−pg(m)(m)) = t. Note that for all µ ∈ S, it holds that satM (µ), satW (µ)
∈ [n2] (see also Lemma 6.5 in Section 6.1.2). Thus, if N is computed correctly, the output is
simply the smallest absolute value t′ for which there exists an integer t ∈ {−n2,−n2 +1, . . . , n2}
such that t′ = |t| and N[root(T ), f : ∅ → ∅, t] = 1.
For the sake of completeness, we proceed to present the computation of the entries of N.
Since the proof of correctness is straightforward, it is omitted. We process the entries of N by
traversing the tree T in post-order. The order in which we process entries corresponding to the
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same node v ∈ V (T ) is arbitrary. In the basis, where v is a leaf and thus β(v) = ∅, we simply
set N[v, f, t] to be 1 if and only if t = 0. Next, we compute entries where v is a forget node, an
introduce node or a join node.
Forget Node. Let u denote the child of v in T , and a denote the agent in β(u) \ β(v). Let F
denote the set of all functions f ′ : β(u) ∩ A? → A? that are identical of f when restricted to
β(v)∩A?. Then, N[v, f, t] is set to be 1 if and only if there exists f ′ ∈ F such that N[u, f ′, t] = 1.
Introduce Node. Let u be the child of v in T , and a be the agent in β(v) \ β(u). Let f ′
be the restriction of f to β(u) ∩ A?. Consider the following cases, recalling that the terms
“inconsistency” and “status” are defined as in Definition 5.1.
• If there exists a′ ∈ β(v) such that the matching of a and a′ is inconsistent: N[v, f, t] = 0.
• Else if there exists a′ ∈ β(v) such that a and a′ prefer being matched to one another over
their status with respect to f : N[v, f, t] = 0.
• Else if a is a man: N[v, f, t] =N[u, f ′, t− (pa(f(a))− pf(a)(a))].
• Otherwise: N[v, f, t] =N[u, f ′, t].
Join Node. Let u and s denote the children of v in T . For the sake of efficiency, we compute all
entries of the form N[v, f, ·] simultaneously. First, we initialize each such entry to 0. Now, we
compute T (u, f) = {t̂ ∈ {−n2,−n2 + 1, . . . , n2} : N[u, f, t̂] = 1} and T (s, f) = {t̂ ∈ {−n2,−n2 +
1, . . . , n2} : N[s, f, t̂] = 1}. Then, for all t̂ ∈ T (u, f) and (t∗, f) ∈ T (s, f) such that t =
t̂+ t∗ −∑m∈dom(f)∩M∩β(v)(pm(f(m))− pf(m)(m)) ∈ [n2], we set N[v, f, t] = 1. (An entry may
be set to 1 multiple times.)
5.2 Balanced Stable Marriage
We now show that BSM can be solved in time nO(tw). To this end, let I = (M,W, {pm}|m∈M ,
{pw}|w∈W ) be an instance of BSM, and let (T, β) denote a nice tree decomposition of width tw
of the primal graph. We compute the same set A? as in the case of SESM, and also introduce a
table N with the same set of entries N[v, f, t], except that now t is restricted to belong to the set
[n2]0. Here, we say that N is computed correctly if for each entry N[v, f, t], it holds that N[v, f, t] ∈
[n2]0∪{nil}, and for all i ∈ [n2]0, N[v, f, t] = i if and only if there exists a (v, β(v)∩A?, f)-stable
function g such that
∑
m∈dom(g)∩M pm(g(m)) = t and
∑
w∈dom(g)∩W pw(g(w)) = i, and there
does not exist a (v, β(v)∩A?, f)-stable function g′ such that ∑m∈dom(g′)∩M pm(g′(m)) = t and∑
w∈dom(g′)∩W pw(g
′(w)) < i.
We process the entries of N by traversing the tree T in post-order. The order in which we
process entries corresponding to the same node v ∈ V (T ) is arbitrary. In the basis, where v is
a leaf, we simply set N[v, f, t] to be 0 if t = 0 and to nil otherwise. Next, we compute entries
where v is a forget node, an introduce node or a join node.
Forget Node. Let u denote the child of v in T , and a denote the agent in β(u) \ β(v). Let F
denote the set of all functions f ′ : β(u) ∩ A? → A? that are identical of f when restricted to
β(v) ∩ A?. Then, N[v, f, t] is set to be i ∈ [n2]0 if and only if there exists f ′ ∈ F such that
N[u, f ′, t] = i, and there does not exist f̂ ∈ F such that N[u, f̂ , t] < i.
Introduce Node. Let u be the child of v in T , and a be the agent in β(v) \ β(u). Let f ′ be the
restriction of f to β(u) ∩A?. Consider the following cases.
• If there exists a′ ∈ β(v) such that the matching of a and a′ is inconsistent: N[v, f, t] = nil.
• Else if there exists a′ ∈ β(v) such that a and a′ prefer being matched to one another over
their status with respect to f : N[v, f, t] = nil.
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• Else if a is a man: N[v, f, t] =N[u, f ′, t− pa(f(a))].
• Otherwise: N[v, f, t] =N[u, f ′, t] + pa(f(a)).
Join Node. Let u and s denote the children of v in T . For the sake of efficiency, we compute all
entries of the form N[v, f, ·] simultaneously. First, we initialize each such entry to nil. Now, we
compute T (u, f) = {t̂ ∈ [n2]0 : N[u, f, t̂] 6= nil} and T (s, f) = {t̂ ∈ [n2]0 : N[s, f, t̂] 6= nil}. Then,
for all t̂ ∈ T (u, f) and (t∗, f) ∈ T (s, f) such that t = t̂ + t∗ −∑m∈dom(f)∩M∩β(v) pm(f(m)) ∈
[n2]0, we set N[v, f, t] to be the minimum between the previous value this entry stored and
N[u, f, t̂] + N[s, f, t∗]−∑w∈dom(f)∩W∩β(v) pw(f(w)).
5.3 max-SMT
We proceed to show that max-SMT can be solved in time nO(tw). To this end, let I =
(M,W, {pm}|m∈M , {pw}|w∈W ) be an instance of max-SMT, and let (T, β) denote a nice tree
decomposition of width tw of the primal graph. Again, we introduce a table N. Here, each entry
of N is of the form N[v, U, f ], where v ∈ V (T ), U ⊆ β(v), and f : U → A is an injective function
such that for all a ∈ dom(f), a and f(a) are agents of opposite sex. We say that N is computed
correctly if for each entry N[v, U, f ], it holds that N[v, U, f ] ∈ [n]0 ∪ {nil}, and for all i ∈ [n]0,
N[v, U, f ] = i if and only if there exists a (v, U, f)-stable function g such that matches exactly i
men, and there does not exist a (v, U, f)-stable function g′ that matches more than i men.
We process the entries of N by traversing the tree T in post-order. The order in which we
process entries corresponding to the same node v ∈ V (T ) is arbitrary. In the basis, where v is
a leaf, we simply set N[v, U, f ] to be 0. Next, we compute entries where v is a forget node, an
introduce node or a join node.
Forget Node. Let u denote the child of v in T , and a denote the agent in β(u) \ β(v). Let F
denote the set containing f as well as all functions f ′ : U ∪ {a} → A that are identical of f
when restricted to U . Then, N[v, U, f ] is set to be i ∈ [n]0 if and only if there exists f ′ ∈ F such
that N[u, dom(f ′), f ′] = i, and there does not exist f̂ ∈ F such that N[u, dom(f̂), f̂ ] > i.
Introduce Node. Let u be the child of v in T , and a be the agent in β(v) \ β(u). Let f ′ be the
restriction of f to β(u) ∩ U . Consider the following cases.
• If there exists a′ ∈ β(v) such that the matching of a and a′ is inconsistent: N[v, U, f ] = nil.
• Else if there exists a′ ∈ β(v) such that a and a′ prefer being matched to one another over
their status with respect to f : N[v, U, f ] = nil.
• Else if a is a man and a ∈ dom(f): N[v, U, f ] =N[u, dom(f ′), f ′] + 1.
• Otherwise: N[v, U, f ] =N[u, dom(f ′), f ′].
Join Node. Let u and s denote the children of v in T . Then, we set N[v, U, f ] = N[u, U, f ] +
N[s, U, f ]− |U ∩M |.
5.4 min-SMT
We proceed to show that min-SMT can be solved in time nO(tw). To this end, let I =
(M,W, {pm}|m∈M , {pw}|w∈W ) be an instance of min-SMT, and let (T, β) denote a nice tree
decomposition of width tw of the primal graph. We introduce a table N with the same set
of entries as in the case of max-SMT. We say that N is computed correctly if for each entry
N[v, U, f ], it holds that N[v, U, f ] ∈ [n]0 ∪ {nil}, and for all i ∈ [n]0, N[v, U, f ] = i if and only if
there exists a (v, U, f)-stable function g such that matches exactly i men, and there does not
exist a (v, U, f)-stable function g′ that matches less than i men.
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We process the entries of N by traversing the tree T in post-order. The order in which we
process entries corresponding to the same node v ∈ V (T ) is arbitrary. In the basis, where v is
a leaf, we simply set N[v, U, f ] to be 0. Next, we compute entries where v is a forget node, an
introduce node or a join node.
Forget Node. Let u denote the child of v in T , and a denote the agent in β(u) \ β(v). Let F
denote the set containing f as well as all functions f ′ : U ∪ {a} → A that are identical of f
when restricted to U . Then, N[v, U, f ] is set to be i ∈ [n]0 if and only if there exists f ′ ∈ F such
that N[u, dom(f ′), f ′] = i, and there does not exist f̂ ∈ F such that N[u, dom(f̂), f̂ ] < i.
Introduce Node. This computation is identical to the one presented for the case of max-SMT.
Join Node. This computation is again identical to the one presented for the case of max-SMT.
6 Rotation Digraph: FPT Algorithms
In this section, we prove Theorem 3, based on the approach described in Section 3. First, in
Section 6.1, we solve a problem that we call Generic SM (GSM), which is defined as follows.
Given an instance of SM as input, the objective of GSM is to determine, for all tM , tW ∈ N,
whether there exists µ ∈ S such that both satM (µ) = tM and satW (µ) = tW . Here, the running
time would be O(2tw · n10), where tw is the treewidth of GΠ. Given this algorithm as a black
box, it is straightforward to solve both SESM and BSM in time O(2tw · n10). In Sections 6.2
and 6.3, we further show that simple modifications to this algorithm imply that both SESM
and BSM can also be solved in time O(2tw · n6).
6.1 Generic Stable Marriage
The presentation of our algorithm for GSM, which we call ALG-GSM, is structured as follows.
First, we set-up terminology that allows us to handle the obstacles described in Section 3, namely
the delicate interplay between “past” and “future” imposed by our partial solutions and their
inability to reveal in a direct manner, for any given man, who is the woman with whom it is
matched. Then, we turn to present ALG-GSM, which is based on DP. Afterwards, we analyze
the running time of this algorithm. Finally, we reach the most technical part of this section,
which is the proof of correctness of ALG-GSM. We remark that ALG-GSM is very short and
easily implementable—the proof of the correctness is the part that is technically involved.
6.1.1 Terminology
We say that a pair (v,R′) of a node v ∈ V (T ) and a set R′ ⊆ β(v) is a state. We define notions
with respect to states, and when the states are clear from context, we avoid mentioning them
explicitly. Each state captures an equivalence class, formally defined as follows.
Definition 6.1. A stable matching µ is compatible with a state (v,R′) if R(µ) ∩ β(v) = R′.
Accordingly, we let S(v,R′) ⊆ S denote the set of all stable matchings compatible with
(v,R′). Next, we proceed by identifying, for every man in M?, a directed path that captures
the manner in which he may swap partners along the execution of our algorithm.
Lemma 6.1. Let m ∈ M?. Then, DΠ contains a directed path whose vertex-set is a superset
of R(m), and such a path can be found in time O(n2).
Proof. By Proposition 2.6, since the transitive closure of DΠ is isomorphic to Π, we have that
DΠ contains a directed path whose vertex-set is a superset of R(m). Moreover, by iterating over
R = V (DΠ) and identifying the rotations involving m, we compute R(m). Since DΠ is a DAG
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Figure 8: Illustrations of Definition 6.2. The drawn vertices form a directed path of one man, m.
The yellow shape captures the bag β(v), and the vertices in R′ are drawn in black. The vertices
`v,R′(m) and fv,R′(m) are drawn in blue and red circles, respectively. In the first illustration,
`v,R′(m) = nil, an in the last illustration, fv,R′(m) = nil.
with O(n2) vertices and arcs (Proposition 2.7), a topological order of DΠ can be computed in
time O(n2). Then, since DΠ is a DAG, by running breadth-first search (BFS) from the first
vertex in R(m) (according to the topological order), we identify a directed path in DΠ whose
vertex-set is a superset of R(m). Overall, the running time is bounded by O(n2).
For each man m ∈ M?, we use the computation in Lemma 6.1 to obtain some directed
path in DΠ whose vertex-set is a superset of R(m). We remark that in case R(m) = ∅, we
can simply let P (m) be the empty path. We say that a man m ∈ M? is relevant to (v,R′) if
β(v)∩V (P (m)) 6= ∅. Given such m, we proceed by identifying vertices on P (m) that determine
how to handle a given state (v,R′). Roughly speaking, these vertices are “exist and entry
points” located in β(v) that help identifying the woman assigned to m (see Fig. 8).
Definition 6.2. Let (v,R′) be a state, and let m ∈ M? be relevant to (v,R′). Then, `v,R′(m)
denotes the last vertex on P (m) that belongs to R′ (if such a vertex does not exist, `v,R′(m) = nil).
Accordingly, the vertex fv,R′(m) is defined as follows.
• If `v,R′(m) 6= nil, then fv,R′(m) denotes the first vertex on P (m) that succeeds `v,R′(m)
and which belongs to β(v) \R′ (if such a vertex does not exist, fv,R′(m) = nil).
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Figure 9: Illustrations of Definition 6.3. The vertices of Pv,R′(m) are marked by green stars.
• Otherwise, fv,R′(m) denotes the first vertex on P (m) that belongs to β(v).
Having `v,R′(m) and fv,R′(m) at hand, we proceed to identify the subpath of P (m) whose
internal vertices are rotations such that when we handle the state (v,R′), it is not known which
of these rotations should be eliminated (see Fig. 9).
Definition 6.3. Let (v,R′) be a state, and let m ∈ M? be relevant to (v,R′). Then, the path
Pv,R′(m) is defined as follows.
• If `v,R′(m), fv,R′(m) 6= nil, then Pv,R′(m) denotes the subpath of P (m) that starts at
`v,R′(m) and ends at fv,R′(m).
• If `v,R′(m) 6= nil and fv,R′(m) = nil, then Pv,R′(m) denotes the subpath of P (m) that starts
at `v,R′(m) and ends at the last vertex of P (m).
• If `v,R′(m) = nil and fv,R′(m) 6= nil, then Pv,R′(m) denotes the subpath of P (m) that starts
at the first vertex of P (m) and ends at fv,R′(m).
Notice that for a relevant man m ∈ M?, at least one among `v,R′(m) and fv,R′(m) is not
nil, and therefore Pv,R′(m) is well defined. Next, we assign a type to each man m ∈M?, which
roughly indicates whether we have already chosen the “final” partner of m. To this end, we first
recall a well-known proposition after which we prove a simple lemma.
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Proposition 6.1 (Folklore). Given a graph G with tree decomposition (T, β), and a connected
subgraph S of G, the subgraph of T induced by TV (S) = {v ∈ V (T ) : V (S) ∩ β(v) 6= ∅} is a tree.
Lemma 6.2. Let (v,R′) be a state, and let m ∈M? such that V (P (m))\γ(v), V (P (m))∩γ(v) 6=
∅, (recall that γ(v) is the union of all the bags of v and the descendants of v in T ). Then, m is
relevant.
Proof. Since the underlying graph of P (m) is connected, Proposition 6.1 implies that TV (P (m)) =
{v ∈ V (T ) : V (P (m)) ∩ β(v) 6= ∅} induces a tree. Thus, since V (P (m)) \ γ(v) and V (P (m)) ∩
γ(v) 6= ∅, it holds that m is relevant.
By Lemma 6.2, the next definition indeed assigns a type to each man in M?.
Definition 6.4. Given a state (v,R′) and a man m ∈M?, the type of m with respect to (v,R′)
is defined as follows.
1. If either (i) V (P (m)) ⊆ γ(v), or (ii) m is relevant and V (Pv,R′(m)) ⊆ γ(v), then m is
settled with respect to (v,R′).
2. Otherwise, either (i) V (P (m))∩γ(v) = ∅, or (ii) m is relevant and V (Pv,R′(m))\γ(v) 6= ∅.
Then, m is unsettled with respect to (v,R′).
For example, let us consider Fig. 9. The depicted man is relevant, and supposing that all
vertices drawn below the bag indeed belong to bags assigned to descendants of v, the man
is settled only in the three illustrations on the left of the figure. We proceed to verify that
Definition 6.4 is consistent in the sense that each man in M? has a unique type.
Lemma 6.3. Given a state (v,R′) and a man m ∈ M?, the type of m with respect to (v,R′)
cannot be both settled and unsettled.
Proof. Clearly, Conditions 1(i) and 2(i) cannot hold simultaneously, and Conditions 1(ii) and
2(ii) cannot hold simultaneously. Since V (Pv,R′(m)) ⊆ V (P (m)), Conditions 1(i) and 2(ii)
cannot hold simultaneously. If Condition 2(i) holds, then m is not relevant; thus, Conditions
2(i) and 1(ii) cannot hold simultaneously.
To prove that our algorithm is correct, it will be useful to view Condition 2 in Definition 6.4
through the prism of the following result.
Lemma 6.4. Let (v,R′) be a state, and let m ∈ M? be relevant. If it does not hold that
V (Pv,R′(m)) ⊆ γ(v), then it holds that ∅ 6= V (Pv,R′(m)) ∩ γ(v) ⊆ {`v,R′(m), fv,R′(m)}.
Proof. Assume that it does not hold that V (Pv,R′(m)) ⊆ γ(v). Let P̂ denote the subpath
of Pv,R′(m) that excludes `v,R′(m) and fv,R′(m). By Definition 6.2, V (P̂ ) ∩ β(v) = ∅. Since
the underlying graph of P̂ is connected, Proposition 6.1 implies that T
V (P̂ )
= {v ∈ V (T ) :
V (P̂ ) ∩ β(v) 6= ∅} induces a tree. Thus, either V (P̂ ) ⊆ γ(v) or ∅ 6= V (P̂ ) ⊆ R \ γ(v). Since it
does not hold that V (Pv,R′(m)) ⊆ γ(v), we conclude that ∅ 6= V (P̂ ) ⊆ R \ γ(v), which implies
that ∅ 6= V (Pv,R′(m)) ∩ γ(v) ⊆ {`v,R′(m), fv,R′(m)}.
Having identified the type of a man, we are able to extract its partner with respect to a
stable matching, given the information available when handling some specific state.
Definition 6.5. Let (v,R′) be a state, µ ∈ S(v,R′), and m ∈M?. Then, the partner of m with
respect to (v,R′, µ), denoted by parv,R′,µ(m), is defined as follows.
1. If m is settled, then parv,R′,µ(m) = µ(m). (By Proposition 2.2, µ(m) is well defined.)
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2. Otherwise, m is unsettled. Then, parv,R′,µ(m) = µR′(m).
Note that the partner of a man m is not determined solely by µ, but it depends on (v,R′).
Intuitively, as our partial solutions will not be “completely known”, it makes sense that some
information should be extracted from (v,R′). We remark that the manner in which we extract
this information, and in particular, the precise definition of parv,R′,µ(m), is a crucial element in
the proof of correctness of our algorithm.
We are now ready to define how to “measure the quality of our partial solutions” (since our
partial solutions are not completely known, we cannot use Definition 2.3). Observe that the
score β does not necessarily reflect an assignment of at most one man to every woman.
Definition 6.6. Given a state (v,R′), µ ∈ S(v,R′) and m ∈M?, define
αv,R′(µ,m) = pm(parv,R′,µ(m)), and λv,R′(µ,m) = pparv,R′,µ(m)(m).
Accordingly, given a state (v,R′) and µ ∈ S(v,R′), define
αv,R′(µ) =
∑
m∈M?
αv,R′(µ,m), and λv,R′(µ) =
∑
m∈M?
λv,R′(µ,m).
Definition 6.6 directly implies the following observation.
Observation 6.1. Let (v,R′) and (u, R̂) be states, µ ∈ S(v,R′) and µ̂ ∈ S(u, R̂). If for all m ∈
M?, it holds that parv,R′,µ(m) = paru,R̂,µ̂(m), then αv,R′(µ) = αu,R̂(µ̂) and λv,R′(µ) = λu,R̂(µ̂).
Moreover, by Observation 6.1 and Definitions 6.6 and 6.5, we have the following observation.
Observation 6.2. Let (v,R′) and (u, R̂) be states, and µ ∈ S(v,R′) ∩ S(u, R̂) such that each
m ∈M? has the same type with respect to (v,R′) and (u, R̂), and if m is unsettled then µR′(m) =
µ
R̂
(m). Then, αv,R′(µ) = αu,R̂(µ̂) and λv,R′(µ) = λu,R̂(µ̂).
Given a state (v,R′) and t ∈ {−n2,−n2 + 1, . . . , n2 − 1, n2}, denote S(v,R′, tM , tW ) = {µ ∈
S(v,R′) : αv,R′(µ) = tM , λv,R′(µ) = tW }.
6.1.2 The DP Table
We let N denote our DP table. Each entry of the table N is of the form N[v,R′, tM , tW ], where
v ∈ V (T ), R′ ⊆ β(v) and tM , TW ∈ [n2]. The following definition addresses the purpose of these
entries.
Definition 6.7. We say that N is computed correctly if for each entry N[v,R′, tM , tW ], it holds
that N[v,R′, tM , tW ] ∈ {0, 1}, and N[v,R′, tM , tW ] = 1 if and only if S(v,R′, tM , tW ) 6= ∅.
Next, we prove why it is sufficient to compute N correctly.
Lemma 6.5. For any µ ∈ S, it holds that satM (µ), satW (µ) ∈ [n2].
Proof. For all m ∈ M? and w ∈ dom(pm), it holds that 1 ≤ pm(w) ≤ n, and for all w ∈ W ?
and m ∈ dom(pw), it holds that 1 ≤ pw(m) ≤ n. Thus, by the definitions of satM and satW , we
have that satM (µ), satW (µ) ∈ [n2].
Lemma 6.6. Suppose that N is computed correctly. For all tM , tW ∈ [n2], there exists µ ∈ S
such that satM (µ) = tM and satW (µ) = tW if and only if N[root(T ), ∅, tM , tW ] = 1.
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Proof. Since β(root(T )) = ∅, it holds that S = S(root(T ), ∅). Furthermore, since γ(root(T )) =
R, it holds that every m ∈ M? is settled with respect to (root(T ), ∅). Therefore, every µ ∈
S satisfies αroot(T ),∅(µ) = satM (µ) and λroot(T ),∅(µ) = satW (µ). We thus have that for all
tM , tW ∈ [n2], it holds that S(root(T ), ∅, tM , tW ) 6= ∅ if and only if there exists µ ∈ S such that
satM (µ) = tM and satW (µ) = tW . Since N is computed correctly, we conclude the proof.
In light of Lemmata 6.5 and 6.6, to prove that GSM is solvable in time O(2tw · n10), it is
sufficient that we show that it is possible to compute N correctly in time O(2tw · n10). The rest
of Section 6.2 focuses on the proof of this claim.
6.1.3 Computation
We process the entries of N by traversing the tree T in post-order. The order in which we process
entries corresponding to the same node v ∈ V (T ) is arbitrary. Thus, the basis corresponds to
entries N[v,R′, tM , tW ] where v is a leaf, and the steps correspond to entries where v is a forget
node, an introduce node or a join node.
Leaf Node. In the basis, where v is a leaf, we have that β(v) = ∅. We consider two cases.
1. If tM = αv,∅(µ∅) and tW = λv,∅(µ∅): N[v, ∅, tM , tW ] = 1.
2. Otherwise: N[v, ∅, tM , tW ] = 0.
Forget Node. Let u denote the child of v in T , and ρ denote the vertex in β(u) \ β(v). Then,
N[v,R′, tM , tW ] = max{N[u,R′, tM , tW ],N[u,R′ ∪ {ρ}, tM , tW ]}.
Introduce Node. Let u be the child of v in T , and ρ be the vertex in β(v) \ β(u). Consider the
following cases.
1. If (cl(R′) ∩ β(v)) \R′ 6= ∅: N[v,R′, tM , tW ] = 0.
2. Else if ρ /∈ R′: Mρ = ∅; N[v,R′, tM , tW ] = N[u,R′, tM , tW ].
3. Otherwise (ρ ∈ R′): Given m ∈ M?, let ρm denote the last vertex on P (m) that belongs
to cl(ρ), where if such a vertex does not exist, ρm = nil. Denote Mρ = {m ∈ M? : ρm ∈
R \ γ(u), `v,R′(m) ∈ cl(ρm) ∪ {nil}} (see Fig. 10). Roughly speaking, Mρ is the set of men
for which we identified a partner that we need to replace at the computation of the cur-
rent entry. For each m ∈ Mρ, denote diffαv,R′(m) = αv,R′(µR′ ,m) − αu,R′\{ρ}(µR′\{ρ},m).
Accordingly, denote diffα(Mρ) =
∑
m∈Mρ diff
α
v,R′(m). Symmetrically, for m ∈ Mρ, de-
note diffλv,R′(m) = λv,R′(µR′ ,m) − λu,R′\{ρ}(µR′\{ρ},m). Accordingly, denote diffλ(Mρ) =∑
m∈Mρ diff
λ
v,R′(m). Now, N[v,R
′, tM , tW ] is computed as follows.
N[v,R′, tM , tW ] = N[u,R′ \ {ρ}, tM − diffα(Mρ), tW − diffλ(Mρ)].
Join Node. Let u and w denote the children of v in T . For the sake of efficiency, we compute all
entries of the form N[v,R′, ·, ·] simultaneously. First, we initialize each such entry to 0. Now, we
compute T (u,R′) = {(t̂M , t̂W ) ∈ [n2]× [n2] : N[u,R′, t̂M , t̂W ] = 1} and T (w,R′) = {(t̂M , t̂W ) ∈
[n2] × [n2] : N[w,R′, t̂M , t̂W ] = 1}. Then, for all (t̂M , t̂W ) ∈ T (u,R′) and (t∗M , t∗W ) ∈ T (w,R′)
such that tM = t̂M + t
∗
M − αv,R′(µR′) ∈ [n2] and tW = t̂W + t∗W − λv,R′(µR′) ∈ [n2], we set
N[v,R′, tM , tW ] = 1. (An entry may be set to 1 multiple times.)
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 Figure 10: Illustrations of Mρ. The yellow shape captures the bag β(v), and it is assumed that
R′ = β(v). In each illustration, a directed path P (m) of a man m is highlighted in green, the
vertices ρm and `v,R′(m) are markeed by red and blue stars, respectively, and it is specified
whether m ∈Mρ.
6.1.4 Time Complexity
The table N contains at most |V (T )| · 2tw · n4 = O(2tw · n6) entries. The computation of an
entry N[v,R′, tM , tW ] where v is a leaf node, a forget node or an introduce node, is performed
in time O(1). Moreover, for every join node v ∈ V (T ) and R′ ⊆ R, the total time to compute
all O(n4) entries of the form N[v,R′, ·, ·] is bounded by O(n8). Therefore, the overall running
time of our algorithm is bounded by O(2tw · n10).
6.1.5 Correctness
In this subsection, we prove that N has been computed correctly (see Definition 6.7). By
our discussions in Sections 6.1.2 and 6.1.4, this proof concludes that GSM is solvable in time
O(2tw · n10). The proof is by induction on the order of the computation.
Basis. For the basis of the induction, consider an entry N[v,R′, tM , tW ] such that v is a leaf in
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T . In this case, β(v) = ∅ and therefore R′ = ∅. Then, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 6.7. µ∅ ∈ S(v, ∅), and for all µ ∈ S(v, ∅), αv,∅(µ) = αv,∅(µ∅) and λv,∅(µ) = λv,∅(µ∅).
Proof. Since R(µ∅) = β(v) = ∅, it holds that µ∅ ∈ S(v, ∅). Moreover, since γ(v) = ∅, every
m ∈ M? is either unsettled with respect to (v, ∅) or satisfies V (P (m)) = ∅. Thus, for all
µ ∈ S(v, ∅) and m ∈ M?, it holds that parv,∅,µ(m) = µ∅(m). By Observation 6.1, we have that
for all µ ∈ S(v, ∅), it holds that λv,∅(µ) = λv,∅(µ∅).
By Lemma 6.7, we have that for all tM , tW ∈ [n2], it holds that S(v,R′, tM , tW ) 6= ∅ if and
only if tM = αv,∅(µ∅) and tW = λv,∅(µ∅). We thus conclude that the basis is correct.
Inductive Hypothesis. Next, we consider some entry N[v,R′, tM , tW ] such that v is not a leaf
in T , and we assume that for every child u of v, all entries of the form N[u, ·, ·, ·] have been
computed correctly (see Definition 6.7). We analyze the cases where v is a forget node, an
introduce node and a join node separately below.
Forget Node. By the inductive hypothesis, to prove that our computation is correct, it is suffi-
cient to show that S(v,R′, tM , tW ) 6= ∅ if and only if S(u,R′, tM , tW )∪S(u,R′∪{ρ}, tM , tW ) 6= ∅.
We start with the following claim.
Lemma 6.8. Let m ∈ M?. Then, the type of m is the same with respect to both (v,R′) and
(u,R′). Moreover, either the type of m is the same with respect to both (v,R′) and (u,R′ ∪{ρ})
or (cl(ρ) ∩ β(v)) \R′ 6= ∅.
Proof. Since γ(v) = γ(u), if V (P (m)) ⊆ γ(v), then m is settled with respect to (v,R′), (u,R′)
and (u,R′ ∪ {ρ}). Moreover, if V (P (m)) ∩ γ(v) = ∅, then m is unsettled with respect to
(v,R′), (u,R′) and (u,R′ ∪ {ρ}).
Next, suppose that m is relevant and V (Pv,R′(m)) ⊆ γ(v). We first show that the type
of m is the same with respect to both (v,R′) and (u,R′). Since β(u) = β(v) ∪ {ρ}, we have
that `u,R′(m) = `v,R′(m). Furthermore, if fu,R′(m) 6= fv,R′(m), then either fv,R′(m) = nil
or fu,R′(m) = ρ is located before fv,R′(m) on P (m). Therefore, we necessarily have that
V (Pu,R′(m)) ⊆ V (Pv,R′(m)). Thus, since V (Pv,R′(m)) ⊆ γ(v) and γ(v) = γ(u), we have that
V (Pu,R′(m)) ⊆ γ(u). This implies m is settled with respect to (v,R′) and (u,R′). Now,
suppose that cl(ρ) ∩ β(v) ⊆ R′. We show that the type of m is the same with respect to
(v,R′) and (u,R′ ∪ {ρ}). Since β(u) = β(v) ∪ {ρ}, if `u,R′∪{ρ}(m) 6= `v,R′(m), then either
`v,R′(m) = nil or `u,R′∪{ρ}(m) = ρ is located after `v,R′(m) on P (m). Since cl(ρ)∩β(u) ⊆ R′∪{ρ},
fu,R′∪{ρ}(m) = fv,R′(m). Therefore, we necessarily have that V (Pu,R′∪{ρ}(m)) ⊆ V (Pv,R′(m)).
Since V (Pv,R′(m)) ⊆ γ(v) and γ(v) = γ(u), this implies that V (Pu,R′∪{ρ}(m)) ⊆ γ(u). Thus, m
is settled with respect to (v,R′) and (u,R′ ∪ {ρ}).
Finally, suppose that m is relevant and V (Pv,R′(m)) \ γ(v) 6= ∅. By Lemma 6.4, we have
that V (Pv,R′(m))∩γ(v) ⊆ {`v,R′(m), fv,R′(m)}, which implies that ρ /∈ V (Pv,R′(m)). Therefore,
`u,R′(m) = `v,R′(m) and fu,R′(m) = fv,R′(m), which implies that Pu,R′(m) = Pv,R′(m). Since
γ(v) = γ(u), we deduce that V (Pu,R′(m))\γ(u) 6= ∅, and therefore m is unsettled with respect to
both (v,R′) and (u,R′). Now, suppose that cl(ρ)∩β(v) ⊆ R′. Then, since V (Pv,R′(m))∩γ(v) ⊆
{`v,R′(m), fv,R′(m)}, we have that `u,R′∪{ρ}(m) = `v,R′(m) and fu,R′∪{ρ}(m) = fv,R′(m). Again,
this leads to the conclusion that m is unsettled with respect to (u,R′ ∪ {ρ}).
First, suppose that S(v,R′, tM , tW ) 6= ∅. Then, there exists µ ∈ S(v,R′, tM , tW ). The
conclusion that S(u,R′, tM , tW )∪S(u,R′ ∪ {ρ}, tM , tW ) 6= ∅ is implied by the following lemma.
Lemma 6.9. Let µ ∈ S(v,R′, tM , tW ). If ρ /∈ R(µ), then µ ∈ S(u,R′, tM , tW ), and otherwise
µ ∈ S(u,R′ ∪ {ρ}, tM , tW ).
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Proof. Assume that ρ /∈ R(µ). Since µ ∈ S(u,R′), it holds that R(µ) ∩ β(v) = R′. Thus, since
β(u) = β(v)∪{ρ} and ρ /∈ R(µ), we have that R(µ)∩β(u) = R′. Therefore, µ ∈ S(u,R′). Next,
assume that ρ ∈ R(µ). Since µ ∈ S(u,R′), it holds that R(µ)∩β(v) = R′ and cl(ρ)∩β(v) ⊆ R′.
Thus, since β(u) = β(v) ∪ {ρ} and ρ ∈ R(µ), we have that R(µ) ∩ β(u) = R′ ∪ {ρ}.
It remains to show that if ρ /∈ R(µ), then αu,R′(µ) = tM and λu,R′(µ) = tW , and otherwise
αu,R′∪{ρ}(µ) = tM and λu,R′∪{ρ}(µ) = tW . Note that αv,R′(µ) = tM and λv,R′(µ) = tW .
Moreover, if ρ ∈ R(µ) then for any m ∈M? unsettled with respect to (v,R′) and (u,R′ ∪ {ρ}),
it can be verified that cl(ρ)∩V (P (m)) ⊆ cl(R′)∩V (P (m)), in which case µR′(m) = µR′∪{ρ}(m).
Thus, by Observation 6.2, to prove the desired claim it is sufficient to show that for all m ∈M?,
it holds that m has the same type with respect to (v,R′) and (u,R′), and if ρ ∈ R(µ), the m also
has the same type with respect to (v,R′) and (u,R′ ∪ {ρ}). The correctness of this statement
is given by Lemma 6.8.
Now, for the other direction; suppose that S(u,R′, tM , tW )∪S(u,R′∪{ρ}, tM , tW ) 6= ∅. Then,
there exists µ ∈ S(u,R′, tM , tW )∪S(u,R′∪{ρ}, tM , tW ). The conclusion that S(v,R′, tM , tW ) 6=
∅ is implied by the following lemma.
Lemma 6.10. Let µ ∈ S(u,R′, tM , tW ) ∪ S(u,R′ ∪ {ρ}, tM , tW ). Then, µ ∈ S(v,R′, tM , tW ).
Proof. First, assume that µ ∈ S(u,R′, tM , tW ). Then, R(µ) ∩ β(u) = R′. Thus, since β(v) =
β(u) \ {ρ}, R(µ) ∩ β(v) = R′. Therefore, µ ∈ S(v,R′). Next, assume that µ ∈ S(u,R′ ∪ {ρ}, t).
Then, R(µ) ∩ β(u) = R′ ∪ {ρ} and cl(ρ) ∩ β(u) ⊆ R′ ∪ {ρ}. Thus, since β(v) = β(u) \ {ρ},
R(µ) ∩ β(v) = R′ and cl(ρ) ∩ β(v) ⊆ R′. Therefore, µ ∈ S(v,R′).
It remains to show that αv,R′(µ) = tM and λv,R′(µ) = tW . Note that if µ ∈ S(u,R′, tM , tW )
then αu,R′(µ) = tM and λu,R′(µ) = tW , and otherwise αu,R′∪{ρ}(µ) = tM and λu,R′∪{ρ}(µ) =
tW . Again, by Observation 6.2, to prove the desired claim it is sufficient to show that for
all m ∈ M?, it holds that m has the same type with respect to (v,R′) and (u,R′), and if
µ ∈ S(u,R′∪{ρ}, tM , tW ), then m also has the same type with respect to (v,R′) and (u,R′∪{ρ}).
The correctness of this statement is given by Lemma 6.8.
Introduce Node. First, note that if (cl(R′) ∩ β(v)) \ R′ 6= ∅, then by Proposition 2.5, it holds
that S(v,R′) = ∅. Thus, in this case, the computation is correct. We next assume that it holds
that cl(R′) ∩ β(v) ⊆ R′. In particular, this implies that if ρ /∈ R′ then ρ /∈ cl(R′), and if ρ ∈ R′
then cl(ρ) ∩ β(v) ⊆ R′.
We proceed to analyze Cases 2 and 3.
Lemma 6.11. S(v,R′) ⊆ S(u,R′ \ {ρ}).
Proof. Let µ ∈ S(v,R′). Then, R(µ) ∩ β(v) = R′. Since β(u) = β(v) \ {ρ}, we have that
R(µ) ∩ β(u) = R′ \ {ρ}. Thus, S(v,R′) ⊆ S(u,R′ \ {ρ}).
We next show that we can add or remove ρ from the closed set R(µ) of rotations of some
µ ∈ S(u,R′ \ {ρ}, tM , tW ) and yet obtain another stable matching in S(u,R′ \ {ρ}, tM , tW ).
Lemma 6.12. If S(u,R′ \ {ρ}, tM , tW ) 6= ∅, we have that
• if ρ /∈ R′, then there exists µ ∈ S(u,R′, tM , tW ) such that ρ /∈ R(µ), and
• if ρ ∈ R′, then there exists µ ∈ S(u,R′ \ {ρ}, tM , tW ) such that ρ ∈ R(µ).
Proof. Assume that S(u,R′ \ {ρ}, tM , tW ) 6= ∅. Then, there exists µ ∈ S(u,R′ \ {ρ}, tM , tW ).
First, suppose that ρ /∈ R′. Denote R̂ = {ρ̂ ∈ R : ρ ∈ cl(ρ̂)}. Then, R∗ = R(µ)\R̂ is a closed set.
Thus, by Proposition 2.5, there exists µ∗ ∈ S such that R(µ∗) = R∗. Since R(µ) ∩ β(u) = R′,
β(u) = β(v) \ {ρ}, cl(R′) ∩ β(v) ⊆ R′ and ρ /∈ R′, we have that R∗ ∩ β(u) = R′, and therefore
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µ∗ ∈ S(u,R′). It remains to show that αu,R′(µ∗) = αu,R′(µ) and λu,R′(µ∗) = λu,R′(µ). Note that
the type of a man is defined with respect to a state. Thus, by Definition 6.5 and Observation
6.1, it remains to show that for every settled man m, it holds that µ∗(m) = µ(m). Let m be a
settled man. Then, the last vertex on P (m) that belongs to R(µ), denoted by ρ′, also belongs
to γ(u). To show that µ∗(m) = µ(m), it is sufficient to show that ρ′ ∈ R∗. To this end, it is
sufficient to show that ρ /∈ cl(ρ′). Suppose, by way of contradiction, that this claim is false.
Then, there exists a directed path in DΠ from ρ to ρ
′. Since ρ /∈ γ(u) and ρ′ ∈ γ(u), Proposition
6.1 implies that this path contains a vertex ρ̂ ∈ β(u). Since µ ∈ S(u,R′), we have that ρ̂ ∈ R′.
This contradicts the facts that cl(R′) ∩ β(v) ⊆ R′ and ρ /∈ R′.
Next, suppose that ρ ∈ R′. Moreover, suppose that ρ /∈ R(µ), else we are done. Note
that R∗ = R(µ) ∪ cl(ρ) is a closed set. Thus, by Proposition 2.5, there exists µ∗ ∈ S such
that R(µ∗) = R∗. Since R(µ) ∩ β(u) = R′, β(u) = β(v) \ {ρ} and cl(ρ) ∩ β(v) ⊆ R′, we
have that R∗ ∩ β(u) = R′ \ {ρ}, and therefore µ∗ ∈ S(u,R′ \ {ρ}). It remains to show that
αu,R′\{ρ}(µ∗) = αu,R′\{ρ}(µ) and λu,R′\{ρ}(µ∗) = λu,R′\{ρ}(µ). Again, for this purpose, it is
sufficient to let m be some settled man, and prove that µ∗(m) = µ(m). Let ρ′ denote the last
vertex on P (m) that belongs to R∗. Then, ρ′ ∈ γ(u). We need to show that ρ′ ∈ R(µ). To
this end, it is sufficient to show that ρ′ /∈ cl(ρ) \ R(µ). Suppose, by way of contradiction, that
this claim is false. Then, there exists a directed path in DΠ from ρ
′ to ρ. Since ρ /∈ γ(u) and
ρ′ ∈ γ(u), Proposition 6.1 implies that this path contains a vertex ρ̂ ∈ β(u). Since µ∗ ∈ S(u,R′),
we have that ρ̂ ∈ R′. Thus, since µ ∈ S(u,R′), we have that ρ̂ ∈ R(µ). However, since ρ′ ∈ cl(ρ̂)
and R(µ) is a closed set, this is impossible.
We proceed to argue about equivalence between partners of men in M? \Mρ.
Lemma 6.13. Let m ∈ M? \Mρ and µ ∈ S(v,R′) ∩ S(u,R′ \ {ρ}). Then, the partners of m
with respect to (v,R′, µ) and (u,R′ \ {ρ}, µ) are identical.
Proof. Suppose that m has different types with respect to (v,R′, µ) and (u,R′ \ {ρ}, µ), else we
are done. Since m /∈ Mρ and β(v) = β(u) ∪ {ρ}, we have that `v,R′(m) = `u,R′\{ρ}(m). Then,
fv,R′(m) 6= fu,R′\{ρ}(m), else m has the same type with respect to (v,R′, µ) and (u,R′ \ {ρ}, µ).
In this case, it must hold that fv,R′(m) = ρ precedes fu,R′\{ρ}(m) on P (m). By Proposition 6.1
and since ρ /∈ γ(u), we deduce that either ρ is the first vertex on P (m) or ρ is the outgoing
neighbor of `v,R′(m) on P (m). Overall, this implies that µ(m) = µR′(m). Therefore, regardless
of the types of m with respect to (v,R′, µ) and (u,R′ \ {ρ}, µ), it holds that the partners of m
with respect to (v,R′, µ) and (u,R′ \ {ρ}, µ) are identical.
In case ρ /∈ R′, it holds that Mρ = ∅ and (u,R′ \ {ρ}) = (u,R′). Thus, we obtain the
following corollary to Lemma 6.13.
Corollary 6.1. Suppose that ρ /∈ R′, and let m ∈ M? and µ ∈ S(v,R′) ∩ S(u,R′). Then, the
partners of m with respect to (v,R′, µ) and (u,R′, µ) are identical.
Next, we prove that the computation for Case 2 (i.e when ρ /∈ R′) is correct.
Lemma 6.14. If ρ /∈ R′, then S(v,R′, tM , tW ) 6= ∅ if and only S(u,R′, tM , tW ) 6= ∅.
Proof. Assume that ρ /∈ R′. First, suppose S(v,R′, tM , tW ) 6= ∅. Then, there exists µ ∈
S(v,R′, tM , tW ). By Lemma 6.11, we have that µ ∈ S(u,R′). By Corollary 6.1 and Ob-
servation 6.1, we obtain that αu,R′(µ) = αv,R′(µ) and λu,R′(µ) = λv,R′(µ), and therefore
µ ∈ S(u,R′, tM , tW ).
Now, suppose S(u,R′, tM , tW ) 6= ∅. Then, by Lemma 6.12, there exists µ ∈ S(u,R′, tM , tW )
such that ρ /∈ R(µ). Since R(µ) ∩ β(u) = R′, ρ /∈ R(µ) ∪ R′ and β(v) = β(u) ∪ {ρ}, we have
that µ ∈ S(v,R′). By Corollary 6.1 and Observation 6.1, we obtain that αv,R′(µ) = αu,R′(µ)
and λv,R′(µ) = λu,R′(µ), and therefore µ ∈ S(v,R′, tM , tW ).
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Next, we suppose that ρ ∈ R′, and our objective is to prove that the computation in
Case 3 is correct. For this purpose, by the inductive hypothesis, it is sufficient to show that
S(v,R′, tM , tW ) 6= ∅ if and only S(u,R′ \ {ρ}, tM − diffα(Mρ), tW − diffλ(Mρ)) 6= ∅. To proceed,
we need two arguments concerning equivalence between partners of men in Mρ..
Lemma 6.15. Let m ∈ Mρ and µ ∈ S(v,R′). The partners of m with respect to (v,R′, µ) and
(v,R′, µR′) are identical.
Proof. If µ(m) = µR′(m), we necessarily have that parv,R′,µ(m) = parv,R′,µR′ (m). Moreover, if m
is unsettled with respect to (v,R′), then again parv,R′,µ(m) = parv,R′,µR′ (m). Now, we suppose
that µ(m) 6= µR′(m) and m is settled (with respect to (v,R′)), and show that this supposition
leads to a contradiction. The first assumption implies that (R(µ) ∩ V (P (m))) \ cl(R′) 6= ∅.
However, since m is settled and µ ∈ S(v,R′), from Proposition 6.1 we deduce that (R(µ) ∩
V (P (m))) \ cl(R′) ⊆ γ(v). Since m ∈Mρ, we have that `v,R′(m) ∈ cl(ρm) ∪ {nil}, and therefore
ρm ∈ γ(u) ∪ {`v,R′(m)}. However, since m ∈ Mρ, it holds that ρm ∈ R \ γ(u), and therefore
ρm = `v,R′(m). Since (R(µ) ∩ V (P (m))) \ cl(R′) 6= ∅, R(µ) contains the outgoing neighbor ρ′
of ρ on P (m). Since `v,R′(m) = ρ, we have that ρ
′ /∈ β(v). Since m is settled, we deduce that
ρ′ ∈ γ(v) \ β(v). However, since v is an introduce node, from Property 2 in Definition B.1 we
conclude that there does not exist u ∈ V (T ) such that ρ, ρ′ ∈ β(u). This conclusion contradicts
Property 1 in Definition B.1 (since ρ, ρ are neighbors in GΠ).
Lemma 6.16. Let m ∈ Mρ and µ ∈ S(u,R′ \ {ρ}). The partners of m with respect to (u,R′ \
{ρ}, µ) and (u,R′ \ {ρ}, µR′\{ρ}) are identical.
Proof. If m is unsettled with respect to (u,R′ \ {ρ}), then we have that paru,R′\{ρ},µ(m) =
paru,R′\{ρ},µR′\{ρ}(m). Now, we suppose that m is settled (with respect to (u,R
′ \ {ρ})), and
show that this supposition leads to a contradiction. Since m is settled and µ ∈ S(v,R′), from
Proposition 6.1 we deduce that (R(µ)∩V (P (m)))\cl(R′\{ρ}) ⊆ γ(u). Moreover, since m ∈Mρ,
we have that ρm ∈ R(µ). Thus, ρm ∈ γ(u). Since m ∈Mρ, we have reached a contradiction.
As a corollary to Lemma 6.16, we have
Corollary 6.2. For any µ ∈ S(v,R′) ∩ S(u,R′ \ {ρ}), it holds that
∑
m∈Mρ
αu,R′\{ρ}(µ,m) =∑
m∈Mρ
pm(paru,R′\{ρ},µR′\{ρ}(m)), and
∑
m∈Mρ
λu,R′\{ρ}(µ,m) = pparu,R′\{ρ},µR′\{ρ} (m)
(m).
We are now ready to analyze αv,R′(µ) and λv,R′(µ) where µ ∈ S(v,R′) ∩ S(u,R′ \ {ρ}).
Lemma 6.17. Let µ ∈ S(v,R′)∩S(u,R′ \ {ρ}). Then, αv,R′(µ) = αu,R′\{ρ}(µ) + diffα(Mρ) and
λv,R′(µ) = λu,R′\{ρ}(µ) + diffλ(Mρ).
Proof. First, note that
αv,R′(µ) =
∑
m∈M?\Mρ
αv,R′(µ,m) +
∑
m∈Mρ
αv,R′(µ,m)
=
∑
m∈M?\Mρ
pm(parv,R′,µ(m)) +
∑
m∈Mρ
pm(parv,R′,µ(m)),
which, by Lemmata 6.13 and 6.15, equals∑
m∈M?\Mρ
pm(paru,R′\{ρ},µ(m)) +
∑
m∈Mρ
pm(parv,R′,µR′ (m))
=
∑
m∈M?\Mρ
αu,R′\{ρ}(µ,m) +
∑
m∈Mρ
pm(parv,R′,µR′ (m)),
58
which, by Corollary 6.2, equals∑
m∈M?\Mρ
αu,R′\{ρ}(µ,m) +
∑
m∈Mρ
αu,R′\{ρ}(µ,m)
+
∑
m∈Mρ
pm(parv,R′,µR′ (m))−
∑
m∈Mρ
pm(paru,R′\{ρ},µR′\{ρ}(m)),
which is exactly αu,R′\{ρ}(µ) + diffα(Mρ).
Similarly, note that
λv,R′(µ) =
∑
m∈M?\Mρ
λv,R′(µ,m) +
∑
m∈Mρ
λv,R′(µ,m)
=
∑
m∈M?\Mρ
pparv,R′,µ(m)(m) +
∑
m∈Mρ
pparv,R′,µ(m)(m),
which, by Lemmata 6.13 and 6.15, equals∑
m∈M?\Mρ
pparu,R′\{ρ},µ(m)(m) +
∑
m∈Mρ
pparv,R′,µR′
(m)(m)
=
∑
m∈M?\Mρ
λu,R′\{ρ}(µ,m) +
∑
m∈Mρ
pparv,R′,µR′
(m)(m),
which, by Corollary 6.2, equals∑
m∈M?\Mρ
λu,R′\{ρ}(µ,m) +
∑
m∈Mρ
λu,R′\{ρ}(µ,m)
+
∑
m∈Mρ
pparv,R′,µR′
(m)(m)−
∑
m∈Mρ
pparu,R′\{ρ},µR′\{ρ}
(m)(m),
which is exactly λu,R′\{ρ}(µ) + diffλ(Mρ).
Armed with Lemmata 6.11, 6.12 and 6.17, we are ready to prove that the computation for
Case 3 (i.e when ρ ∈ R′) is correct.
Lemma 6.18. S(v,R′, tM , tW ) 6= ∅ if and only if S(u,R′\{ρ}, tM−diffα(Mρ), tW−diffλ(Mρ)) 6= ∅.
Proof. First, suppose that S(v,R′, tM , tW ) 6= ∅. Then, there exists µ ∈ S(v,R′, tM , tW ). By
Lemma 6.11, we have that µ ∈ S(u,R′ \ {ρ}). Since αv,R′(µ) = tM and λv,R′(µ) = tW ,
to conclude that µ ∈ S(u,R′ \ {ρ}, tM − diffα(Mρ), tW − diffλ(Mρ)), it remains to show that
αu,R′\{ρ}(µ) = αv,R′(µ) − diffα(Mρ) and λu,R′\{ρ}(µ) = λv,R′(µ) − diffλ(Mρ). By Lemma 6.17,
this is true.
Next, suppose that S(u,R′ \ {ρ}, tM − diffα(Mρ), tW − diffλ(Mρ)) 6= ∅. Then, by Lemma
6.12, there exists µ ∈ S(u,R′ \ {ρ}, tM − diffα(Mρ), tW − diffλ(Mρ)) such that ρ ∈ R(µ). Then,
since β(v) = β(u) ∪ {ρ}, ρ ∈ R′ and ρ ∈ R(µ), we have that µ ∈ S(v,R′). Since αu,R′\{ρ}(µ) =
tM − diffα(Mρ) and λu,R′\{ρ}(µ) = tW − diffλ(Mρ), to conclude that µ ∈ S(v,R′, tM , tW ), it
remains to show that αv,R′(µ) = tM and λv,R′(µ) = tW . By Lemma 6.17, this is true.
Join Node. By the inductive hypothesis, to prove that our computation is correct, it is sufficient
to show that S(v,R′, tM , tW ) 6= ∅ if and only if there exist t̂M , t̂W , t∗M , t∗W ∈ [n2] such that
tM = t̂M+t
∗
M−αv,R′(µR′), tW = t̂W +t∗W−λv,R′(µR′) and S(u,R′, t̂M , t̂W ),S(w,R′, t∗M , t∗W ) 6= ∅.
Lemma 6.19. S(v,R′) = S(u,R′) = S(w,R′).
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Proof. Note that β(v) = β(u) = β(w). Therefore, for any x, y ∈ {v, u, w}, a stable matching
µ satisfies R(µ) ∩ β(x) = R′ if and only if it satisfies R(µ) ∩ β(y) = R′. This implies that
S(v,R′) = S(u,R′) = S(w,R′).
In what follows, we implicitly rely on Lemma 6.19. Towards proving the correctness of our
computation, we need a lemma specifying some of the partners of the men.
Lemma 6.20. Let µ ∈ S(v,R′), µ̂ ∈ S(u,R′) and µ∗ ∈ S(w,R′) such that R(µ) = R(µ̂)∪R(µ∗).
Then, at least one of the following conditions is satisfied.
1. The partners of m with respect to (v,R′, µ) and (u,R′, µ̂) are identical, and the partners
of m with respect to (v,R′, µ) and (w,R′, µR′) are identical.
2. The partners of m with respect to (v,R′, µ) and (w,R′, µ∗) are identical, and the partners
of m with respect to (v,R′, µ) and (u,R′, µR′) are identical.
Proof. Definitions 6.5 and 6.6 directly imply that m’s partners with respect to (v,R′, µR′),
(u,R′, µR′) and (w,R′, µR′) are identical. In this proof, we implicitly rely on this observation.
If R(µ) ∩ P (m) = ∅, then R(µ̂) ∩ P (m) = R(µ∗) ∩ P (m) = ∅. In this case, or if m is unsettled
with respect to (v,R′, µ), (u,R′, µ̂) and (w,R′, µ∗), then m’s partners with respect to (v,R′, µ),
(u,R′, µ̂) and (w,R′, µ∗) are identical to µR′(m). Thus, we next assume that V (P (m))∩R(µ)∩
γ(v) 6= ∅, else we are done. Let ρ denote the last vertex on P (m) that belongs to R(µ) ∩ γ(v).
Since γ(v) = γ(u) ∪ γ(w), we can suppose w.l.o.g. that ρ ∈ γ(u).
First, suppose that `v,R′(m) = nil. Then, by Proposition 6.1, V (P (m)) ⊆ γ(u) and
V (P (m)) ∩ γ(w) = ∅. Therefore, since R(µ) = R(µ̂) ∪R(µ∗), we have that R(µ) ∩ V (P (m)) =
R(µ̂) ∩ V (P (m)) and R(µ∗) ∩ V (P (m)) = ∅. In this case, m is settled with respect to both
(v,R′) and (u,R′), but unsettled with respect to (w,R′). Overall, parv,R′(µ,m) = paru,R′(µ̂,m)
and parw,R′(µ,m) = µR′(m), which concludes the proof of this case.
Now, suppose that `v,R′(m) 6= nil. Then, by Proposition 6.1, we have that the last vertex on
P (m) that belongs to γ(w) is `v,R′(m). Thus, regardless of the type of m with respect to the
three states, the fact that R(µ) = R(µ̂) ∪ R(µ∗) implies that parv,R′(µ,m) = paru,R′(µ̂,m) and
parw,R′(µ,m) = µR′(m), which concludes the proof of this case.
Finally, we are ready to prove that our computation is correct. Thus, we also conclude that
GSM is solvable in time O(2tw · n10).
Lemma 6.21. S(v,R′, tM , tW ) 6= ∅ if and only if there exist t̂M , t̂W , t∗M , t∗W ∈ [n2] such that
tM = t̂M+t
∗
M−αv,R′(µR′), tW = t̂W+t∗W−λv,R′(µR′) and S(u,R′, t̂M , t̂W ),S(w,R′, t∗M , t∗W ) 6= ∅.
Proof. In the first direction, assume that S(v,R′, tM , tW ) 6= ∅, and let µ ∈ S(v,R′, tM , tW ).
Then, µ ∈ S(u,R′) ∩ S(w,R′). By Lemma 6.20, for all m ∈ M?, at least one of the two
following conditions hold.
• αv,R′(µ,m) = αu,R′(µ,m) + αw,R′(µ,m)− αu,R′(µR′ ,m), and λv,R′(µ,m) = λu,R′(µ,m) +
λw,R′(µ,m)− λu,R′(µR′ ,m).
• αv,R′(µ,m) = αu,R′(µ,m) + αw,R′(µ,m)− αw,R′(µR′ ,m), and λv,R′(µ,m) = λu,R′(µ,m) +
λw,R′(µ,m)− λw,R′(µR′ ,m).
By Definitions 6.5 and 6.6, it holds that αv,R′(µR′ ,m) = αu,R′(µR′ ,m) = αw,R′(µR′ ,m) and
λv,R′(µR′ ,m) = λu,R′(µR′ ,m) = λw,R′(µR′ ,m). Therefore, αv,R′(µ) = αu,R′(µ) + αw,R′(µ) −
αv,R′(µR′) and λv,R′(µ) = λu,R′(µ) + λw,R′(µ) − λv,R′(µR′). By setting t̂M = αu,R′(µ), t̂W =
λu,R′(µ), t
∗
M = αw,R′(µ) and t
∗
W = λw,R′(µ), we get that µ ∈ S(u,R′, t̂M , t̂W )∩S(w,R′, t∗M , t∗W ).
In the second direction, assume that there exist t̂M , t̂W , t
∗
M , t
∗
W ∈ [n2] such that tM =
t̂M + t
∗
M − αv,R′(µR′), tW = t̂W + t∗W − λv,R′(µR′) and S(u,R′, t̂M , t̂W ),S(w,R′, t∗M , t∗W ) 6= ∅.
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Let m̂ ∈ S(u,R′, t̂M , t̂W ) and µ∗ ∈ S(w,R′, t∗M , t∗W ). By Proposition 2.5 and since m̂ ∈ S(u,R′)
and µ∗ ∈ S(w,R′), there exists µ ∈ S(v,R′) such that R(µ) = R(m̂) ∪R(µ∗). Now, by Lemma
6.20, for all m ∈M?, at least one of the following conditions hold.
• αv,R′(µ,m) = αu,R′(µ̂,m) +αw,R′(µ∗,m)−αu,R′(µR′ ,m), and λv,R′(µ,m) = λu,R′(µ̂,m) +
λw,R′(µ
∗,m)− λu,R′(µR′ ,m).
• αv,R′(µ,m) = αu,R′(µ̂,m) +αw,R′(µ∗,m)−αw,R′(µR′ ,m), and λv,R′(µ,m) = λu,R′(µ̂,m) +
λw,R′(µ
∗,m)− λw,R′(µR′ ,m).
By Definitions 6.5 and 6.6, αv,R′(µR′ ,m) = αu,R′(µR′ ,m) = αw,R′(µR′ ,m) and λv,R′(µR′ ,m) =
λu,R′(µR′ ,m) = λw,R′(µR′ ,m). Therefore, αv,R′(µ) = t̂M + t
∗
M − αv,R′(µR′) and λv,R′(µ) =
t̂W + t
∗
W − λv,R′(µR′), which implies that µ ∈ S(v,R′, tM , tW ).
6.2 Sex Equal Stable Marriage
Let I = (M,W, {pm}m∈M , {pw}w∈W ) be an instance of SESM. First, call ALG-GSM with I as
input. We thus obtain the set of all pairs (tM , tW ) for which there exists µ ∈ S such that both
satM (µ) = tM and satW (µ) = tW . Then, we return a pair (tM , tW ) that minimizes |tM − tW |.
Clearly, by the correctness of ALG-GSM, we thus solve SESM in time O(2tw · n10).
To solve SESM faster, we define a table S as follows. Each entry of the table S is of the form
S[v,R′, d], where v ∈ V (T ), R′ ⊆ β(v) and d ∈ {−n2,−n2 + 1, . . . , n2}. The following definition
addresses the purpose of these entries.
Definition 6.8. We say that S is computed correctly if for each entry S[v,R′, d], it holds that
S[v,R′, d] ∈ {0, 1}, and S[v,R′, tM , tW ] = 1 if and only if there exist tM , tW ∈ [n2] such that
tM − tW = d and S(v,R′, tM , tW ) 6= ∅.
However, Definition 6.8 directly implies the correctness of the following observation.
Observation 6.3. Let N be a table that is computed correctly by Definition 6.7. Then, the table
S is computed correctly by Definition 6.8 if and only if for each entry S[v,R′, d], it holds that
S[v,R′, d] ∈ {0, 1}, and S[v,R′, tM , tW ] = 1 if and only if there exist tM , tW ∈ [n2] such that
tM − tW = d and N[v,R′, tM , tW ] = 1.
In light of Observation 6.3, it is straightforward to modify ALG-GSM to solve SESM in
time O(2tw · n6). For the sake of completeness, we briefly present the computation here. We
process the entries of S by traversing the tree T in post-order. The order in which we process
entries corresponding to the same node v ∈ V (T ) is arbitrary. Thus, the basis corresponds to
entries S[v,R′, d] where v is a leaf, and the steps correspond to entries where v is a forget node,
an introduce node or a join node.
Leaf Node. In the basis, where v is a leaf, we have that β(v) = ∅. We consider two cases.
1. If d = αv,∅(µ∅)− λv,∅(µ∅): S[v, ∅, d] = 1.
2. Otherwise: S[v, ∅, d] = 0.
Forget Node. Let u denote the child of v in T , and ρ denote the vertex in β(u) \ β(v). Then,
S[v,R′, d] = max{N[u,R′, d],N[u,R′ ∪ {ρ}, d]}.
Introduce Node. Let u be the child of v in T , and ρ be the vertex in β(v) \ β(u). Consider the
following cases.
1. If (cl(R′) ∩ β(v)) \R′ 6= ∅: S[v,R′, d] = 0.
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2. Else if ρ /∈ R′: Mρ = ∅; S[v,R′, d] = S[u,R′, d].
3. Otherwise (ρ ∈ R′): For each m ∈ Mρ, denote diffSESMv,R′ (Mρ) = diffα(Mρ) − diffλ(Mρ).
Now, S[v,R′, d] is computed as follows.
S[v,R′, d] = S[u,R′ \ {ρ}, d− diffSESM (Mρ)].
Join Node. Let u and w denote the children of v in T . For the sake of efficiency, we compute all
entries of the form S[v,R′, ·] simultaneously. First, we initialize each such entry to 0. Now, we
compute D(u,R′) = {d̂ ∈ {−n2,−n2 + 1, . . . , n2 − 1, n2} : S[u,R′, d̂] = 1} and D(w,R′) = {d̂ ∈
{−n2,−n2 + 1, . . . , n2 − 1, n2} : S[w,R′, d̂] = 1}. Then, for all d̂ ∈ D(u,R′) and d∗ ∈ D(w,R′)
such that d = d̂+ d∗− (αv,R′(µR′)−λv,R′(µR′)) ∈ {−n2,−n2 + 1, . . . , n2}, we set S[v,R′, d] = 1.
6.3 Balanced Stable Marriage
Let I = (M,W, {pm}m∈M , {pw}w∈W ) be an instance of BSM. First, call ALG-GSM with I as
input. We thus obtain the set of all pairs (tM , tW ) for which there exists µ ∈ S such that both
satM (µ) = tM and satW (µ) = tW . Then, we return a pair (tM , tW ) that minimizes max{tM , tW }.
Clearly, by the correctness of ALG-GSM, we thus solve BSM in time O(2tw · n10).
To solve BSM faster, we define a table B as follows. Each entry of the table B is of the form
B[v,R′, b], where v ∈ V (T ), R′ ⊆ β(v) and b ∈ [n2] ∪ {nil}. The following definition addresses
the purpose of these entries.
Definition 6.9. We say that B is computed correctly if for each entry B[v,R′, b], B[v,R′, b] ∈
[n2]∪{nil}, and for all i ∈ [n2], B[v,R′, b] = i if and only if S(v,R′, b, i) 6= ∅ and for all j ∈ [n2]
where j < i, S(v,R′, b, j) = ∅.
However, Definition 6.9 directly implies the correctness of the following observation.
Observation 6.4. Let N be a table that is computed correctly by Definition 6.7. Then, the table
B is computed correctly by Definition 6.9 if and only if for each entry B[v,R′, d], B[v,R′, d] ∈
[n2]∪ {nil}, and for all i ∈ [n2], B[v,R′, b] = i if and only if N[v,R′, b, i] = 1 and for all j ∈ [n2]
where j < i, N[v,R′, b, j] = 0.
In light of Observation 6.4, it is straightforward to modify ALG-GSM to solve BSM in
time O(2tw · n6). For the sake of completeness, we briefly present the computation here. We
process the entries of B by traversing the tree T in post-order. The order in which we process
entries corresponding to the same node v ∈ V (T ) is arbitrary. Thus, the basis corresponds to
entries B[v,R′, b] where v is a leaf, and the steps correspond to entries where v is a forget node,
an introduce node or a join node.
Leaf Node. In the basis, where v is a leaf, we have that β(v) = ∅. We consider two cases.
1. If b = αv,∅(µ∅): B[v, ∅, b] = λv,∅(µ∅).
2. Otherwise: B[v, ∅, b] = nil.
Forget Node. Let u denote the child of v in T , and ρ denote the vertex in β(u) \ β(v). Then,
B[v,R′, b] = min{B[u,R′, b],B[u,R′ ∪ {ρ}, b]}. Here, we define integers to be smaller than nil.
Introduce Node. Let u be the child of v in T , and ρ be the vertex in β(v) \ β(u). Consider the
following cases.
1. If (cl(R′) ∩ β(v)) \R′ 6= ∅: B[v,R′, b] = nil.
2. Else if ρ /∈ R′: Mρ = ∅; B[v,R′, b] = B[u,R′, b].
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3. Otherwise (ρ ∈ R′): Compute B[v,R′, b] as follows. Here, we define the subtraction of an
integer from nil to be nil.
B[v,R′, b] = B[u,R′ \ {ρ}, b− diffα(Mρ)]− diffλ(Mρ).
Join Node. Let u and w denote the children of v in T . For the sake of efficiency, we compute
all entries of the form B[v,R′, ·] simultaneously. First, we initialize each such entry to nil. Now,
we compute B(u,R′) = {b̂ ∈ [n2] : B[u,R′, b̂] 6= nil} and B(w,R′) = {b̂ ∈ [n2] : B[w,R′, b̂] 6= nil}.
Then, for all b̂ ∈ D(u,R′) and b∗ ∈ D(w,R′) such that b = b̂ + b∗ − αv,R′(µR′) ∈ [n2], we set
B[v,R′, b] to be the minimum between the previous value this entry stored and B[u,R′, b̂] +
B[w,R′, b∗]− λv,R′(µR′).
7 Rotation Digraph: Lower Bounds
In this section, we prove Theorem 4, based on the approach described in Section 3. Throughout
this section, the notation tw would refer to the treewidth of the underlying undirected graph
of the rotation digraph. The source of our reductions is the s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT problem,
which is the special case of the p-CNF-SAT problem where the number of clauses is upper
bounded by s · n. Here, n is the number of variables.
Proposition 7.1 ([21, 2, 4]). Unless SETH fails, for every fixed  < 1, there exist integers
p = p() and s = s() such that s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT cannot be solved in time O((2 − )n),
where n is the number of variables.
Given a clause C of a formula ϕ in CNF, we would also treat C as a set whose elements are
the literals of the clause C.
7.1 Sex Equal Stable Marriage
First, we prove that unless SETH fails, SESM cannot be solved in time (2− )tw · nO(1) for any
fixed  > 0, where n is the number of agents. Note that this claim is equivalent to the one
stating that unless SETH fails, SESM cannot be solved in time 2tw · nO(1) for any fixed  < 1.
To prove this claim, we suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exist fixed  > 0 and c ≥ 1
as well as an algorithm SESM-ALG such that SESM-ALG solves SESM in time 2tw · nc.
7.1.1 Reduction
Denote δ =  + (1 − )/2 < 1. By Proposition 7.1, supposing that SETH is true, there exist
integers p = p(δ) and s = s(δ) such that s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT cannot be solved in time
O(2δn). Let ϕ = C1∧C2∧· · ·∧Cr be an instance of p-CNF-SAT. Denote C = {C1, C2, . . . , Cr}.
Note that by the definition of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT, r ≤ s · n. In this context, let X =
{x1, x2, . . . , xn} denote the set of positive literals (to which we also refer as variables), and let
X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} denote the set of negative literals, where for all t ∈ [n], xt is the negation of
xt. We now describe how to construct an instance redSESM (ϕ) = (M,W, {pm}|m∈M , {pw}|w∈W )
of SESM.
Partial Truth Assignments. Let d denote the smallest possible integer such that δ ≥  + 3csd ,
and set q = rd . We assume w.l.o.g. that r is divisible by d. We partition C into q sets as follows:
For all i ∈ [q], we define Ci = {C1+(i−1)d, C2+(i−1)d, . . . , Cid}. Moreover, for all i ∈ [q], let Xi be
the set of every variable xj ∈ X such that at least one among the literals xj and xj belongs to
at least one clause in Ci. Now, for all i ∈ [q], let F i = {f i1, f i2, . . . , f i|F i|} denote the set of every
truth assignment to the variables in Xi that satisfies all of the clauses in Ci. For all i ∈ [q] and
63
j ∈ [|F i|], we let P ij denote the subset of variables of Xi to which f ij assigns true, and we let
N ij denote the subset of variables of X
i to which f ij assigns false. Clearly, for all i ∈ [q] and
j ∈ [|F i|], P ij ∪N ij = Xi and P ij ∩N ij = ∅. For all i ∈ [q], denote ai = |F i|, P i = {P i1, P i2, . . . , P iai}
and N i = {N i1, N i2, . . . , N iai}. Finally, denote
∑
i∈[q] a
i = a˜.
For all t ∈ [n], denote P(xt) = {P ij : i ∈ [q], j ∈ [ai], xt ∈ P ij} and N (xt) = {N ij : i ∈ [q], j ∈
[ai], xt ∈ N ij}.
Agents. First, to represent variables, we introduce four sets of new agents:
• Mvar = {m1,m2, . . . ,mn}.
• M̂var = {m̂1, m̂2, . . . , m̂n}.
• Wvar = {w1, w2, . . . , wn}.
• Ŵvar = {ŵ1, ŵ2, . . . , ŵn}.
Next, for all i ∈ [q], to represent the sets in P i, we introduce four sets of new agents:
• M i = {mi1,mi2, . . . ,miai}.
• M̂ i = {m̂i1, m̂i2, . . . , m̂iai}.
• W i = {w1, w2, . . . , wai}.
• Ŵ i = {ŵi1, ŵi2, . . . , ŵai}.
Similarly, for all i ∈ [q], to represent the sets in P i, we introduce four sets of new agents:
• M i = {mi1,mi2, . . . ,miai}.
• M̂
i
= {m̂i1, m̂
i
2, . . . , m̂
i
ai}.
• W i = {wi1, wi2, . . . , wiai}.
• Ŵ
i
= {ŵi1, ŵ
i
2, . . . , ŵ
i
ai}.
Moreover, we introduce α new happy pairs, denoted by (m1hap, w
1
hap), (m
2
hap, w
2
hap), . . . ,
(mαhap, w
α
hap), where the definition of α relies on the arguments λ(i) ,γ(i) and τ , which are as
defined later.
α =
∑
i∈[q]
((ai − 1)λ(i)− γ(i)) + (2q − a˜)τ.
Finally, we introduce one new man, m?, and one new woman w?. We define the preference
list of m? by setting its domain to contain all happy women and w?, and defining pm?(w
?) = α+1
and pm?(w
i
hap) = i for all i ∈ [α]. The preference list of w? is simply defined to contain only m?.
Variable Selector. We first describe the preference lists of the agents in the sets Mvar, M̂var,
Wvar and Ŵvar. For all t ∈ [n], we define the preference list of mt as follows. We set dom(pmt) =
{wt}∪{wij : N ij ∈ N (xt)}∪{ŵt}. Then, we let wt be the woman most preferred by mt, ŵt be the
woman least preferred by mt, and strictly order all of the other women in the domain arbitrarily.
For all t ∈ [n], the preference list of m̂t is simply defined by setting dom(pm̂t) = {ŵt, wt},
pm̂t(ŵt) = 1 and pm̂t(wt) = 2.
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Now, for all t ∈ [n], we define the preference list of wt as follows. We set dom(pwt) =
{m̂t} ∪ {mij : P ij ∈ P(xt)} ∪ {mt}. Then, we let m̂t be the man most preferred by wt, mt be
the man least preferred by wt, and strictly order all of the other men in the domain arbitrarily.
For all t ∈ [n], the preference list of ŵt is simply defined by setting dom(pŵt) = {mt, m̂t},
pŵt(mt) = 1 and pŵt(m̂t) = 2.
Truth Selector. We next describe the preference lists of the agents in the sets M i, M̂ i, W i
and Ŵ i. For all i ∈ [q] and j ∈ [ai], we define the preference list of mij as follows. We set
dom(pmij
) = {wij} ∪ {wt : xt ∈ P ij} ∪ {wik : k ∈ [ai], k 6= j} ∪W ′ ∪ {ŵij}, where W ′ is some
subset of γ(i) = n20 ·2i−1 arbitrarily chosen happy women. Then, we let wij be the woman most
preferred by mij , ŵ
i
j be the woman least preferred by m
i
j , and strictly order all of the other
women in the domain arbitrarily. For all i ∈ [q] and j ∈ [ai], the preference list of m̂ij is simply
defined by setting dom(pm̂ij
) = {ŵij , wij}, pm̂ij (ŵ
i
j) = 1 and pm̂ij
(wij) = 2.
Now, for all i ∈ [q] and j ∈ [ai], the preference list of wij is defined as follows. We set
dom(pwij
) = {m̂ij} ∪M ′ ∪ {mij}, where M ′ is some subset of λ(i) = n20 · 22q−i arbitrarily chosen
happy men. Then, we let m̂ij be the man most preferred by w
i
j , m
i
j be the man least preferred by
wij , and strictly order all of the other men in the domain arbitrarily. For all i ∈ [q] and j ∈ [ai],
the preference list of ŵij is simply defined by setting dom(pŵij
) = {mij , m̂ij}, pŵij (m
i
j) = 1 and
pŵij
(m̂ij) = 2.
False Selector. Finally, we describe the preference lists of the agents in the sets M
i
, M̂
i
, W
i
and Ŵ
i
. For all i ∈ [q] and j ∈ [ai], the preference list of mij is defined as follows. We set
dom(pmij
) = {wij} ∪W ′ ∪ {ŵ
i
j}, where W ′ is some subset of τ = n10 arbitrarily chosen happy
women. Then, we let wij be the woman most preferred by m
i
j , ŵ
i
j be the woman least preferred
by mij , and strictly order all of the other women in the domain arbitrarily. For all i ∈ [q] and
j ∈ [ai], the preference list of m̂ij is simply defined by setting dom(pm̂ij ) = {ŵ
i
j , w
i
j}, pm̂ij (ŵ
i
j) = 1
and p
m̂
i
j
(wij) = 2.
Now, for all i ∈ [q] and j ∈ [ai], the preference list of wij is defined as follows. We set
dom(pwij
) = {m̂ij} ∪ {mt : xt ∈ N ij} ∪ {mik : k ∈ [ai], k 6= j} ∪M ′ ∪ {mij}, where M ′ is some
subset of τ arbitrarily chosen happy men. Then, we let m̂
i
j be the man most preferred by w
i
j ,
mij be the man least preferred by w
i
j , and strictly order all of the other men in the domain
arbitrarily. For all i ∈ [q] and j ∈ [ai], the preference list of ŵij is simply defined by setting
dom(p
ŵ
i
j
) = {mij , m̂
i
j}, pŵij (m
i
j) = 1 and pŵij
(m̂
i
j) = 2.
7.1.2 All Stable Matchings
We begin our analysis by identifying exactly which matchings are stable matchings. Let us start
with the following definition.
Definition 7.1. Let ϕ be an instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. Then, in the context of
redSESM (ϕ), the matching µ∅ is defined as follows.
• For all t ∈ [n]: µ(mt) = wt and µ(m̂t) = ŵt.
• For all i ∈ [q] and j ∈ [ai]: µ(mij) = wij and µ(m̂ij) = ŵij.
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• For all i ∈ [q] and j ∈ [ai]: µ(mij) = wij and µ(m̂
i
j) = ŵ
i
j.
• For all i ∈ [α]: µ(mihap) = wihap.
• µ(m?) = w?.
Observe that in the matching µ∅, every man except m? is matched to the woman he prefers
the most. Moreover, the man m? cannot belong to a blocking pair since all of the women
who he prefers over w? are matched to their most preferred men. Thus, we have the following
observation.
Observation 7.1. Let ϕ be an instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. Then, in the context of
redSESM (ϕ), the matching µ∅ is a stable matching.
Next, we proceed to note that also in the current reduction, all agents are matched.
Lemma 7.1. Let ϕ be an instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. Every stable matching of redSESM (ϕ)
matches all agents.
Proof. Note that µ∅ matches all men. Thus, by Observation 7.1 and Proposition 2.2, we deduce
that every stable matching of redSESM (ϕ) matches all men. Since the number of men is equal
to the number of women, we conclude the correctness of the lemma.
To formalize the conditions that a stable matching should satisfy, we introduce the following
definition.
Definition 7.2. Let ϕ be an instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. Let µ be a matching of
redSESM (ϕ). Then, we say that µ is good if it satisfies the following conditions.
1. For all t ∈ [n]: Either both µ(mt) = wt and µ(m̂t) = ŵt or both µ(mt) = ŵt and
µ(m̂t) = wt.
2. For all i ∈ [q] and j ∈ [ai]: Either both µ(mij) = wij and µ(m̂ij) = ŵij or both µ(mij) = ŵij
and µ(m̂ij) = w
i
j.
3. For all i ∈ [q] and j ∈ [ai]: Either both µ(mij) = wij and µ(m̂
i
j) = ŵ
i
j or both µ(m
i
j) = ŵ
i
j
and µ(m̂
i
j) = w
i
j.
4. For all i ∈ [α]: µ(mihap) = wihap.
5. µ(m?) = w?.
We start with the following lemma.
Lemma 7.2. Let ϕ be an instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. Let µ be a stable matching of
redSESM (ϕ). Then, µ is a good matching.
Proof. Let µ be a stable matching of redSESM (ϕ). The proof of the last two conditions is the
same as the one given for Lemma 4.5. For completeness, we present them here as well. Since
for all i ∈ [α], mihap and wihap prefer each other over all other agents, they must be matched to
one another (by µ), else they form a blocking pair. Then, since apart from happy women, the
preference lists of m? and w? only contain each other, they also must be matched to one another,
else they form a blocking pair. Hence, Conditions 4 and 5 (in Definition 7.2) are satisfied.
For all i ∈ [q] and j ∈ [ai], observe that excluding happy agents, the only two men in the
preference lists of wij and ŵ
i
j are m
i
j and m̂
i
j , and the only two women in the preference lists
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of mij and m̂
i
j are w
i
j and ŵ
i
j . Thus, by Lemma 7.1, we deduce that Conditions 2 and 3 are
satisfied. Finally, observe that excluding women who have already been determined not to be
matched to agents in Mvar ∪ M̂var, for all t ∈ [n], the only two women in the preference lists
of mt and m̂t are wt and ŵt. Thus, by Lemma 7.1, we deduce that Condition 1 is satisfied as
well.
However, the converse of Lemma 7.2 is not true, namely, not every good matching is a stable
matching. To capture only stable matchings, we further need to strengthen Definition 7.2.
Definition 7.3. Let ϕ be an instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. Let µ be a matching of
redSESM (ϕ). Then, we say that µ is excellent if it good as well as satisfies the two follow-
ing conditions.
1. For all t ∈ [n] such that µ(mt) = ŵt: For all i ∈ [q] and j ∈ [ai] such that xt ∈ N ij ,
µ(mij) = ŵ
i
j.
2. For all i ∈ [q] and j ∈ [ai] such that µ(mij) = ŵij, the two following conditions are satisfied.
(a) For all t ∈ [n] such that xt ∈ P ij , µ(mt) = ŵt.
(b) For all k ∈ [ai] such that k 6= j, µ(mik) = ŵ
i
k.
In the context of redSESM (ϕ), define Λ to be the set of all excellent matchings.
The two following lemmata show that Definition 7.3 provides both sufficient and necessary
conditions for a matching to be a stable matching.
Lemma 7.3. Let ϕ be an instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. Let µ be a stable matching of
redSESM (ϕ). Then, µ is an excellent matching.
Proof. By Lemma 7.2, it holds that µ is a good matching. We first claim that Condition 1
is Definition 7.3 is satisfied. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that this claim is false. Then,
there exist t ∈ [n], i ∈ [q] and j ∈ [ai] such that µ(mt) = ŵt, xt ∈ N ij , µ(mij) 6= ŵ
i
j . Since µ
is a good matching, we then have that µ(mij) 6= wij . However, mt prefers wij over ŵt, and wij
prefers mt over m
i
j , which contradicts the fact that µ is stable as (mt, w
i
j) is a blocking pair.
Thus, Condition 1 is Definition 7.3 is satisfied.
Second, we claim that Condition 2a is satisfied. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that this
claim is false. Then, there exist t ∈ [n], i ∈ [q] and j ∈ [ai] such that µ(mij) = ŵij , xt ∈ P ij and
µ(mt) 6= ŵt. Since µ is a good matching, we then have that µ(mt) = wt. However, wt prefers mij
over mt, and m
i
j prefers wt over ŵ
i
j , which contradicts the fact that µ is stable. Thus, Condition
2a is satisfied as well.
Third, we claim that Condition 2b is satisfied, which would conclude the proof of the lemma.
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that this claim is false. Then, there exist i ∈ [q] and j, k ∈ [ai]
such that j 6= k, µ(mij) = ŵij and µ(mik) 6= ŵ
i
k. Since µ is a good matching, we then have that
µ(mik) = w
i
k. However, w
i
k prefers m
i
j over m
i
k, and m
i
j prefers w
i
k over ŵ
i
j , which contradicts
the fact that µ is stable. Thus, Condition 2b is satisfied.
Lemma 7.4. Let ϕ be an instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. Let µ be an excellent matching
of redSESM (ϕ). Then, µ is a stable matching.
Proof. Since all happy agents are matched to agents at position 1 in their preference lists, they
cannot belong to any blocking pair. Hence, we also have that m? and w? cannot belong to any
blocking pair. For all t ∈ [n], since µ is in particular a good matching, either both mt and
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m̂t are matched to the women at position 1 in their preference lists, in which case they cannot
belong to any blocking pair, or µ(mt) = ŵt and µ(m̂t) = wt. In the latter case, by Condition
1 in Definition 7.3, we have that all women that mt prefers over ŵt are matched to men that
they prefer over mt, and therefore mt cannot belong to any blocking pair. Since ŵt is matched
to the man at position 1 in her preference list and this is the only woman that m̂t prefers over
wt, we have that m̂t cannot belong to any blocking pair.
Now, consider some i ∈ [q] and j ∈ [ai]. Since µ is in particular a good matching, either
both mij and m̂
i
j are matched to the women at position 1 in their preference lists, in which case
they cannot belong to any blocking pair, or µ(mij) = ŵ
i
j and µ(m̂
i
j) = w
i
j . In the latter case,
by Conditions 2a and 2b in Definition 7.3, we have that all women that mij prefers over ŵt are
matched to men that they prefer over mij , and therefore m
i
j cannot belong to any blocking pair.
Since ŵij is matched to the man at position 1 in her preference list and this is the only woman
that m̂ij prefers over w
i
j , we have that m̂
i
j cannot belong to any blocking pair. Finally, since µ is
in particular a good matching, either both mij and m̂
i
j are matched to the women at position 1
in their preference lists, in which case they cannot belong to any blocking pair, or µ(mij) = ŵ
i
j
and µ(m̂
i
j) = w
i
j . However, the only two non-happy women in the preference lists of m
i
j and m̂
i
j
are wij and ŵ
i
j , who are matched to men at position 1 in their preference lists. Thus, neither m
i
j
nor m̂
i
j can belong to any blocking pair. Since the choices of i and j were arbitrary, we overall
conclude that no man belongs to any blocking pair, and therefore µ is a stable matching.
From Lemmata 7.3 and 7.4, we derive the following corollary. Here, recall that S denotes
the set of all stable matchings.
Corollary 7.1. Let ϕ be an instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. Then, in the context of
redSESM (ϕ), S = Λ.
To argue about the sex-equality measure of stable matchings, we rely on the following
definition.
Definition 7.4. Let ϕ be an instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT, and let µ be a stable matching
of redSESM (ϕ). For all i ∈ [q], denote a(µ, i) = |{j ∈ [ai] : µ(mij) = ŵij}|. Moreover, denote
b(µ) = |(i, j) : i ∈ [q], j ∈ [ai], µ(mij) = ŵ
i
j}|.
Lemma 7.5. Let ϕ be an instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT, and let µ be a stable matching
of redSESM (ϕ). Then, there exist 0 ≤ x, y ≤ 100s4pd · n2 = O(n2) such that the two following
conditions hold.
• satM (µ) = 2α+
∑
i∈[q]
a(µ, i)γ(i) + b(µ)τ + x.
• satW (µ) = α+
∑
i∈[q]
(ai − a(µ, i))λ(i) + (a˜− b(µ))τ + y.
Proof. Note that for all i ∈ [q] and j ∈ [ai], |P ij |, |N ij | ≤ |Xi| ≤
pr
q
= pd, and that for all t ∈ [n],
|N (xt)|, |P(xt)| ≤ a˜ ≤ q2pd. Thus, on the one hand, by Corollary 7.1 and the definition of the
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preference lists of the men of redSESM (ϕ), we have that
satM (µ) =
∑
t∈[n],µ(mt)=wt
2 +
∑
t∈[n],µ(mt)=ŵt
(4 + |N (xt)|)
+
∑
i∈[q],j∈[ai],µ(mij)=wij
2 +
∑
i∈[q],j∈[ai],µ(mij)=ŵij
(3 + |P ij |+ ai + γ(i))
+
∑
i∈[q],j∈[ai],µ(mij)=wij
2 +
∑
i∈[q],j∈[ai],µ(mij)=ŵ
i
j
(4 + τ) + 2α+ 1
= 2α+
∑
i∈[q]
a(µ, i)γ(i) + b(µ)τ + x,
for some 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 + (4 + q2pd)n+ (7 + pd+ 2pd)a˜ ≤ 5q2pdn+ 9 · 2pd · q2pd ≤ 100s4pd · n2.
On the other hand, by Corollary 7.1 and the definition of the preference lists of the women
of redSESM (ϕ), we have that
satW (µ) =
∑
t∈[n],µ(wt)=mt
(4 + |P(xt)|) +
∑
t∈[n],µ(wt)=m̂t
2
+
∑
i∈[q],j∈[ai],µ(wij)=mij
(4 + λ(i)) +
∑
i∈[q],j∈[ai],µ(wij)=m̂ij
2
+
∑
i∈[q],j∈[ai],µ(wij)=mij
(3 + |N ij |+ ai + τ) +
∑
i∈[q],j∈[ai],µ(wij)=m̂
i
j
2 + α+ 1
= α+
∑
i∈[q]
(ai − a(µ, i))λ(i) + (a˜− b(µ))τ + y,
for some 0 ≤ y ≤ 100s4pd · n2.
7.1.3 Correctness
Forward Direction. We first show how given a truth assignment for an instance ϕ of s-Sparse
p-CNF-SAT that satisfies ϕ, we can construct a stable matching µ of redSESM (ϕ) whose sex-
equality measure is at most 100s4pd ·n2. For this purpose, we introduce the following definition.
Here, given a truth assignment f , we let X(f) denote the variables to which f assigns true.
Definition 7.5. Let ϕ be a Yes-instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT, and let f a truth assignment
that satisfies ϕ. Then, the matching µfSESM of redSESM (ϕ) is defined as follows.
• For all t ∈ [n] such that xt ∈ X(f): µfSESM (mt) = ŵt and µfSESM (m̂t) = wt.
• For all t ∈ [n] such that xt /∈ X(f): µfSESM (mt) = wt and µfSESM (m̂t) = ŵt.
• For all i ∈ [q] and j ∈ [ai] such that P ij = X(f)∩Xi: µfSESM (mij) = ŵij and µfSESM (m̂ij) =
wij.
• For all i ∈ [q] and j ∈ [ai] such that P ij 6= X(f)∩Xi: µfSESM (mij) = wij and µfSESM (m̂ij) =
ŵij.
• For all i ∈ [q] and j ∈ [ai] such that N ij 6= Xi\X(f): µfSESM (mij) = ŵ
i
j and µ
f
SESM (m̂
i
j) =
wij.
• For all i ∈ [q] and j ∈ [ai] such that N ij = Xi\X(f): µfSESM (mij) = wij and µfSESM (m̂
i
j) =
ŵ
i
j.
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• For all i ∈ [α]: µfSESM (mihap) = wihap.
• µfSESM (m?) = w?.
Let us first argue that µfSESM is a stable matching.
Lemma 7.6. Let ϕ be a Yes-instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. Let f be a truth assignment
that satisfies ϕ. Then, µfSESM is an excellent matching of redSESM (ϕ).
Proof. Definition 7.5 directly implies that µ is a good matching. Next, we verify that Conditions
1–excel3 in Definition 7.3 are satisfied as well. First, consider some t ∈ [n] such that µ(mt) = ŵt,
i ∈ [q] and j ∈ [ai] such that xt ∈ N ij . Since µ(mt) = ŵt, we have that xt ∈ X(f), which implies
that xt /∈ Xi \X(f). Thus, N ij 6= Xi \X(f), which implies that µ(mij) = ŵ
i
j . Hence, Condition
1 is satisfied. Second, consider some i ∈ [q], j ∈ [ai] such that µ(mij) = ŵij and t ∈ [n] such that
xt ∈ P ij . Since µ(mij) = ŵij , we have that P ij = X(f) ∩ Xi. Thus, xt ∈ X(f), which implies
that µ(mt) = ŵt. Hence, Condition 2a is satisfied. Third, consider some consider some i ∈ [q],
j ∈ [ai] such that µ(mij) = ŵij and k ∈ [ai] such that k 6= j. Since µ(mij) = ŵij , we again have
that P ij = X(f)∩Xi. Therefore, N ij = Xi\X(f). Since N ik 6= N ij , we have that N ik 6= Xi\X(f),
and thus µ(mik) = ŵ
i
k. Hence, Condition 2b is satisfied. We thus conclude that µ
f
SESM is an
excellent matching.
By Lemma 7.4, we have the following corollary to Lemma 7.6.
Corollary 7.2. Let ϕ be a Yes-instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. Let f be a truth assignment
that satisfies ϕ. Then, µfSESM is a stable matching of redSESM (ϕ).
In light of Corollary 7.2, the measure δ(µfSESM ) is well defined. We proceed to analyze this
measure with the following lemma.
Lemma 7.7. Let ϕ be a Yes-instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. Let f be a truth assignment
that satisfies ϕ. Then, δ(µfSESM ) ≤ 100s4pd · n2.
Proof. By Lemma 7.5, there exist 0 ≤ x, y ≤ 100s4pd · n2 such that the two following conditions
hold.
• satM (µfSESM ) = 2α+
∑
i∈[q]
a(µfSESM , i)γ(i) + b(µ
f
SESM )τ + x.
• satW (µfSESM ) = α+
∑
i∈[q]
(ai − a(µfSESM , i))λ(i) + (a˜− b(µfSESM ))τ + y.
In the case of µfSESM , we have that for all i ∈ [q], a(µfSESM ) = 1, and also b(µfSESM ) = a˜−q.
Thus, we have that the two following conditions hold.
• satM (µfSESM ) = 2α+
∑
i∈[q]
γ(i) + (a˜− q)τ + x.
• satW (µfSESM ) = α+
∑
i∈[q]
(ai − 1)λ(i) + qτ + y.
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Now, note that α =
∑
i∈[q]
((ai − 1)λ(i)− γ(i)) + (2q − a˜)τ =
∑
i∈[q]
(ai − 1)λ(i) + qτ
 −∑
i∈[q]
γ(i) + (a˜− q)τ
 = (satW (µfSESM )− y)− (satM (µfSESM )− α− x). Thus, we have that
δ(µfSESM ) = |satW (µfSESM )− satM (µfSESM )|
= |y − x− α+
(
(satW (µ
f
SESM )− y)− (satM (µfSESM )− α− x)
)
|
= |y − x| ≤ 100s4pd · n2.
This concludes the proof of the lemma.
Combining Corollary 7.2 and Lemma 7.7, we derive the following corollary.
Corollary 7.3. Let ϕ be a Yes-instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. Then, for the instance
redSESM (ϕ) of SESM, ∆ ≤ 100s4pd · n2. Here, n is the number of variables.
This concludes the proof of the forward direction.
Reverse Direction. Second, we prove that given an instance ϕ of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT, if
for the instance redSESM (ϕ) of SESM, ∆ is “low” (namely, at most 100s4
pd · n2), then we can
construct a truth assignment that satisfies ϕ. To this end, we first need to analyze the structure
of stable matchings of redSESM (ϕ) whose sex-equality measure is low. Let us begin by proving
the following lemma.
Lemma 7.8. Let ϕ be a instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. Let µ be a stable matching of
redSESM (ϕ) such that δ(µ) ≤ 100s4pd · n2. Then, the two following equalities are satisfied.
•
∑
i∈[q]
((1− a(µ, i))λ(i)− (1− a(µ, i))γ(i)) = 0.
• (a˜− b(µ)− q)τ = 0.
Proof. Since δ(µ) ≤ 100s4pd · n2, it holds that |satW (µ) − satM (µ)| ≤ 100s4pd · n2. Recall
that s, p, d = O(1). Now, notice that τ = n10 > 100s4pd · n2, else the problem is solvable in
polynomial time. Moreover, for all i ∈ [q], λ(i) and γ(i) are divisible by n10. Thus, Lemma 7.5
implies that the following equality is satisfied.
0 =
∑
i∈[q]
(ai − a(µ, i))λ(i) + (a˜− b(µ))τ
−
∑
i∈[q]
a(µ, i)γ(i) +
∑
i∈[q]
(
(ai − 1)λ(i)− γ(i))+ b(µ)τ + (2q − a˜)τ
.
The equality above is equivalent to the following equality.
0 =
∑
i∈[q]
((1− a(µ, i))λ(i)− (1− a(µ, i))γ(i)) + 2(a˜− b(µ)− q)τ.
Next, notice that 0 ≤ b(µ) ≤ a˜, and hence −2qn10 ≤ 2(a˜ − b(µ) − q)τ as well as 2(a˜ −
b(µ) − q)τ ≤ 2(a˜ − q)n10 ≤ 2q(2pd − 1)n10 ≤ n12, where the last inequality is assumed to hold
else the problem is solvable in polynomial time. Moreover, for all i ∈ [q], λ(i), γ(i) are divisible
by n20. Thus, we derive that the two equalities given in the statement of the lemma must be
satisfied.
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Lemma 7.9. Let ϕ be an instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. Let µ be a stable matching of
redSESM (ϕ) such that δ(µ) ≤ 100s4pd · n2. Then, for all i ∈ [q], there exists j ∈ [ai] such that
µ(mij) = ŵ
i
j and for all k 6= j, µ(mik) = wik.
Proof. By Corollary 7.1, the statement of the lemma is equivalent to the statement that for all
i ∈ [k], a(µ, i) = 1. By Lemma 7.8, the following equality is satisfied.∑
i∈[q]
((1− a(µ, i))λ(i)− (1− a(µ, i))γ(i)) = 0,
which is equivalent to the following one.∑
i∈[q]
a(µ, i)(γ(i) + λ(i)) =
∑
i∈[q]
(γ(i) + λ(i)).
Substituting γ(i) and λ(i) for all i ∈ [q] and dividing both sides by n20, we derive that the
following equality is satisfied.∑
i∈[q]
a(µ, i)(2i−1 + 22q−i) =
∑
i∈[q]
(2i−1 + 22q−i).
Since
∑
i∈[q]
(2i−1 + 22q−i) = (2q − 1) + 2q(2q − 1), we overall get that the following equality is
satisfied. ∑
i∈[q]
a(µ, i)(2i−1 + 22q−i) = 22q − 1.
Let ψ be an assignment to the variables a(µ, i) that satisfies this condition as well as the
two equalities above. We claim that ψ necessarily assigns 1 to all of these variables. This claim
can be easily proven by induction on q. In the base case, where q = 1, the first equality directly
implies that a(µ, 1) = 1. Now, suppose that q ≥ 2 and that the claim holds for q − 1. Then,
first note if a(µ, 1) = 0, then the left side of the equality would have been an even number while
the right side is an odd number, and therefore a(µ, 1) ≥ 1. Now, observe that if a(µ, 1) ≥ 2,
then
∑
i∈[q]
a(µ, i)(2i−1 + 22q−i) ≥ 2 + 2 · 22q−1 > 22q − 1, which is a contradiction. Thus, we have
that a(µ, 1) = 1. We get that the following equality is then satisfied, where for all i ∈ [q − 1],
we denote â(µ, i) = a(µ, i+ 1).
(1 + 22q−1) + 2
∑
i∈[q−1]
â(µ, i)(2i−1 + 22q−i) = 22q − 1,
which is equivalent to the following one.∑
i∈[q−1]
â(µ, i)(2i−1 + 22q−i) = 22(q−1) − 1.
By the inductive hypothesis, we have that for all i ∈ [q − 1], it holds that â(µ, i) = 1.
Therefore, for all i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , q}, it holds that a(µ, i) = 1. This concludes the proof of the
lemma.
Lemma 7.10. Let ϕ be an instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. Let µ be a stable matching of
redSESM (ϕ) such that δ(µ) ≤ 100s4pd · n2. Then, for all i ∈ [q], there exists j ∈ [ai] such that
µ(mij) = w
i
j and for all k 6= j, µ(mik) = ŵ
i
k.
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Proof. First, notice that by Lemma 7.8, it holds that (a˜− b(µ)− q)τ = 0. Therefore, b(µ) =
a˜−q. Hence, by Corollary 7.1, it is sufficient to show that for all i ∈ [q], there do not exist distinct
j, k ∈ [ai] such that both µ(mij) = wij and µ(mik) = wik. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that
this claim is false. That is, there exist i ∈ [q] and distinct j, k ∈ [ai] such that both µ(mij) = wij
and µ(mik) = w
i
k. Then, by Corollary 7.1 and Condition 2b in Definition 7.3, there do not exist
` ∈ [ai] such that µ(mij) = ŵij . However, this contradicts Lemma 7.9, and thus we conclude
that the lemma is correct.
We are now ready to prove the correctness of the reverse direction.
Lemma 7.11. Let ϕ be an instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. If for the instance redSESM (ϕ)
of SESM, ∆ ≤ 100s4pd · n2, then ϕ is a Yes-instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT.
Proof. Suppose that for the instance redSESM (ϕ) of SESM, ∆ ≤ 100s4pd · n2. Then, there
exists a stable matching µ such that δ(µ) ≤ 100s4pd · n2. Note that by Corollary 7.1, µ is an
excellent matching. Let f denote the truth assignment such that for all t ∈ [n], f assigns true
to xt if and only if µ(mt) = ŵt. Recall that X(f) denotes the set of variables to which f assigns
true. We claim that f satisfies ϕ. By the definition of the partial truth assignments, to show
that f satisfies ϕ, it is sufficient to show that for all i ∈ [q], there exists j ∈ [ai] such that
P ij ⊆ X(f) ∩Xi and N ij ⊆ Xi \X(f) (in which case P ij = X(f) ∩Xi). Indeed, it then holds
that for all i ∈ [q], f satisfies all of the clauses in Ci as when f is restricted to Xi, it would be
identical to an assignment in F i. Notice that the proof of our claim would also conclude the
proof of the lemma, as it implies that ϕ is a Yes-instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT.
To prove our claim, we first note that by Lemma 7.9, for all i ∈ [q], there exists `i ∈ [ai]
such that µ(mi`i) = ŵ
i
j and for all j 6= `i, µ(mij) = wij . Moreover, by Lemma 7.10 and Condition
2b in Definition 7.3, for all i ∈ [q], we have that µ(mi`i) = wi`i and for all j 6= `i, µ(mij) = ŵ
i
j .
Now, choose some arbitrary t ∈ [n] and i ∈ [q] such that xt ∈ Xi. We show that if xt ∈ P i`i then
µ(mt) = ŵt, and otherwise (xt ∈ N i`i) it holds that µ(mt) 6= ŵt. First, suppose that xt ∈ P ij .
Then, by Condition 2a in Definition 7.3, it indeed holds that µ(mt) = ŵt. Second, suppose that
xt ∈ N i`i . Then, by Condition 1 in Definition 7.3, it indeed holds that µ(mt) 6= ŵt. As we have
argued earlier, this concludes the proof of the lemma.
7.1.4 Rotation Digraph
By Observation 7.1 and Corollary 7.1, we directly derive the following observation.
Observation 7.2. Let ϕ be an instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. Then, the man-optimal
stable matching of redSESM (ϕ) is µ∅.
Now, we define three sequences of pairs, which we would later prove to capture rotations.
Definition 7.6. Let ϕ be an instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. Then, in the context of
redSESM (ϕ), the three sets R1, R2 and R3 are defined as follows.
• R1 = {ρij = ((mij , wij), (m̂
i
j , ŵ
i
j)) : i ∈ [q], j ∈ [ai]}.
• R2 = {ρt = ((mt, wt), (m̂t, ŵt)) : t ∈ [n]}.
• R3 = {ρij = ((mij , wij), (m̂ij , ŵij)) : i ∈ [q], j ∈ [ai]}.
We further define which combinations of subsets of R1, R2 and R3 would be relevant to us.
Definition 7.7. Let ϕ be an instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. Then, in the context of
redSESM (ϕ), a set R ⊆ R1 ∪R2 ∪R3 is legal if it satisfies the following conditions.
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1. For all t ∈ [n] such that ρt ∈ R: For all i ∈ [q] and j ∈ [ai] such that xt ∈ N ij , ρij ∈ R.
2. For all i ∈ [q] and j ∈ [ai] such that ρij ∈ R, the two following conditions are satisfied.
(a) For all t ∈ [n] such that xt ∈ P ij , ρt ∈ R.
(b) For all k ∈ [ai] such that k 6= j, ρik ∈ R.
Define L = {R ⊆ R1 ∪R2 ∪R2 : R is legal}.
With the lemma, we begin to analyze the relations between L and S.
Lemma 7.12. Let ϕ be an instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. Let R ∈ L be a legal set of
redSESM (ϕ). Then, every sequence in R1 ∩ R is a µ∅-rotation, every sequence in R2 ∩ R is a
µR1∩R-rotation, and every sequence in R3 ∩R is a µ(R1∪R2)∩R-rotation.
Proof. First, note that for all ρij = ((m
i
j , w
i
j), (m̂
i
j , ŵ
i
j)) ∈ R1, it holds that ŵ
i
j = sµ∅(m
i
j)
and wij = sµ∅(m̂
i
j). Therefore, by Definition 2.5, every sequence in R1 ∩ R is a µ∅-rotation.
We thus have that µR1∩R is well defined as a stable matching. Now, consider some ρt =
((mt, wt), (m̂t, ŵt)) ∈ R2 ∩ R. By Condition 1 in Definition 7.7, we have that ŵt = sµR1∩R(mt)
and wt = sµR1∩R(m̂t). Therefore, by Definition 2.5, every sequence in R2 ∩ R is a µR1∩R-
rotation. We thus have that µ(R1∪R2)∩R is well defined as a stable matching. Finally, consider
some ρij = ((m
i
j , w
i
j), (m̂
i
j , ŵ
i
j)) ∈ R3 ∩ R. By Conditions 2a and 2b in in Definition 7.7, we
have that ŵij = sµ(R1∪R2)∩R(m
i
j) and w
i
j = sµ(R1∪R2)∩R(m̂
i
j). Therefore, by Definition 2.5, every
sequence in R3 ∩R is a µ(R1∪R2)∩R-rotation.
For the complementary direction of Lemma 7.12, we also require the following definition.
Definition 7.8. Let ϕ be an instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT, and let µ be a stable matching
of redSESM (ϕ). Then, the sets R1(µ), R2(µ) and R3(µ) are defined as follows.
• R1(µ) = {ρij ∈ R1 : µ(mij) = ŵ
i
j}.
• R2(µ) = {ρt ∈ R2 : µ(mt) = ŵt}.
• R3(µ) = {ρij ∈ R3 : µ(mij) = ŵij}.
In the context of the following lemma, recall that R(µ) is a notation defined in Section 2.3.
Lemma 7.13. Let ϕ be an instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. For any stable matching µ of
redSESM (ϕ), R(µ) = R1(µ) ∪R2(µ) ∪R3(µ).
Proof. The correctness of this lemma directly follows from Corollary 7.1 and Definition 7.8.
From Lemmata 7.12 and 7.13, we directly derive the following corollary.
Corollary 7.4. Let ϕ be an instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. Then, the set of all rotations
of redSESM (ϕ) is R1 ∪R2 ∪R2.
We have thus identified the vertex set of the rotation digraph DΠ. Let us now identify a
superset of the edge set of DΠ as well.
Definition 7.9. Let ϕ be an instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. Then, in the context of
redSESM (ϕ), the sets of ordered pairs of rotations, E12, E13 and E23, are define as follows.
• E12 = {(ρij , ρt) : ρij ∈ R1, ρt ∈ R2}.
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• E13 = {(ρij , ρij) : i ∈ [q], j ∈ [ai]}.
• E23 = {(ρt, ρij) : ρt ∈ R2, ρij ∈ R3}.
We can now easily conclude with the following result.
Lemma 7.14. Let ϕ be an instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. Then, the rotation digraph DΠ
of redSESM (ϕ) is a subgraph of HΠ = (R1 ∪R2 ∪R2, E12 ∪ E13 ∪ E23).
Proof. Definition 7.7 and Corollary 7.4 directly imply that the transitive closure of HΠ is a
supergraph of Π. Thus, by the definition of DΠ, we conclude the correctness of the lemma.
7.1.5 Treewidth
We are now ready to bound the treewidth of GΠ, the undirected underlying graph of the rotation
digraph DΠ.
Lemma 7.15. Let ϕ be an instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. Then, in the context of the
instance redSESM (ϕ) of SESM, the treewidth of GΠ is bounded by n+ 2 · 2pd.
Proof. By Lemma 7.14, GΠ is a subgraph of the underlying undirected graph of HΠ, which we
denote by H˜. Thus, to prove that the treewidth of GΠ is bounded by n + 2
pd, it is sufficient
to prove that the treewidth of H˜ is bounded by n + 2pd. Let H ′ denote the graph obtained
from H˜ by the removal of all of vertices in R2. Note that |R2| = n. Hence, to prove that
the treewidth of H˜ is bounded by n + 2pd, it is sufficient to prove that the treewidth of every
connected component of H ′ is bounded by 2 · 2pd. However, every connected component of H ′
consists only of the vertices in {ρij : j ∈ [ai]} ∪ {ρij : j ∈ [ai]} for some i ∈ [q]. Note that for
all i ∈ [q], ai ≤ 2|Xi| = 2pd. Thus, the size of every connected component of H ′ is bounded
by 2 · 2pd, and therefore it is clear that the treewidth of every connected component of H ′ is
bounded by 2 · 2pd as well.
7.1.6 Running Time
Let us first bound the number of agents constructed by our reduction, assuming that the size
of the input is not bounded by some fixed constant (since d is a fixed constant).
Observation 7.3. Let ϕ be an instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. Then, in the context of the
instance redSESM (ϕ) of SESM, the number of agents, |A|, is exactly 4(n+2q2pd)+α+1, which
is upper bounded by 8q.
Next, we define an algorithm SAT-ALG for s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT as follows. Given an
instance ϕ of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT, SAT-ALG construct the instance redSESM (ϕ) of SESM.
Then, it calls SESM-ALG with redSESM (ϕ) as input. If SESM-ALG determines that ∆ ≤ 100s4pd ·
n2, then SAT-ALG determines that ϕ is satisfiable, and otherwise it determines that ϕ is not
satisfiable.
Lemma 7.16. If SESM-ALG exists, then SAT-ALG solves s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT in time 2δn.
Proof. By Corollary 7.3 and Lemma 7.11, SAT-ALG solves s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT correctly. By
the running time of SESM-ALG, we note that SAT-ALG runs in time O(2tw|A|c). By Lemma 7.15
and Observation 7.3, we have that SAT-ALG runs in time O(2(n+2·2pd)8 csd n). Note that since
d = O(1), we further have that SAT-ALG runs in time O(2(+ 3csd )n). Since δ ≥  + 3csd , it holds
that SAT-ALG runs in time O(2δn).
Note that given the existence of SAT-ALG that solves s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT in time 2δn,
we have that SETH fails. Hence, we conclude that unless SETH fails, SESM cannot be solved
in time (2− )tw · nO(1) for any fixed  > 0.
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7.2 Balanced Stable Marriage
First, we prove that unless SETH fails, BSM cannot be solved in time (2− )tw · nO(1) for any
fixed  > 0, where n is the number of agents. Again, this claim is equivalent to the one stating
that unless SETH fails, BSM cannot be solved in time 2tw · nO(1) for any fixed  < 1. To prove
this claim, we suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exist fixed  > 0 and c ≥ 1 as well
as an algorithm BSM-ALG such that BSM-ALG solves BSM in time 2tw · nc.
7.2.1 Reduction
Denote δ =  + (1 − )/2 < 1. By Proposition 7.1, supposing that SETH is true, there ex-
ist integers p = p(δ) and s = s(δ) such that s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT cannot be solved in
time O(2δn). Let ϕ be an instance of p-CNF-SAT. We construct an instance redBSM (ϕ) =
(M,W, {pm}|m∈M , {pw}|w∈W ) of BSM in a manner that is identical to the one in which we
construct redSESM (ϕ) except for the following three modifications.
• For all i ∈ [q], we replace λ(i) = n20 · 22q−i by λ̂(i) = n20 · 4i−1.
• We replace α =
∑
i∈[q]
((ai − 1)λ(i)− γ(i)) + (2q − a˜)τ by the the following value.
α̂ = α−
∑
i∈[q]
(ai − 1)λ(i) +
∑
i∈[q]
(ai − 1)λ̂(i) =
∑
i∈[q]
((ai − 1)λ̂(i)− γ(i)) + (2q − a˜)τ.
Finally, let us define
η = 100s4pd · n2 + α̂+
∑
i∈[q]
(ai − 1)λ̂(i) + qτ
= 100s4pd · n2 + 2α̂+
∑
i∈[q]
γ(i) + (a˜− q)τ.
7.2.2 Proof Modification
Let us observe that since our modification to the reduction to SESM only concern the number
of happy pairs in total and is preference lists of some other agents. Hence, the rotation digraphs
of redBSM (ϕ) is identical to the rotation digraph of redSESM (ϕ). Hence, we immediately derive
the following version of Lemma 7.15.
Lemma 7.17. Let ϕ be an instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. Then, in the context of the
instance redBSM (ϕ) of BSM, the treewidth of GΠ is bounded by n+ 2 · 2pd.
Furthermore, it still holds that the number of agents in the reduction is upper bounded by
8q. Hence, the arguments given in Section 7.1.6 imply the if we show that for every instance ϕ
of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT, it holds that ϕ is a Yes-instance if and only our reduction is correct
in the sense that if the instance redBSM (ϕ) of BSM satisfies Bal ≤ η, then we would be able
to conclude that unless SETH fails, BSM cannot be solved in time (2 − )tw · nO(1) for any
fixed  > 0. In light of this observation, we next focus only on the proof of correctness of our
reduction.
7.2.3 Correctness
First, notice that Definitions 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 are also applicable to our current setting, that
is, where redSESM (ϕ) is replaced by redBSM (ϕ). Hence, exactly as in the case of SESM in
Section 7.1.2, we derive the following results.
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Corollary 7.5. Let ϕ be an instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. Then, in the context of
redBSM (ϕ), S = Λ.
Lemma 7.18. Let ϕ be an instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT, and let µ be a stable matching
of redBSM (ϕ). Then, there exist 0 ≤ x, y ≤ 100s4pd · n2 = O(n2) such that the two following
conditions hold.
• satM (µ) = 2α̂+
∑
i∈[q]
a(µ, i)γ(i) + b(µ)τ + x.
• satW (µ) = α̂+
∑
i∈[q]
(ai − a(µ, i))λ̂(i) + (a˜− b(µ))τ + y.
We next turn to modify the proofs of the forward and reverse directions in Section 7.1.3 to
handle our current reduction.
Forward Direction. We first show how given a truth assignment for an instance ϕ of s-Sparse
p-CNF-SAT that satisfies ϕ, we can construct a stable matching µ of redBSM (ϕ) whose balance
is at most 100s4pd · n2. Given a satisfying truth assignment f of an instance ϕ of s-Sparse
p-CNF-SAT, we define µfBSM exactly as µ
f
SESM (with the modification that we now match a
different number of happy agents to one another). Hence, exactly as in the case of SESM, we
obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 7.6. Let ϕ be a Yes-instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. Let f be a truth assignment
that satisfies ϕ. Then, µfBSM is a stable matching of redBSM (ϕ).
In light of Corollary 7.6, the measure bal(µfBSM ) is well defined. We proceed to analyze this
measure with the following lemma.
Lemma 7.19. Let ϕ be a Yes-instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. Let f be a truth assignment
that satisfies ϕ. Then, bal(µfBSM ) ≤ η.
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 7.7, we obtain that there exist 0 ≤ x, y ≤ 100s4pd · n2 such
that the two following conditions are satisfied.
• satM (µfBSM ) = 2α̂+
∑
i∈[q]
γ(i) + (a˜− q)τ + x.
• satW (µfBSM ) = α̂+
∑
i∈[q]
(ai − 1)λ̂(i) + qτ + y.
Thus, by the definition of η, we directly conclude that satM (µ
f
BSM ), satW (µ
f
BSM ) ≤ η.
Hence, bal(µfBSM ) ≤ η.
Combining Corollary 7.6 and Lemma 7.19, we derive the following corollary.
Corollary 7.7. Let ϕ be a Yes-instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. Then, for the instance
redBSM (ϕ) of BSM, Bal ≤ 1η.
This concludes the proof of the forward direction.
Reverse Direction. Second, we prove that given an instance ϕ of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT, if
for the instance redBSM (ϕ) of BSM, Bal ≤ η, then we can construct a truth assignment that
satisfies ϕ. We start our analysis with the following lemma.
Lemma 7.20. Let ϕ be a instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. Let µ be a stable matching of
redBSM (ϕ) such that bal(µ) ≤ η. Then, the following inequalities are satisfied.
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•
∑
i∈[q]
(a(µ, i)− 1)γ(i) ≤ 0.
•
∑
i∈[q]
(1− a(µ, i))λ̂(i) ≤ 0.
•
∑
i∈[q]
(a(µ, i)− 1)γ(i) + (b(µ) + q − a˜)τ ≤ 0.
•
∑
i∈[q]
(1− a(µ, i))λ̂(i) + (a˜− b(µ)− q)τ ≤ 0.
Proof. Since bal(µ) ≤ η, it holds that satW (µ), satM (µ) ≤ η. Recall that s, p, d = O(1). Now,
notice that τ = n10 > 100s4pd · n2, else the problem is solvable in polynomial time. Moreover,
for all i ∈ [q], λ̂(i) and γ(i) are divisible by n10. Thus, Lemma 7.5 implies that the following
inequalities are satisfied.
•
∑
i∈[q]
a(µ, i)γ(i) + b(µ)τ ≤
∑
i∈[q]
γ(i) + (a˜− q)τ .
•
∑
i∈[q]
(ai − a(µ, i))λ̂(i) + (a˜− b(µ))τ ≤
∑
i∈[q]
(ai − 1)λ̂(i) + qτ .
The inequalities above are equivalent to the following equalities.
•
∑
i∈[q]
(a(µ, i)− 1)γ(i) + (b(µ) + q − a˜)τ ≤ 0.
•
∑
i∈[q]
(1− a(µ, i))λ̂(i) + (a˜− b(µ)− q)τ ≤ 0.
Next, notice that as in the proof of Lemma 7.8, −2qn10 ≤ 2(a˜ − b(µ) − q)τ as well as
2(a˜− b(µ)− q)τ ≤ n12. Moreover, for all i ∈ [q], λ(i), γ(i) are divisible by n20. Thus, we derive
that the two first inequalities given in the statement of the lemma must also be satisfied.
Lemma 7.21. Let ϕ be an instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. Let µ be a stable matching of
redBSM (ϕ) such that bal(µ) ≤ η. Then, for all i ∈ [q], there exists j ∈ [ai] such that µ(mij) = ŵij
and for all k 6= j, µ(mik) = wik.
Proof. By Corollary 7.5, the statement of the lemma is equivalent to the statement that for all
i ∈ [k], a(µ, i) = 1. By Lemma 7.20, the following inequalities are satisfied.
1.
∑
i∈[q]
(a(µ, i)− 1)γ(i) ≤ 0.
2.
∑
i∈[q]
(1− a(µ, i))λ̂(i) ≤ 0.
Substituting γ(i) and λ̂(i) for all i ∈ [q] and dividing both sides by n20, we derive that the
following equalities are satisfied.
•
∑
i∈[q]
a(µ, i)2i−1 ≤ 2q − 1.
• 1
3
(4q − 1) ≤
∑
i∈[q]
a(µ, i)4i−1.
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However, these inequalities are precisely of the form of those obtained in the proof of Lemma
4.16, and hence we again derive that both of them can be satisfied simultaneously only when
for all i ∈ [k], a(µ, i) = 1.
Lemma 7.22. Let ϕ be an instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. Let µ be a stable matching of
redBM (ϕ) such that bal(µ) ≤ 100s4pd · n2. Then, for all i ∈ [q], there exists j ∈ [ai] such that
µ(mij) = w
i
j and for all k 6= j, µ(mik) = ŵ
i
k.
Proof. First, notice that by Lemma 7.8, it holds that the two following inequalities are satisfied.
•
∑
i∈[q]
(a(µ, i)− 1)γ(i) + (b(µ) + q − a˜)τ ≤ 0.
•
∑
i∈[q]
(1− a(µ, i))λ̂(i) + (a˜− b(µ)− q)τ ≤ 0.
However, by Lemma 7.21, we have that for all i ∈ [q], a(µ, i) = 1. Thus, the two equalities
above imply that (b(µ) + q− a˜)τ = 0. Having this equality at hand, the proof proceeds exactly
as the proof of Lemma 7.10.
Having Lemmata 7.21 and 7.22, the proof of following lemma is identical to the proof of
Lemma 7.11.
Lemma 7.23. Let ϕ be an instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT. If for the instance redBSM (ϕ)
of BSM, Bal ≤ η, then ϕ is a Yes-instance of s-Sparse p-CNF-SAT.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we studied Sex-Equal Stable Marriage, Balanced Stable Marriage,
max-Stable Marriage with Ties and min-Stable Marriage with Ties, four of the most
central NP-hard optimization versions of Stable Marriage, in the realm of Parameterized
Complexity. We analyzed these problems with respect to the parameter treewidth and presented
a comprehensive, complete picture of the behavior of central optimization versions of Stable
Marriage with respect to treewidth. Towards this, we established that all four problems are
W[1]-hard. In particular, while all four problems admit algorithms that run in time nO(tw), we
proved that all of these algorithms are likely to be essentially optimal. Next, we studied the
treewidth tw of the rotation digraph. For both SESM and BSM, we designed algorithms that
run in time 2twnO(1). Then, for both SESM and BSM, we also proved that unless SETH is
false, algorithms that run in time (2−)twnO(1) do not exist for any fixed  > 0. We believe that
our parameterized algorithms, W[1]-hardness reductions and SETH-based reductions will act as
a template to show similar results for other computational problems arising in Economics and
resource allocation. As a direction for further research, we suggest to conduct a comprehensive
study that measures various parameters, with emphasis on treewidth, of instances of Sex-
Equal Stable Marriage, Balanced Stable Marriage, max-Stable Marriage with
Ties and min-Stable Marriage with Ties that arise in real-world applications.
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A Parameterized Complexity
Let Π be an NP-hard problem. In the framework of Parameterized Complexity, each instance
of Π is associated with a parameter k. Here, the goal is to confine the combinatorial explosion
in the running time of an algorithm for Π to depend only on k. Formally, we say that Π is
fixed-parameter tractable (FPT) if any instance (I, k) of Π is solvable in time f(k) · |I|O(1), where
f is an arbitrary function of k. A weaker request is that for every fixed k, the problem Π would
be solvable in polynomial time. Formally, we say that Π is slice-wise polynomial (XP) if any
instance (I, k) of Π is solvable in time f(k) · |I|g(k), where f and g are arbitrary functions of k.
Nowadays, Parameterized Complexity supplies a rich toolkit to design FPT and XP algorithms.
Parameterized Complexity also provides methods to show that a problem is unlikely to be
FPT. The main technique is the one of parameterized reductions analogous to those employed in
classical complexity. Here, the concept of W[1]-hardness replaces the one of NP-hardness, and
for reductions we need not only construct an equivalent instance in FPT time, but also ensure
that the size of the parameter in the new instance depends only on the size of the parameter in
the original one. If there exists such a reduction transforming a problem known to be W[1]-hard
to another problem Π, then the problem Π is W[1]-hard as well. Central W[1]-hard-problems
include, for example, deciding whether a nondeterministic single-tape Turing machine accepts
within k steps, Clique parameterized be solution size, and Independent Set parameterized
by solution size. To show that a problem Π is not XP unless P=NP, it is sufficient to show that
there exists a fixed k such Π is NP-hard. Then, the problem is said to be para-NP-hard.
To obtain (essentially) tight conditional lower bounds for the running times of algorithms,
we rely on the well-known Exponential-Time Hypothesis (ETH) and Strong Exponential-Time
Hypothesis (SETH) [20, 21, 3]. To formalize the statements of ETH and SETH, first recall that
given a formula ϕ in conjuctive normal form (CNF) with n variables and m clauses, the task
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of CNF-SAT is to decide whether there is a truth assignment to the variables that satisfies
ϕ. In the p-CNF-SAT problem, each clause is restricted to have at most p literals. First,
ETH asserts that 3-CNF-SAT cannot be solved in time O(2o(n)). Second, SETH asserts that
for every fixed  < 1, there exists a (large) integer p = p() such that p-CNF-SAT cannot be
solved in time O((2 − )n). We remark that ETH implies FPT6=W[1], and that SETH implies
ETH. More information on Parameterized Complexity, ETH and SETH can be found in [8, 5].
B Treewidth
Treewidth is a structural parameter indicating how much a graph resembles a tree. Formally,
Definition B.1. A tree decomposition of a graph G is a pair (T, β) of a tree T and β : V (T )→
2V (G), such that
1. for any edge {x, y} ∈ E(G) there exists a node v ∈ V (T ) such that x, y ∈ β(v), and
2. for any vertex x ∈ V (G), the subgraph of T induced by the set Tx = {v ∈ V (T ) : x ∈ β(v)}
is a non-empty tree.
The width of (T, β) is maxv∈V (T ){|β(v)|} − 1. The treewidth of G is the minimum width over
all tree decompositions of G.
We use a standard form of a tree decomposition that simplifies the design of DP algorithms.
Definition B.2. A tree decomposition (T, β) of a graph G is nice if for the root r of T , β(r) = ∅,
and each node v ∈ V (T ) is of one of the following types.
• Leaf: v is a leaf in T and β(v) = ∅.
• Forget: v has one child, u, and there is a vertex x ∈ β(u) such that β(v) = β(u) \ {x}.
• Introduce: v has one child, u, and there is a vertex x ∈ β(v) such that β(v)\{x} = β(u).
• Join: v has two children, u and w, and β(v) = β(u) = β(w).
For v ∈ V (T ), we say that β(v) is the bag of v, and γ(v) denotes the union of the bags of
v and the descendants of v in T . According to standard practice in Parameterized Complexity
with respect to problems parameterized by tw, we assume that every input instance is given
to us along with a tree decomposition (of the appropriate graph, primal or GΠ) of width tw.
(Otherwise, such a decomposition can be computed using the means described in [5, 8].) Given
a tree decomposition (T, β), Bodlaender [1] showed how to construct a nice tree decomposition
of the same width as (T, β). Thus, from now onwards, when we design our algorithms, we
assume that we have a nice tree decomposition of the appropriate graph of width tw.
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